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This thesis explores the relationship between the British Conservative Party and the European 
Parliament. It will address three interlocking matters. First, it will examine the conduct of 
Conservative Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the European Parliament. It 
will show the difficulties they faced in their dealings with the largest centre-right grouping in 
the European Parliament, the European People’s Party (EPP). The thesis will contest the 
limited existing literature on Conservative MEPs which suggests that the two groupings 
struggled to work together because of differing ideological perspectives and religious 
orientations. It will instead argue that lukewarm relations were created because of differing 
opinions on key issues such as the European Parliament presidency election in 1982, and 
poor personal relationships between the two sets of MEPs. A decisive stage in the 
development of the relationship between the two came in 1992 when the British Conservative 
MEPs ceased in their efforts to operate their own centre-right grouping and joined the EPP. 
However, it will be shown that the merger between the two groupings was only achievable 
because of very fortuitous circumstances, indicating that the EPP was not a natural fit for the 
British Conservative MEPs.  
Secondly, the thesis will examine the relationship between Conservative MEPs and the 
domestic British Conservative Party, including its leadership and its Westminster 
representatives. MPs at Westminster consistently feared the possibility of MEPs undermining 
their role. Yet the thesis will argue that MEPs generally maintained relations with the 
Conservative leadership in this period, during the tenures of Edward Heath, Margaret 
Thatcher and John Major. Thatcher, particularly, was pragmatic and willing to work with the 
MEPs in key areas such as her efforts to achieve a partial rebate of the UK financial 




certain MEPs throughout her time as Conservative leader. At times during this period, some 
British Conservative MEPs did perceive a division between themselves and the British 
Conservative leadership and became disillusioned when they felt they were unable to work 
with the Conservative Party leadership or government departments when the party was in 
office at UK level. Nonetheless, as will be seen, Thatcher and Conservative MEPs interacted 
often at least until 1988 when she began to shift towards an increasingly Eurosceptic 
orientation. A consideration of Thatcher’s engagement with the European Parliament and the 
Conservative cohort within it adds an important new perspective to analysis of her overall 
attitude towards the Community. 
Lastly, the thesis will examine the development of the European Parliament as an institution 
and how the Conservatives as a whole reacted to these changes. Initially, the European 
Parliament had limited powers over the Community budget. By 1992 the European 
Parliament had gained more influence, achieving broad legislative authority despite 
scepticism about this development from within some member states (including Germany, 
France and the UK) who felt the European Parliament undermined national parliaments. 
Notwithstanding reservations among some domestic players in the UK regarding the role of 
the European Parliament, British Conservative MEPs throughout this period wanted to 
increase the credibility of the institution of which they were members. They were successful 
in this objective, contributing greatly to the European Parliament’s development. For 
instance, British Conservative MEPs were influential in shaping the rules of the European 
Parliament, which developed in ways that optimised its abilities to delay amendments, 
transactions and even the approval of the Community budget. 
The thesis corrects shortcomings in the existing literature, which fails fully to convey the 




under consideration, and which does not properly recognise the contributions made by the 
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The purpose of this thesis is to provide a detailed examination of the relationship between the 
European Parliament) and the British Conservative Party during the first nineteen years of the 
United Kingdom’s (UK) participation in European integration. It approaches this task with 
three central questions in mind: what did British Conservative Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) do in the European Parliament? What was the nature of the relationship 
between Conservative MEPs and the domestic British Conservative Party, including its 
leadership and representatives in the Westminster Parliament? How did the British 
Conservative MEPs and Members of Parliament (MPs) react to the developments in the 
powers and procedures of the European Parliament? These core questions will be used to 
develop a clear understanding of the relationship between the European Parliament and the 
Conservative Party. The timeframe of 1973 to 1992 has been picked because it encompasses 
the period between two milestones: British accession and the completion of the Single 
Market. During this time, Conservative MEPs helped influence and were required to respond 
to a number of significant developments both in the UK and European politics. It is a long 
enough period to enable the drawing of general conclusions, while still presenting a 
manageable research load for a single project.  
An important first task is to contextualise the thesis by describing the role of the European 
Parliament and how its influence increased during this period under consideration. The 
European Parliament in 1973 had three geographical places of operation: the committee work 
occurred in Brussels, the secretariat was in Luxembourg, and the plenary sessions were held 
in both Luxembourg and Strasbourg. These arrangements were clearly not ideal. Under the 




states.1 But since 1957, member states had been unable to agree on a single seat for the 
European Parliament, hence the three locations. Secondly, there were three different types of 
voting procedure in the European Parliament. Votes could be cast through a show of hands or 
through voting in the hemicycle, in which a button was pressed by the MEP to vote in favour, 
abstain or reject, the identity of the MEP remaining anonymous. The last method was through 
roll-calling in which MEPs had to verbally state their vote.2   
Since 1973 the European Parliament has undergone transformations greater than that of any 
other Community institution.3  The European Parliament in 1973 had two functions: it could 
dismiss the European Commission through a two-thirds majority vote, and it could approve 
or reject the non-compulsory budget of the Community, which consisted of only three per 
cent of the budget in 1973. In their detailed study of the European Parliament, Richard 
Corbett, Francis Jacobs and Michael Shackleton argue that due to these limited powers the 
European Parliament has always seen itself as an institution ‘requiring evolution’.4 Yet the 
European Parliament gained more influence with the signing of the Brussels Treaty in 1975. 
Under this treaty the European Parliament could audit the EU accounts and had the power to 
reject or approve the entire Community budget annually.5 The next development of the 
European Parliament came in 1979 when it became the only directly elected institute of the 
Community. Academics Juliet Lodge and Valentine Herman suggest that direct elections 
justified the European Parliament’s demand for more powers.6 But Mark Franklin observes 
 
1European Parliament Archive, Treaty of Rome article 216, 25 March 1957, p.74. 
2 R. Corbett, F. Jacobs, M. Shackleton, The European Parliament, (London: Catermill, 1999), pp.10-35. Their 
account also touches on the time commitments of a MEP. They suggest over the course of a month that MEPs 
spent one to two weeks working over the three locations, and the remainder of the time was spent on 
constituency work. Since direct elections in 1979 MEPs also worked with extra-Parliamentary delegations, 
which provided links to non-member states for instance the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly.  
3 Community in this thesis will refer to EEC later the EU as a whole which includes the Council of Ministers, 
the European Court of Justice, the European Commission and the European Parliament.  
4 R. Corbett, F. Jacobs, M. Shackleton, pp.294-307. 
5 Ibid.  




that low turnout for direct elections had a lasting impact and created ‘a crisis of legitimacy’ 
for the European Parliament.7 The British view of the European Parliament varied, the 
Conservatives under Heath initially wanted to legitimise its role. Moreover, Thatcher from 
1975 onwards supported direct elections and was in principle open to the prospect of the 
European Parliament gaining more influence. However, she was more pragmatic than Heath. 
Roger Scully in his account discusses her caution over the ambition of the European 
Parliament as she wanted to ensure that the majority of decision-making powers stayed with 
the Council of Ministers.8 Yet there were many that opposed the European Parliament, 
including both Conservative and Labour MPs.9 In his account Neil Nugent discusses how 
most of these MPs feared that the European Parliament presented a threat to the status of the 
Westminster Parliament.10 This thesis will demonstrate how these MPs regularly questioned 
the efficiency and cost of the European Parliament, focusing especially on those who were 
Conservatives. 
The powers of the European Parliament continued to increase in the following decade, as 
seen through the 1980 Isoglucose case which confirmed some of the existing powers of the 
European Parliament.11 In 1979 the Council of Ministers acted without consulting the 
European Parliament (the Council moved to submit a proposal regarding Isoglucose without 
the opinion of the European Parliament), and the matter was brought to the ECJ which ruled 
the Council’s actions void as an ‘essential procedural requirement’ had not been 
undertaken.12 The ruling suggested that the European Parliament had a prominent role to play 
in the Community. However, it would not be until the Single European Act (SEA) was 
 
7 M. Franklin, J. Richardson, ed., European Union: Power and Policy-Making, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), 
p.228. 
8 R. Scully in  B. Steunenberg,  J. Thomassen, ed., The European Parliament: Moving Toward Democracy in 
the EU, (Maryland: Rowman and Litlefield Publishers, 2002), p.130. 
9 Opposing the EP refers to those MPs who were openly hostile to the EP, and for reasons that will be discussed 
in the thesis, did not want to see its powers increase. 
10 See N. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, (London: Palgrave, 2015).  
11 The matter was regarding the use of Isoglucose as a sweeter for European cereals. See Nugent, p.242. 




passed in 1986 that the European Parliament gained a further increase in its powers. The SEA 
provided the European Parliament with the right to amend proposals that required Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV).13 The European Parliament also gained the power to approve the 
assent to future enlargements of the Community. The European Parliament also established 
the ‘court of first instance’ which meant that the Council of Ministers, having consulted both 
the European Parliament and Commission, could refer matters to a general constitutional 
court.14 Yet despite these expansions in the power of the European Parliament, the SEA 
defined the European Parliament as a ‘closely associated’ institution, and therefore as a lesser 
institution in terms of Community responsibility.15 Writing in her memoirs, Thatcher 
subsequently expressed regret at signing the treaty as it encroached on British sovereignty.16 
Andrew Geddes suggests that the signing of the SEA was a watershed moment for the 
Conservative government and ‘thereafter the Prime Minister moved to a more sceptical 
position’.17 The SEA was the first significant amendment to the Treaty of Rome and had 
granted the European Parliament more influence as it had to be consulted in many more areas 
of decision-making than in the past.  
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 meant the European Parliament, again, gained 
more influence. Under the treaty the European Parliament increased its ability to advise and 
amend proposals that required QMV, ‘allowing it to fulfil its role of democratic 
accountability’.18 Almost all areas where the Council of Ministers made legislative decisions 
were now discussed by the European Parliament. Moreover, decisions pertaining to matters 
such as structural and cohesion funds under the SEA were deemed under Maastricht to 
require an absolute majority of votes not only in the Council but also the European 
 
13 European Parliament Archive, The Single European Act, 29 June 1987. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 M. Thatcher, Downing Street, (London: HarperCollins, 1993). 
17 A. Geddes, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics: Opposition to Europe in the British 
Conservative and Labour Party since 1945, (London: Routledge, 2002), p.64. 




Parliament. After Maastricht the European Parliament’s assent was required for all other 
areas of the assent procedure, including decisions about electoral procedure and the accession 
of new member states.19 Additionally, under Maastricht, the European Parliament gained 
powers of legislative initiation, although this was limited to putting forward proposals to the 
Commission.20 The Maastricht Treaty signed under John Major created divisions within the 
Conservative Party. Nicholas Crowson observes that Major conducted negotiations in a 
manner consistent with Conservative governments of the past, yet by 1992 the Conservatives 
were more divided as ‘the tone and tenor of the debate had changed’.21  
This thesis will consider the contributions made by the Conservative MEPs to the 
development of the European Parliament, and the impact they had on relations with other 
groupings. The grouping had many successes including the implementation of a new form of 
question time in the European Parliament in 1973; the work of Christopher Prout in the Rules 
Committee to assist in defining the role of the European Parliament in the early 1980s; the 
introduction of Spanish members to the European Democratic Grouping (EDG) in 1986; and 
Henry Plumb becoming the first and only British European Parliament president in 1987. 
This work will also assess the failures of the British Conservative MEPs as they struggled to 
build strong relationships with the European People’s Party (EPP). The decision to sit 
independently in 1973 and the circumstances of the European Parliament presidency election 
of 1982 greatly impacted the relationship between the two and limited the amount of support 
the British Conservative MEPs received in relation to voting in the European Parliament. 
Moreover, the failure of the EDG to attract Greek MEPs in 1981 left it appearing to be a 
narrow British Conservative faction. This isolation worsened when in 1989 Spanish MEPs 
 
19 Under the Assent procedure the European Parliament must provide the Council of Ministers on two occasions 
for more see N. Nugent.   
20 Ibid. 
21 N. J. Crowson, The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945: At the Heart of Europe?, 




left the EDG. Moreover, owing to Thatcher’s actions over the Falklands, the rebate and later 
her Bruges speech, other groupings struggled to work with British Conservative MEPs. In 
1992 the EDG joined the EPP, which ultimately demonstrated that the EDG were unable to 
act as an effective alternative centre-right grouping to the EPP. The thesis will show that the 
merger was only possible between the dates of Thatcher’s resignation (23 November 1990) 
and the ERM crisis (16 September 1992), as prior to Thatcher’s resignation the EPP would 
not accept the EDG, and after the ERM crisis the hostility towards the Community by the 
Conservative Party would have prevented a merger. Hence, it was fortuitous that the merger 
occurred, which demonstrates that the EPP was not a natural fit for the EDG.  
The thesis will also examine the relationship between the Conservative MEPs and the 
Conservative Party in the UK, including its leadership and representation in the Westminster 
Parliament. It will show that, in the initial period, Heath was committed to extensive 
collaboration with his MEPs. Thatcher enjoyed close collaboration with them at very 
significant moments including the 1975 referendum, during the rebate debate in 1984 and 
even over the SEA in 1986. However, there was an overall deterioration in the relations 
between the two after the previously mentioned meeting of March 1983. The thesis will 
discuss how individual MEPs, such as Henry Plumb, Jim Scott-Hopkins, Christopher 
Jackson, Christopher Prout and Diane Elles, were able to work closely with Thatcher (and 
with Whitehall departments). It will be shown that through studying Thatcher’s interactions 
with British Conservative MEPs the thesis enriches the understanding of Thatcher’s views on 
the Community. The thesis will support the view of John Young in identifying similarities 
between Harold Wilson and Thatcher’s approach towards the Community.22 She took a 
pragmatic view on Community matters, and this work will show that this approach extended 
to her dealings with the EP. However, unlike Young, this will be shown through her working 
 




with the MEPs and European Parliament, thus contributing to the literature on Thatcher. The 
thesis will also show that towards the end of her tenure Thatcher's relationship with the 
Conservative delegation of MEPs worsened.  
The relationship between the Conservative MEPs and Major will also be discussed. Major 
cultivated strong links with his MEPs from the start of his premiership in 1990. Many MEPs 
believed that he was more approachable on sensitive matters than Thatcher. Major’s work 
with the Conservative MEPs supports the view that emerges from much of the literature 
about his premiership: that he was committed to balancing the different wings of the 
Conservative Party.23 However, most accounts do not include the MEPs in their analysis, 
despite the MEPs tending to be more pro-integrationist than the party as a whole. 
  
 




Literature Review: Conservative Party and European Integration 
 
The thesis broadly sits between two flourishing literatures: on Conservative Party history and 
European integration history. There has been much literature on both subjects that will be 
discussed in this section. The literature review will first examine the Conservative Party’s 
attitudes towards European integration and then move onto Labour’s involvement. The 
Labour Party played an important role in European integration which is worth examining. 
The chapter will then explore the European Parliament’s history and lastly examine the 
limited literature on the British Conservative MEPs.  
Conservative Party 
The Conservative Party has often acted as a supporter of UK participation in European 
integration and has contributed to various European projects. In 1945, in spite of losing a 
general election, Churchill sought an international role and believed Europe offered such a 
stage. In his Zurich speech Churchill stated that ‘we must build a kind of United States of 
Europe’.24 There has been much literature on the interpretation of this speech. Some, such as 
Alan Watson, have suggested that it marks the starting point of post-war European 
integration.25 However, historians such as John Young believe the speech was purposely 
ambiguous as Churchill ‘did not want to upset the Anglo-American relationship’.26 Yet Felix 
Klos has commented that the statement on Europe was vague since Churchill did not want the 
Soviet Union to feel challenged by a European bloc led by Britain.27 The literature around the 
speech shows Churchill’s ambivalence towards Europe. Historians such as Sue Onslow have 
suggested that there were three categories of Conservative thinking towards Europe in this 
 
24 University of Pittsburgh (UOP), European Integration Archive, Winston Churchill's speech [on a Council of 
Europe]. Zurich, 19 September 1946. 
25 A. Watson, Two Speeches to save the World, (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp.170-203. 
26 J.W. Young, p.21. 





period.28 These three groups existed due to Britain's different experiences, compared to 
European nations, in the Second World War.29 The first were the Europeanist outlook which 
favoured closer relations with Europe through ‘unspecified’ integration and closer 
collaboration but; at the level of nation states, not as part of a supranational organisation.30   
The second category were the ‘sceptics’ who gathered more traction in the lead up to the 
Hague Conference in 1948.31 These MPs again were not a formal group. They were 
characterised by their ambivalent views on Europe. The most notable MP from this group 
was Anthony Eden who had not made his views on Europe clear. He had stated in his internal 
correspondence during the war that ‘Britain was broke, Europe was even broker’,32 and saw 
Britain’s future as having an independent global role. However, his position was more 
complex (like the majority of this group) as he also saw the value of a harmonised Europe 
and even championed closer relations with France. The Hague Conference held in May 1948 
is of great importance as the formation of the Council of Europe was discussed. Churchill, as 
the man who led European democracy to victory in the war, was a central figure at the 
conference. Yet Nicolas Crowson observed that ‘Churchill’s European rhetoric was symbolic, 
lacking in specifics’,33 again suggesting Churchill’s ambivalence towards Europe. Much has 
been written about the significance of the Hague Conference. Jean Pateux refers to it as ‘one 
of the milestones on the path to Europe’34, while Desmond Dinan highlighted the importance 
 
28 See S. Onslow, Backbench Debate within the Conservative Party and its influence on British Foreign Policy, 
1948-57, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), or S. George, Britain and European Integration, (London: 
Blackwell, 1991). 
29 David Gowland, for example, notes that Britain, unlike mainland Europe, had escaped ‘wartime trauma of 
invasion, defeat and occupation. Also see D. Gowland, A. Turner, and A. Wright, Britain and European 
Integration since 1945: On the Sidelines, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), p.19. 
30 S. Onslow, pp.33-35. 
31 Ibid, p.35. 
32 The National Archives (TNA), HS 8/901, Correspondence with Eden, 7 December 1942. 
33 N.J. Crowson, p.15. 
34 J. Pateux, Democracy and Human Rights for Europe: The Council of Europe's Contribution, (Strasbourg: 




of Duncan Sandys and Peter Thorneycroft in the conference’s organisation.35 In his account, 
John Young also suggests the role it played in unifying European nations.36 The conference 
was significant as it demonstrated the influence Churchill had on an international stage 
despite being in opposition. By 1949 integration continued with the signing of the Statute of 
the Council of Europe. There was some hesitancy, as plans regarding the integration of 
Europe with the Commonwealth were suggested but were deemed unfeasible. Several 
accounts examine in detail the problems regarding the integration of the two entities.37 
The third group can be termed anti-Europeans. When the Schuman Plan was announced on 9 
May 1950 the group expanded.38 The Schuman Plan proposed to link the coal and steel 
industries of European nations through one organisation. British non-participation has been 
widely discussed. Robert Hogan has described the limited interest Whitehall departments 
took in the plan.39 John Young argues against this point suggesting Whitehall departments 
were interested; however, the Labour government and members of the Conservative Party 
feared a ‘third force’ would threaten the Anglo-American relationship.40 Sue Onslow 
suggests that Churchill was slow to react but realised the ‘Conservatives could not stomach 
open support for the [Schuman] plan’.41 In July 1950 Harold Macmillan and David Eccles 
published an alternative plan for a non-supranational coal and steel institution Nichloas 
Crowson suggests this ‘marked a turning point when a new breed of Conservatives first 
elected to Westminster nailed their colours to the European standard’.42 However, Onslow 
 
35 D. Dinan, p.43.  
36 J.W. Young, pp.20-21. 
37 See G. C. Peden, 'Economic Aspects of British Perceptions of Power', in Becker and Knipping, eds, Power in 
Europe?, (New York: Routledge, 1986), pp. 256-9. Or A. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 
1945-51, (California: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 335-61. Or J. Kent, ‘Bevin’s Imperialism and 
the Idea of Euro-Africa, 1945–49’. In: M. Dockrill., J.W.Young, eds, British Foreign Policy 1945-56, (London, 
Macmillan, 1989), pp. 47-76. 
38 See Onslow, p.30-50. 
39 M. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.48-51. 
40 J.W. Young, p.31. 
41 S. Onslow, p.65. 




correctly argues that the Macmillan-Eccles Plan was designed to be a compromise between 
the French and British positions, but also to reassert British leadership of Europe.43 
Furthermore in 1950 the Pleven Plan was proposed which sought to create a European 
Defence Community (EDC). The matter was further complicated as at the same time the 
USA raised questions about rearmament for West Germany a very sensitive matter for 
France. The EDC eventually failed due to the French National Assembly rejecting the 
proposal in August 1954. Much had been written about the EDC, John Young argues that its 
failure confirmed British doubts about the practicality of supranationalism for a time.44 
Nicholas Crowson argues that the EDC’s failure gave Eden the opportunity to resolve the 
issue of German rearmament within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
framework.45 Whilst Sue Onslow suggests the period form 1950-54 regarding the EDC 
further dissuaded Conservatives about the supposed attractions of European integration.46 
European integration would continue with the developments in Messina in 1955 and the 
signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and Britain participated in neither. Spencer Mawby 
argues that there were also fears amongst the Europeanists that European consolidation would 
proceed without Britain and that this would damage Britain’s global position.47 James Ellison 
has concluded that this was an important period as Anglo-French tensions became more 
acute.48 Efforts were thus made to approach Germany and France to negotiate a free trade 
agreement in 1958; both countries, however, rejected the idea. There has been much literature 
on the significance of the Treaty of Rome and Britain. Some historians, such as Martin 
Dedman, have referred to it as ‘a costly failure’ for Britain.49 Others believe that Britain's 
 
43 S. Onslow. P.70. 
44 J.W. Young, P.54.  
45 N.J. Crowson, p. 39. 
46 S. Onslow, pp.95-97. 
47 S. Mawby, Containing Germany: Britain and the Arming of the Federal Republic, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1999), p.77. 
48 J. Ellison, Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the European Community 1955-1958, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2000), p.9. 




'missed opportunities' lay further back in the refusal to engage with the Schuman Plan.50 
Regardless, it can be seen that Britain had many opportunities to engage with European 
developments prior to its first application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) 
in 1961. As can be seen Conservative opinion differed greatly towards European integration 
as it fundamentally raised questions for Britain’s position in the World. Some initially 
opposed a supranational organisation, and as seen from above, even those who were 
committed to engaging with Europe were still hesitant in entering a more federal system, 
favouring instead an intergovernmental framework approach. But by 1961 it was clear to 
Macmillan that the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) ‘was not delivering as 
expected’.51 Macmillan would thus seek British entry into the EEC. Again, Conservative 
attitudes towards accession differed as some feared what this meant for Commonwealth 
trade, whilst others feared the loss of Parliamentary sovereignty in a supranational 
organisation amongst other reasons which will be examined in greater detail in the 
background chapter.52  
More broadly, since accession in 1973 European integration has caused divisions within the 
Conservative Party as the Community evolved from common market to a single market. The 
Maastricht Treaty sign on 7 February 1992, established the European Union (EU) on three 
pillars: the European Communities, Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (JHA), and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It introduced European citizenship and 
launched the economic and monetary union (EMU) demonstrating how much the European 
project evolved in the time period this thesis covers. The literature regarding the Conservative 
Party has demonstrated the divisions this caused internally. Seldon and Ball state that 
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‘factionalism has been an endemic in the party.’53 Jonathan Turner argues that ‘in the modern 
Conservative Party Europe is fundamentally the basic divide running through the party.’54 
Richard Rose comments that ‘factionalism runs deeply within the Conservatives, although 
this has traditionally been behind ‘the façade of unity.’55 European integration has caused 
these divisions as it has brought into question Britain’s position in the world. Seldon and Ball 
have argued that Europe was a very sensitive topic for the Conservative Party as it touches on 
the legacy of the British Empire, referring to it as ‘a central integrating force within the 
party’.56 However, the decline of Empire has forced Britain to re-evaluate its position in the 
world and has led to closer relations with Europe. Due to the complex and sensitive issue of 
Britain's position in the world, more Conservative MPs after accession started to become 
increasingly hostile towards the Community and caused many problems for the party’s 
whips.57 The hostility by Conservative MPs also shows that the Community after accession 
was linked to the issue of party management. 
Baker, Gamble, and Ludlam also attempt to discuss the multidimensional effects of the 
Community on Britain. They argue that European integration has been decisive because it has 
linked crucial ‘debates about Britain’s role in the World political economy’.58 They highlight 
three factors which have provoked the most sustained and serious disputes over European 
integration. The first is the question that arises from Britain’s global position. They argue that 
European integration produced divisions within the Conservatives like those provoked by 
arguments over free trade and tariff reform in the early twentieth century. Secondly, it has 
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directly threatened both national identity and national sovereignty, which has undermined the 
party’s electoral position and ideology. Lastly, it has highlighted the division over state 
intervention and free market policies. Overall, Baker, Gamble, and Ludlam believe that the 
Conservatives were divided on two separate axes: national sovereignty and interdependence 
on the one hand, and a divide over extended and limited government on the other.59 Their 
account (like Seldon and Ball’s) show the difficulties faced by the Conservatives because a 
choice had to be made about Britain’s role in the world. The question of this role has had an 
obvious impact on the party’s leadership as it has often had to find an appropriate response to 
the European question, which has been challenging as Europe proved an issue which could 
easily divide the party. 
Furthermore, Nicholas Crowson has also stressed that the Conservatives maintained a 
consistent pro-European wing within the party, even if at times this was in a minority. He 
refers to this group of Conservatives as ‘Europeanists’ on a number of occasions.60 Crowson 
discusses the role of groups such as the Conservative Group for Europe, the Macleod Group, 
the Blue Chip Group, and the Positive Group for Europe. He explains how these different 
groups have attempted to present their pro-European views and suggests that there was a 
correlation between centrist-leaning Conservative MPs and pro-European ideas.61 Yet 
Crowson overlooks a component of the party that might have strengthened his thesis, namely 
the Conservative MEPs who consistently had a strong pro-European element. Anthony 
Forster takes a different perspective to Crowson, emphasising the importance of 
Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party in post-war politics. He holds that Europe has 
periodically changed and thus opposition towards Europe has come from different parts of 
the party. Opposition towards Europe was originally against ‘the common market; it then 
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changed to opposition against political and monetary union.’62 Forster does suggest, however, 
that the Europe issue has never transcended party loyalty.63  
Furthermore, there has been much work on Britain’s position in the world which also 
encompasses the Conservative Party’s attitude towards Europe. Christopher Bartlett correctly 
emphasises the importance of the Cold War during the period of 1973-92 and the effects it 
had in shaping Europe.64 Andrew Geddes, like Forster’s work mentioned above, also suggests 
the importance of the Community in British political thought. Geddes argues that the 
Community has ‘Europeanised’ British politics as it became a central topic for debate 
throughout the 1980s.65 His work also demonstrates the divisions Europe caused within the 
Conservative Party. However, Hugo Young’s account, which examines Euroscepticism, 
concludes that anti-European feelings have been a traditional aspect of British politics and 
represents nothing new. He also suggests opposition to Europe has traditionally come from 
all areas of the political spectrum. Nonetheless he concludes that ‘at important moments 
[Thatcher] gave Europe the loudest agenda’.66  
The later part of the thesis covers the replacement of Thatcher by John Major as leader of the 
Conservative Party. The specific topic of John Major’s time as Prime Minister has been much 
discussed. John Young suggests that the early years of Major’s premiership were marked by 
Major trying to maintain ensure party unity. Young comments that ‘with an election 
necessary by June 1992, and deeper division between pro and anti–Europeans in the 
Conservative Party thanks to the leadership contest, he had to prevent EC issues upsetting 
domestic politics’.67 Lastly, Helen Thompson comments on the significance of the ERM 
Crisis for the Major government. Her work illustrates the deep divisions Europe caused, and 
 
62 A. Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 4. 
63 Ibid. 
64 C. Bartlett, British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, (London: Palgrave, 1989), pp.92-122. 
65 A. Geddes, The EU and British Politics (London: Palgrave, 2003), p.5.  
66 H. Young, This Blessed Plot Churchill to Blair, (London: Macmillan, 1999), p.306. 




how it shifted the Conservative Party into a more Eurosceptic stance.68 It specifically tracks 
the ERM and the Conservative government between 1979 and 1994. The later period from 
1988-92 regarding ERM will be discussed in this thesis. The literature described in these 
section shows that the period under examination was a turbulent one and that the Community 
was a central concern for the Conservative Party from 1973 to 1992.  
  
 






It is, however, difficult to understand the Conservative Party’s relationship with the 
Community without understanding the internal situations of other parties during this period. 
Labour had been greatly involved with the Community, which had in turn affected the 
Conservative Party’s approach to Europe. Moreover, Labour encountered similar problems to 
the Conservatives over the European issue. Harold Wilson in 1967 re-applied for EEC 
membership, an event which has been covered in detail by Helen Parr. She highlights that the 
second application made the idea of accession more acceptable to Westminster.69 John Young 
also describes how Wilson attempted to work with De Gaulle to ‘win the General over to 
British membership’.70 In his second term Wilson persisted in his determination despite the 
debates surrounding the Community on account of deep divisions in the Labour Party over 
membership. The 1975 referendum illustrated best how divided both parties were over 
Europe with cross-party alliances occurring, such as the Tony Benn–Enoch Powell 
relationship. Robert Saunders in his account states that the different ‘allegiances opened a 
space for an unusual array of campaign focuses.71 Stephen Wall establishes that Wilson’s 
inability to resolve divisions within the Labour Party ‘forced him to commit to a 
referendum’.72 In their account, Butler and Kitzinger fully explore the 1975 referendum and 
the significant impact it had on Britain’s relationship with the Community.73 Moreover, 
despite the referendum result Labour would remain deeply divided over membership with the 
creation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981. Rachel Holden supports this view and 
even suggests that Europe attributed to the lack of electoral success on the part of the Labour 
 
69 H. Parr, Britain’s Policy towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 1964-
1967, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp.114-133. 
70 J.W. Young, p.89. 
71 R. Saunders, Yes to Europe! The 1975 Referendum, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2018, p.8. 
72 S. Wall, The Official History of Britain and the European Community, Vol. II: From Rejection to Referendum, 
1963-1975, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p.557. 




Party from 1979 onwards.74 Labour did, however, change its stance on Europe significantly 
under Neil Kinnock after the 1983 general election when it had advocated withdrawal. 
Mitchell and Heller observe that the party from 1983 onwards ‘viewed Europe as an 
opportunity rather than a threat’.75 Kenneth Morgan suggests that for the Labour leadership 
the European Community policies overlapped with two areas of concern: economic policy 
and party unity.76 Kinnock also saw Europe as an opportunity to modernise the Labour Party. 
The Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) published in 1980 gave rise to the potential of an 
Alternative European Strategy which Kinnock supported. The European Strategy 
acknowledged Britain’s position in the world, and the need for interdependence between 
Britain and Europe. This was all part of Labour’s broader policy review process which was 
aimed at evaluating party organisation and party unity.77 Kinnock attempted to move the 
party away from the far left, though the main purpose of this policy review process was to 
allow the leadership to have more control over the direction of the overall party. As seen 
from the literature discussed Labour did play a role in Britain’s relationship with the 
Community.  
European Parliament 
Another issue recognised in much of the literature involves the way in which the EU 
developed and the way in which Britain had to adapt in response. An important part of such 
analysis is the tension that emerged between different European institutions. It is traditionally 
argued that Britain, Germany, and France have wanted the powers of decision-making to 
reside mainly within the Council of Ministers.78 They have perceived the European 
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Parliament as a supranational institution that would take sovereignty away from member 
states. Despite this, the EP has developed profoundly since British accession.  
However, in his account, Neil Nugent suggests that the European Parliament has weaknesses 
in three areas. The first is that the European Parliament, unlike national parliaments, does not 
have full legislative powers. The final decision of what becomes law is decided by the other 
Community institutions. The Council of Ministers could even overturn European Parliament 
amendments that have or have not been suggested to the European Commission. Secondly, 
the EP is expected to deliver opinions as early as possible to the Council of Ministers. This 
has proved a difficult task to complete quickly due to the slow bureaucratic process of 
consultation, which has been exacerbated over time as the European Parliament has grown in 
size substantially. As a result, the Council often adopts a ‘common position’ before the 
European Parliament provides its opinion. This is particularly the case when urgent actions 
are required due to sudden developments in areas of concern that side-line the European 
Parliament’s influence. Another weakness is that the European Parliament is often not 
consulted on Council legislation. It lacks any right to be consulted on most external 
negotiations which the Council conducts with third-party countries on behalf of the EU. The 
EP’s approval is not even required when trade agreements are concluded. Lastly, the 
European Parliament does not have to be consulted on Commission legislation.79 Nugent’s 
work demonstrates the evaluation of the European Parliament and this thesis will also 
examine the European Parliament’s powers, and how the British Conservative MEPs 
contributed in making the European Parliament more influential in the period from 1973 to 
1992. 
 




Guglielmo Carchedi observes that many have argued this is ‘another example of executive 
power, and legislative and democratic weakness’.80 It has highlighted the major weaknesses 
of the EP. However, the EP has clearly assumed an increasingly important role in the EU. 
The work of Helen Wallace specifically discusses how the powers of the European 
Parliament grew in the period between 1973 and 1992. She singles out the importance of the 
Single European Act (SEA) and how it embedded wider institutional changes to the 
Community.81 She goes on to explain how the SEA increased the European Parliament’s 
influence. John Peterson and Michael Shackleton build on Wallace’s work and explain where 
the EP fits into the decision-making process in the Community. Their work assesses the four 
main institutions of the Community and argues that the EP plays an ever-growing role, 
particularly after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007.82  
Overall, the European Parliament is still not regarded as a ‘proper parliament’ due to its 
formal powers being weaker than national parliaments. However, the European Parliament 
does have influence in several areas that make it a key component of the decision-making 
process in the Community. The European Parliament as an institution has also been studied 
particularly by Richard Corbett. Having been a Labour MEP (1996-2014) Corbett’s account 
provides a first-hand insight into the workings of the European Parliament. Moreover, his 
work argues the growing need for European Parliament groupings to be diverse.83 Diversity 
was a concern that the British Conservative MEPs struggled with throughout the period of 
1973-92. Simon Hix enhances Corbett’s account as he discusses the work of a MEP and how 
decision-making occurs in the Community. He cites that decisions were taken mainly in 
committee and not in the hemicycle. Moreover, his work highlights the need for MEPs to 
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negotiate with one another to achieve a desired result.84 Lastly, Desmond Dinan gives one of 
the most significant accounts into the study of European integration. His work tracks 
European integration, providing insight from all the Community institutions. Moreover, in his 
chapters dedicated to Britain’s contributions to the Community, he discusses the role of the 
Conservative Party in Europe and even discusses the relationship between the Community 
and Thatcher. Dinan explains how the passing of the SEA and the gaining of powers by the 
European Parliament frustrated the Conservative government.85 He also concludes that 
Thatcher’s legacy on gaining concessions from the Community meant that 'defending 
Britain's rebate became an article of faith for subsequent Prime Ministers' and other nations 
that sought concessions.86 This section has illustrated the weaknesses of the European 
Parliament and outlines the significant existing literature on the EP's development over time, 
on which this thesis will draw. 
British Conservative MEPs 
There is less literature specifically examining the British Conservative MEPs. In their 
account, Nelsen and Guth examine the relationship between the EPP and the British 
Conservative MEPs. They track the long history of religion, conservatism, and European 
unity.87 It is commonly agreed that continental Conservatives (and some in Britain) believed 
that Western Europe as an entity can be unified by their common experiences of ‘Latin 
Christianity’.88 Moreover, in the original cohort of MEPs, the Christian Democrats (CDs) had 
emphasised the role of religion even through the selection of the grouping’s name. They 
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would later change this to the European People’s Party (EPP) to ensure the grouping appealed 
to a larger demographic and thus attract MEPs from different groupings. Yet religion did 
remain a core aspect of the EPP, in terms of unifying a diverse group of European nations. 
Nelsen and Guth believe this affected the relationship the British Conservative MEPs had 
with the EPP. In his examination of religion in British politics, Paul Bugge states that religion 
played a lesser role for the British Conservatives, although not specifically mentioning the 
MEPs.89 Yet Heuser and Buffet have emphasised the importance of religion and decision-
making from an EPP perspective, which led to tensions between the two groupings.90 Their 
work supports the views of Nelsen and Guth.  However, Tony Jensen, who was the former 
Secretary General of the EPP (1988-92), gives a much more detailed first-hand account of the 
British Conservative MEPs. He states that ‘Conservative MEPs understood, before their party 
friends in Westminster or in Central Office, that Britain’s future is at the heart of Europe’.91 
Caroline Jackson has also specifically examined British Conservative MEPs from 1973 to 
1979. In her work she examines the early workings of the grouping and discusses at length 
the contributions the MEPs made to the EP, namely the introduction of a new question time.92 
However, this thesis will go into more detail regarding the British Conservative MEPs’ 
conduct as it benefited from access to more recent and relevant archival material. As a result, 
the thesis goes beyond Jackson’s work and highlights the early difficulties the British MEPs 
faced, particularly in their dealings with other groupings and the eventual decision taken to sit 
independently, which had a lasting impact. Moreover, this thesis will show that the divide 
that occurred between the EDG and EPP was not only from a religious perspective. Tensions 
arose through differing personalities and various episodes between the two groupings, the 
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two largest being the decision of the British Conservatives in 1973 not to sit with the CDs, 
and the EP Presidency election in 1982. Both events had a long-lasting impact until the 
merger between the two groupings in 1992.  
From the historiography discussed above, it can be seen that the Conservative Party has had 
long-term difficulties regarding Europe that have impacted the party. Broadly, this thesis 
draws together and puts into dialogue the literature on European integration history and 







From the literature review and introduction, it can be seen that there are clear gaps in the 
historiography which this thesis sets out to fill.93 To this end an archival research approach 
was taken to address these concerns. There are a number of sources that were consulted to 
gain a better understanding of these themes. There are six main archives that were thoroughly 
researched: the Bodleian Library, the Churchill Archive Centre, the National Archive, the 
University of Pittsburgh European Integration Archive, the British Library newspaper archive 
and oral testimonies.  
The Bodleian Library hosts an array of sources that are vital to this thesis. The thesis refers to 
the papers of many Conservative MEPs who have deposited their private papers at the 
Bodleian. Peter Kirk’s private papers are of critical importance as he led the Conservative 
delegation in 1973 and was subsequently the Conservative Grouping’s leader until 1977.94  
The Conservative Central Office (CCO) holds the majority of the MEP grouping’s papers. 
The material includes minutes from meetings, MEP publications, notes from study days and 
committee reports. Moreover, the Conservative Research Department (CRD) has a significant 
amount of material regarding the EP as well as wider Community concerns. It holds many 
papers regarding the three European Elections this thesis covers (1979, 1984 and 1989), as 
well as research on specific matters regarding MEPs.95 After conducting research it was clear 
that the CCO holds more records relating to the MEPs than the CRD which does show that 
the Conservative MEPs were engaging more with the CCO and had limited interaction with 
the CRD unless it was in the lead up to a European Election. This differs greatly to some 
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Conservative MPs who tended to work more closely with the CRD. The reason this occurred 
was because MEPs tended to rely on European Parliament support staff (such as grouping 
coordinators who were hired by individual groupings) and committees to gather research or 
campaign in the European Parliament, they chose to work with the CRD only when it was 
specifically around a European election.96 This differed to some Conservative MPs who 
relied more on the CRD and thus an early difference in the way MEPs and MPs worked can 
be seen through this archive. 
Another source that was relied upon was the Thatcher Papers deposited in the Churchill 
College Archive. These were of great value for illustrating Thatcher’s as well as other senior 
Conservative members’ attitudes towards the European Parliament. Moreover, they also show 
how Conservative MEPs fitted into the overall Conservative Party. The archive has a 
substantial number of documents regarding Thatcher’s shadow cabinet from 1975 to 1979. 
These documents are particularly useful as it allows the thesis to show what the Conservative 
MEPs did during the 1975 referendum.97 The Churchill College Archive also fills the deficit 
of the National Archives in this period regarding the Conservative Party. There are extensive 
records on briefings which highlight the attitudes of Conservative members towards the EP. 
Lastly, the Thatcher Papers indicate how Thatcher’s attitudes hardened towards Europe and 
the impact this change had on Conservative MEPs. The archive also holds the private papers 
of prominent MEPs, including Christopher Prout, the leader of the Conservative MEPs from 
1988, and Sir Frederick Catherwood, a MEP for Cambridgeshire from 1979 to 1994. 
Moreover, some private papers such as Douglas Hogg’s and Patrick Gordon-Walker’s 
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(despite being part of the Labour party) also provide insight into the workings between the 
EP and Westminster. 
The National Archives was of great importance, as it holds papers for all the government 
administrations in the period examined in this thesis. Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
papers (FCO Series) were referred to since Britain’s interaction with the European Parliament 
was recorded in these. In addition, the Prime Ministers’ papers (PREM Series) were 
examined, particularly for the content relating to European Council meetings and discussion 
of policy towards Europe. Council meetings were important because they were the forum in 
which member states made decisions on all matters, including those regarding the European 
Parliament (such as direct elections, and the size and site of the EP). Cabinet papers (CAB 
Series) were also useful. They showed the differing views within and between cabinets 
towards the Community, and in particular the European Parliament. They also provided 
evidence of how the British government saw Britain’s position in the world, with regards to 
both Europe and the Anglo-American relationship. Cabinet papers also reveal attitudes 
towards the European Parliament. The thesis will come on to show the importance of the 
European Parliament during the budget rebate, however, there was a lack of material in 
Treasury papers relating to the European Parliament showing the limited engagement that the 
department had with British MEPs.98 Moreover, as well be shown in the thesis those MEPs 
that were able to build relations with departments chose instead to work directly with the 
Cabinet Office and Number Ten. 
The University of Pittsburgh’s European Integration Archive was of great assistance to this 
project. It has an extensive collection on the Community and holds records of all European 
Parliament debates, which explore the relationship between Conservative MEPs and their 
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European counterparts. It shows that MEPs were more willing to work across party lines, and 
this was also the case for British MEPs. In turn these debates also show the attitudes of the 
various groupings towards each other and the development of the European Parliament as an 
institution. These files also depict how Conservative MEPs interacted with one another. The 
archival material is of great value because, from accession in 1973, the Conservatives created 
their own grouping. Understanding how a new group developed is another aspect that has 
been neglected in the literature that this thesis builds on. The archive also holds minutes from 
the various EP committees as well as European Council meetings. Thus it can be used to gain 
an understanding of how decision-making in the Community occurs. It also demonstrates the 
way in which the institutional structure of the Community changed over time and the growing 
role of Conservative MEPs. The minutes from committees also show the relationship British 
Conservative MEPs held with Continental European MEPs.   
Additionally, the British Newspaper Archive was consulted for this project. Newspapers were 
used to gain a better understanding of public discourse around the European Parliament. It 
was particularly useful to examine newspapers during the run up to direct elections, as these 
provide evidence of the nature of campaigns by MEPs. This in turn shows what issues 
concerning the EP and Community were regarded as important to the public by the MEPs and 
the media. Archival papers from The Economist, The Times, and The Financial Times 
assisted greatly with this research. These papers helped illustrate the views of Conservative 
figures as many wrote articles on Europe. Newspapers also show the role of the media in this 
period and how different papers viewed the developments of the Community. The 
newspapers helped develop an in-depth knowledge of British public debate surrounding the 
EP as it gained new powers and responsibilities throughout this period. Moreover, as this 
thesis looks at dates beyond 1988, newspapers become more important in the latter part of 




Newspapers such as The Sun, The Daily Mail, and The Daily Mirror were consulted but these 
newspapers had very few contributions by Conservative MEPs compared to The Economist, 
The Times, The Financial Times, and even The Guardian which supports an argument of the 
thesis that Conservative MEPs were willing to work across traditional party lines. 
Lastly, this thesis relied on oral testimonies. Twenty interviews were conducted with either 
Conservative MEPs or support staff who worked in the European Parliament. An effort was 
made to speak to as many MEPs that were still alive and willing to be approached; some were 
unable to partake due to ill health or were unavailable. Barring one, interviews were 
conducted on a one-to-one basis. The interviews themselves were semi-structured and were 
used to develop an understanding of the work on a MEP both domestically and in the 
European Parliament. Interviews also provided an opportunity to understand what these 
MEPs felt the major challenges were for them specifically. The interviews did show that 
depending on the constituency the job domestically varied between cities and rural seats as 
matters such as the fisheries policy and Common Agriculture Policy mattered more in rural 
seats. Approximately fourteen of these interviews were directly relevant to the thesis, as they 
provided insight into of how the Conservative MEPs worked. They also built on certain areas 
where the archival records were limited. They assisted in discerning the relationship between 
various actors in Europe, for instance, between British MEPs and Commissioners as there 
was very limited archival material in this area specifically. Interviews with MEPs also 
highlighted how the EP worked in practice, as many MEPs sat on a variety of European 
Parliament committees. These committees passed through many changes as the Community 
enlarged. Yet a record of how they developed cannot be clearly found in archival records. 
These interviews also provide insight into the relationship between MEPs and Westminster. 
Due to the timing of this thesis, which was researched in the lead up to and aftermath of the 




saw the interviews as a forum to voice their opinions on present-day affairs regarding 
Brexit.99 Moreover, when I initially started this thesis I struggled to conduct oral interviews, I 
was fortunate enough to secure a job working alongside Anthony Seldon, this furthered my 
ability and confidence in interviewing and thus fourteen of these interviews were used 
directly in this thesis. The remaining six were also very beneficial but were not directly used 
in the thesis. Considering the current political climate, it was also important to handle 
testimonies carefully. Furthermore, there are already a number of oral interviews that have 
been conducted by various institutions and historians regarding Europe and the Conservative 
Party. The Institute of Contemporary British History had many witness seminars on matters 
such as the Common Agricultural Policy, which were also drawn upon.100 Moreover, the 
European University Institute hosts the official EU archives, where interviews with former 
British political actors who were involved in the Community are deposited.  
There were also other archives and material that was consulted to provide completeness to the 
thesis. One Conservative MEP, Michael Welsh (MEP from 1979 to 1994), allowed access to 
his diaries, kept from 1979 to the present day, which was a valuable resource for this thesis. 
They provide a unique first-hand account of meetings held in the European Parliament’s 
committees and meetings at Number Ten with the Prime Minister. The European Parliament 
Archive located in Luxembourg was also consulted. It holds many of the groupings’ papers, 
including those of the British Conservatives, and has a clear record on how groupings voted 
and interacted with one another. Moreover, the library has papers from the Community’s civil 
service and best displays the interaction between the EP and other Community institutions. It 
also holds the reports of the committees the Conservative MEPs worked on, providing 
evidence of their attitudes on a number of subjects. Hansard is also important as the debates 
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in Westminster demonstrate the attitudes of MPs towards the Community. Furthermore, there 
are two memoirs of former Conservative MEPs that were used: Andrew Pearce’s, who was 
an MEP from 1979 to 1989, and Henry Plumb who was leader of Conservative MEP 
delegation from 1982 to 1987.101 Plumb’s work was particularly beneficial in providing a 
direct account of events from a senior Conservative MEP perspective. Lastly, Parliamentary 
Archives (where possible) were consulted as select committees examined specific 
Community matters that related to the European Parliament.102 
There are issues that, though significant do not fall directly within the scope of the thesis and 
these will be outlined. Firstly, it does not explore in-depth constituency work of MEPs. MEPs 
spent a considerable amount of times working in their constituencies and building local 
relationships. MEP consistency boundaries differed from MP boundaries.103  As a result, 
MEPs dealt with several MPs in their constituencies. However, as each constituency differed, 
so did the environment in which the MEPs worked. Some MEPs felt less detached from 
Westminster due to the relations they had with the Westminster MPs within their 
constituencies, while the experiences of other MEPs were more negative. Furthermore, this 
thesis does not explore in great detail the history of Labour MEPs, who attended in 1976 and 
joined the Socialist Grouping. The Conservative MEPs did on occasion have to react to what 
the Labour MEPs did in the European Parliament, however, the Labour MEPs relationship 
and work in the European Parliament differed from that of the Conservatives. Lastly, the 
thesis was not able to cover all aspects of European Parliament committee work. The 
majority of work in the EP occurred in committees after 1979. There were a total of 28 
committees in the period from 1973 to 1992 hence it would be difficult to cover all of these. 
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The thesis will instead focus on three of the more prominent ones that influenced the 
Conservatives in this period: the Political Affairs Committee, the Budget Committee and the 
Rules Committee.104 These committees clearly demonstrate the relationship between MEPs 
and MPs as well as highlighting the more significant contributions made by the MEPs. 
Regardless, of the areas that cannot be covered, the evidence considered for this thesis is 
sufficient to address the three core questions outlined in the introduction. 
The thesis is divided into four sections as seen in the table of contents. Section one consists of 
two chapters examining directly what the British Conservative MEPs did in the European 
Parliament and then moves on to discuss the difficulties around direct elections. Section two, 
has two chapters, the first broadly addresses the domestic situation of the UK in this earlier 
period and how the MEPs built relations with the Conservative leaders (Heath and later 
Thatcher). The second chapter looks at Mediterranean enlargement of the Community (Greek 
and potential Turkish membership) and the EMS. It will show how MEPs and MPs worked 
together and shared similar views on these developments. The approach for section one to 
look at MEPs and then section two to explore the broader domestic situation was taken 
because it was important to immediately establish the complexities of the European 
Parliament and the working environment of the MEPs. Furthermore, it demonstrates what 
these MEPs wanted to achieve in the European Parliament (making it a functioning and 
credible institution) and this is vital to understand prior to addressing domestic concerns. 
There is then a concluding chapter for the 1970s as with direct elections complete in 1979, 
the European Parliament rapidly evolves thus it is important to have a concluding chapter that 
discusses the themes of the European Parliament prior to direct elections as the decisions 
made in the period from 1973 to 1979 shaped the future of the European Parliament. 
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Section three addresses the Conservative Party and MEPs in the period from 1980 to 1985 
and is broken down into three chapters. The first shows the significant impact the 1982 
European Parliament presidency election has on the relationship between the European 
Democratic Group (EDG) and the European Peoples Party (EPP). The second chapter 
displays how the EDG expanded their grouping size through gaining Spanish MEPs. The 
third chapter discusses the 1983 general election and the relationship between MEPs and MPs 
through examining two reports commissioned by the European Parliament, the Northern 
Ireland report and the Falklands report. 
Section four explores the period from 1986-1992 and is broken into three chapters. The first 
chapter will show how the Single European Act was passed and later the Maastricht Treaty. It 
will examine the role of the MEPs and how these two treaty ratifications increased the 
powers of the European Parliament. The second chapter addresses Thatcher’s resignation and 
it will demonstrate how John Major was able to quickly and effectively work with MEPs 
during the Maastricht negotiations. The final chapter will explore the merger between the 






Background Chapter 1961-73: Applications to the EEC 
 
To understand Conservative attitudes from 1973 onwards, it is important to assess the first 
application under Harold Macmillan. The history of the Conservatives and the Community in 
the 1960s rests significantly on why the first application was made, and the divisions it 
created within the party. The following background chapter will examine briefly the three 
applications and highlight the importance of Heath’s Europeanism that affected the 
Conservative Party from 1965. During this period Britain had to balance its interests between 
the US, the Commonwealth and Europe which caused internal division in the Conservative 
Party.  
The EEC in this period would undergo many changes and these changes began in the early 
1960s when French industrialists became more supportive of the EEC. Initially, this group 
opposed integration, fearing that German industry would flood French markets with cheaper 
goods making French industry uncompetitive.105 However, French industrialists changed 
their stance, as by 1960 they understood that they would have to inevitably work with 
Germany and other states. Due to this, French industrialists started working on joint 
production and marketing agreements with companies in the Benelux states and Germany. 
However, the French industrialists who were quickly becoming committed to integration 
grew frustrated at the cautious pace integration was taking place.106 The French industrialists 
in this period would become a main pressure group for the accelerated development of the 
EEC.  
A vital factor in this was the European Commission in its role as a broker, responsible for 
attaining German and French rapprochement. The key figures in this process of heightened 
cooperation were Walter Hallstein, the President of the Commission, and Sicco Mansholt, the 
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senior vice-president of the Commission, who was heavily involved in integration and 
agriculture. Wilfrid Loth has observed that the two ensured that both France and Germany 
benefited from these new arrangements.107 There was an industrial common market that 
would benefit Germany, and a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), established by the 
Commission, which would greatly benefit France. Despite the efforts made by the 
Commission, ultimately it was the willingness of member states to make the EEC a success 
that drove integration.108 During the early 1960s, Macmillan was supported by the Federation 
of British Industry (FBI) in efforts to ensure that the European Free Trade Association 
((EFTA) was a success.109 Neil Rollings argues that the FBI consistently lobbied for 
integration during this period as it feared European businesses would surpass British 
businesses.110 Macmillan was thus preoccupied with both making EFTA work and repairing 
the Anglo-American relationship due to the aftermath of the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956.111 
Meanwhile, France, now under De Gaulle’s leadership, began to take a lead on European 
integration. De Gaulle believed a strong European Community could act as a ‘third force’ in 
world politics. He determined that France should gain control over the Community’s foreign 
policy. His policy led to the Fouchet plan being tabled in 1961, which proposed cooperation 
on foreign policy and human rights.112 During this period, De Gaulle also attempted to form 
closer links to West Germany through developing a relationship with Chancellor Adenauer. 
However, the Benelux states began to grow suspicious of France fearing they were 
attempting to take control over the Community. George Wilkes suggests it marked a 
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significant point, as the Benelux states began to strongly favour British membership as 
Britain could provide an alternative view to the Franco-German alliance.113 Moreover, in 
1961 Britain had for the first time began exporting more to the Community than the 
Commonwealth.114  
As EEC countries outperformed Britain’s economy and in a bid to repair the relationship with 
America, Macmillan considered applying for membership, although he felt ‘chances are 
against an agreement…. unless de Gaulle changes his mind.’115 In 1960, Macmillan was 
aware that the EEC was moving forward without Britain. The situation was exacerbated by 
the US, which became more supportive of the EEC, providing it with loans to assist with 
deeper integration. Macmillan responded and asked Whitehall departments in 1960 to 
determine the cost of adhering to the Treaty of Rome. Piers Ludlow suggests Macmillan's 
request alone deepened divisions over the Community in the Cabinet.116 To ease tensions, 
Macmillan suggested a step-by-step approach to examine the EEC. He also reshuffled his 
Cabinet to reflect a more European stance. Duncan Sandys moved to the Commonwealth 
Relations Department. Christopher Soames was moved to agriculture (the CAP, from the 
onset of the first EEC application, was clearly going to be controversial). Heath was put in 
charge of European affairs and was made the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Lord 
Privy Seal. After Heath’s preliminary discussion with the Six he concluded that they would 
not be prepared to accept Britain as an associate member of the EEC.117 The Six were 
adamant that Britain adhere to the Treaty of Rome. Because of this, Macmillan reluctantly 
secured approval from both EFTA and the Commonwealth in mid-1961 to approach the EEC. 
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John Young comments on how Macmillan’s announcement for applying was ‘surprisingly 
lacklustre’.118 Piers Ludlow suggests the application was a historic turning point as it 
‘signalled the culmination of a lengthy British policy change’ dating back to 1950s.119 Others 
such as Nicholas Crowson argued that it was not as significant, believing the application ‘a 
defensive rear-guard action of a government that was quickly running out of ideas.’120 
Regardless, the decision to apply began to divide the party as described in Nicholas 
Crowson’s account, which notes that scepticism was centred on a quartet consisting of Derek 
Walker-Smith, Robin Turton, Peter Walker and Lord Hinchingbrooke.121 The quartet still 
maintained that Britain had a global role to play beyond the Community and feared the 
effects membership would have on the Commonwealth. 
The British European delegation, led by Heath, attempted to address this concern through 
securing concessions for the Commonwealth and a twelve to fifteen-year transitional period 
to ease the pressure on British trade. In his work, Alan Milward highlights the importance of 
1962, as it was then and not in 1961 that the government acknowledged the Commonwealth 
could no longer be central to Britain’s national strategy.122 The situation was exacerbated in 
late December 1962 when the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that ‘Britain had 
lost an Empire and not yet found a role’.123 Macmillan responded that this struck a raw nerve. 
The first application was eventually quashed by Charles De Gaulle, who vetoed it in 1963, as 
he believed that Britain would press its agenda and that of the US agenda in the 
Community.124 Piers Ludlow has demonstrated how De Gaulle convinced fellow member 
states to reject Britain’s application. This was particularly in relation to the European 
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Commission who agreed that British accession would strain the Community, especially as the 
CAP had begun to develop.125 The 1961 application demonstrated a change from the norm 
for British foreign policy. However, James Ellison has argued that this application was 
significant for British foreign policy in terms of strategy as ‘it represented a shift in British 
tactics to secure traditional goals.’126 Regardless, the rejection of the application did provide 
more time for the Community to develop without British input.   
The European Assembly had also developed as, by 1962, it was formally recognised as the 
European Parliament by its members.127 The name change was for consistency as in the four 
languages of the Community it was referred to variously as an Assembly and a Parliament. 
Specifically, in French it was referred to as the Assemblée parlementaire européenne and in 
Italian as the Assemblea parlementara, both referring to it as an ‘Assembly’. However, in 
Dutch it was Europees Parlament and in German as the Europäische Parlament, thus 
referring to it as a Parliament. So, in the period from its first sitting in 1958 to 1962 it was 
called both an Assembly and a Parliament depending on the language.128 Thus, in March 
1962, to ensure consistency it was announced that the institution would formally be 
recognised as the European Parliament. However, it was not until 1987 that the name change 
was officially sanctioned.129 Despite this, it was not a matter of contention as, by the 1970s, 
all member states referred to the institution as the European Parliament. Yet the flaws of 
indirectly electing officials were also becoming apparent, particularly for France and Italy, 
where both governments were unwilling to send a proportionate member of opposition parties 
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as representatives.130 Moreover, both governments declined sending MEPs from parties that 
were staunchly anti-EEC which meant Italy would not send any representatives from its 
Communist Party until 1969 and France would not send any Communist Party members until 
1973. 
In 1964 a general election in Britain was held which saw Labour led by Harold Wilson return 
to Number Ten with a narrow majority of five. Peter Dorey remarks that Wilson was the 
youngest Prime Minister of the century and brought with him innovative ideas intended to 
bring Britain out of perceived economic difficulties.131 He created the Department of 
Economic Affairs (DEA) and the Ministry of Technology. It is argued by John Young, 
however, that Wilson took a more pragmatic stance towards the Community.132 His tactical 
approach (as it was for Macmillan) was intended to avoid internal conflict in his government 
and party. An important moment for the government came when, in the summer of 1966, it 
was forced to abandon its policy for an economic National Plan. David Reynolds suggests 
that through a series of weekend seminars for Cabinet members, by 1967 Wilson had worn 
down the opposition to the point that Labour could support a second application.133 
Government members such as Tony Benn (later a prominent opponent of EEC membership) 
wished to see ‘Imperial Britain’ become ‘Industrial Britain.’134  
There was also strong support from the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) for Britain to 
apply for membership.135 It had begun to feel that British business was being surpassed in the 
fields of technology and industry. Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) was also strongly in 
favour of working with the EEC beliving a closer relationship with Germany could improve 
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Britain’s industrial position.136 The decision for the second application was also an important 
moment as its legacy allowed the third attempt to be successful. Helen Parr has observed that 
the 1967 application was significant.137 It provided a change in Wilson’s tactics in 
negotiations. Wilson made the idea of joining more acceptable at Westminster and wanted 
fewer concessions from the Community. The application was also vital from a Community 
perspective as it garnered support from the European Commission for British accession.  
During this time Edward Heath had also become the leader of the Conservative Party. It was 
written of Heath that, unlike any British leader, he shared a vision similar to the founding 
fathers of the Community.138 Yet upon becoming the leader of the party, he also had to 
manage its Eurosceptic wing and made Enoch Powell Shadow Minister of Defence. It is 
observed by Nicholas Crowson that Heath ‘reignited’ the European debate in the party citing 
that in the annual party conference there were 24 resolutions from pro-Europeans alone. 
Moreover, the conference endorsed the desire to seek British membership by 1,452 votes to 
475.139 Even opponents of membership became more receptive to the idea as seen by Enoch 
Powell’s commentary in 1970. Powell along with Ridley wrote a pamphlet entitled ‘One 
Europe’. Ian Gilmour suggests that today the pamphlet ‘would be considered federalist’,140 
and argues that Powell, like other Conservative MPs, understood that Britain’s future would 
lay in membership. However, opposition within the Conservative and Labour Party still 
existed. In his account, Chris Gifford explores in detail the role of the Anti-Common Market 
League and the role it played from the first bid to join the Community under Macmillan 
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remained active.141 The divisions described above shows why cross-party alliances were 
formed.  
Yet there was much dispute and development between the Six in the period 1965 to 1967 that 
made Britain’s application more difficult. Stephen George observes that during this period, 
De Gaulle continued with his policy of attempting to integrate the Six quickly, which in turn 
would entail applicants to the EEC having to adhere to stricter rules.142 The new rules would 
make accession for Britain more difficult and provide France with a clearer leadership role in 
the Community. De Gaulle, however, rejected the idea of political integration fearing loss of 
sovereignty for national parliaments. Sovereignty was the crux of the problems during the 
mid-1960s for the Community. By 1965 the first stage of economic integration was nearing 
completion. The two major achievements of the first round of integration were the 
agreements of a common external tariff and a common agricultural policy.143 There were still 
concerns over the budget and how it should be financed. Since the Community was created, 
the member states had provided funds for the EEC. But in 1965 the Council proposed that an 
automatic funding mechanism should be created.144 It would also mean that money from the 
levy on imported agricultural products and the common external tariff would become the 
EEC’s own resource. Member states would be able to keep a small sum from the tariffs to 
cover the cost of collection.  
Germany and the Benelux states wanted some measure of democratic control over the budget, 
thus it was recommended that the European Parliament gain powers over the budget. The 
proposal was the first time it was suggested that the European Parliament extend its power. 
The Dutch Parliament felt particularly strongly on this matter and had been a strong advocate 
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for the European Parliament since it had been founded, believing it could be used to 
counterbalance the Franco-German alliance in the Council.145 Hence, the Netherlands was in 
favour of the European Parliament gaining budgetary powers. However, De Gaulle did not 
approve, feeling it was a significant step towards supranationalism. Due to this, De Gaulle 
withdrew form the Council of Minister meetings, stalling the completion of the first stage of 
integration as the Treaty of Rome stated that upon completion of the first stage of integration 
the Community should move to a majority voting system. De Gaulle did not want majority 
voting as it would diminish France’s role in the Community. After negotiations it was 
decided that countries would maintain their veto under what became known as the 
‘Luxembourg Compromise’. De Gaulle did not stop there as he had a list of other demands 
that he wanted addressed before he re-entered the Community.  
The most significant requirement was that publicity of the Community should not be handled 
by the Commission alone. De Gaulle wanted Community publicity to be jointly approved by 
the President of the Council and the President of the Commission.146 The actions of De 
Gaulle’s demands damaged the Community’s morale and led to a loss of momentum. The 
situation was exacerbated as De Gaulle vetoed Wilson’s application in 1967. Simon Holt 
argues that the rejection occurred as De Gaulle suspected Britain would act to support the US 
within the Community. Holt also argues that the devaluation of Sterling and accepting the 
CAP would be too big a burden on Britain.147 Uwe Kitzinger suggests that the application 
was bound to fail until French attitudes towards British accession changed.148 Piers Ludlow 
also points to the importance of the second rejection by De Gaulle as it came at a time where 
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East and West relations were highly contentious.149 Yet Ludlow also suggests that the second 
application had significance as the Benelux states who were in favour of British accession 
grew more vocal on the subject.150 The second application was important in shaping the third 
application made under Heath. Moreover, no decision on the European Parliament gaining 
control of the budget was taken during this period of stalled integration.  
A major change also came in April 1969 when De Gaulle resigned as French president. He 
stood down following his failure to win a referendum to endorse the French Senate. This led 
to an election that saw Georges Pompidou become president. It marked a major breakthrough 
for both the EEC and Britain as De Gaulle had become an obstacle regarding Community 
development and enlargement. Thus Pompidou’s election spurred another attempt at EEC 
enlargement. Uwe Kitzinger argues that this was because of pressure placed on him by other 
member states (namely the Benelux countries).151 Other historians such as Stephen George 
suggest that Pompidou had decided to make steps towards enlargement because the smaller 
French parties who ensured his election victory lobbied for enlargement.152 Moreover, De 
Gaulle’s death on 9 November 1970 also allowed Pompidou to pursue policy more freely. 
Yet the proposal for enlargement to be reconsidered was already decided weeks prior to the 
French election.  
German Chancellor Willy Brandt had publicly announced that a conference at the Hague 
would be held to consider the issue. Enlargement was also spurred on by the French 
economy. Since the mid-1960s economic growth had slowed dramatically. De Gaulle had 
aggravated this problem as his refusal to devalue the Franc had left French goods 
uncompetitive. Hence Pompidou upon becoming president immediately devalued the 
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Franc.153 He also wanted to widen the EEC market and was open to the idea of Community 
enlargement. Yet the Community was keen to ratify the issues around the budget before 
negotiations for enlargement began.154 The Community was motivated by De Gaulle’s 
previous hostility towards the European Parliament having control of the budget. The 
Community had finessed this issue in a way that meant France would gain the most from the 
budget while contributing a small amount and with potential member states such as Britain 
having to contribute a larger sum. Because of this France agreed to allow the European 
Parliament to have control over the budget. This officially completed the first round of 
integration that provided the European Parliament with a meaningful power. It was also 
decided that steps to enlarge the Community would be taken. Lastly, it was decided that 
economic and monetary union would be pursued simultaneously. Economic policy 
coordination could be made through the activity of existing committees; monetary union 
could be pursued by linking together the exchange rates of the member states within narrow 
bands to limit fluctuations.155 The Hague talks had concluded all three outstanding 
Community issues, and the EEC opened negotiations with Britain for accession. 
By April 1970 the European Parliament’s powers had also slightly increased with the signing 
of the Luxembourg Treaty. This treaty proposed a new revenue structure for the Community. 
Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the Community had been financed by the direct 
contributions of its member states, in a similar way to other international organisations. 
However, the Treaty of Rome had left open the opportunity to finance the Community 
through ‘other resources’.156 Thus the treaty made possible the gathering of Community 
resources through three means: the Community’s agricultural levies, the common customs 
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duties, and a fixed rate based on VAT. The issue caused tensions amongst member states, as 
the Community’s own resources gave it financial autonomy that could not be governed by the 
national parliaments of member states. Member states feared the federalist direction in which 
the Community could move. Hence, to address this concern the preamble of the Luxembourg 
Treaty called for ‘the strengthening of the budgetary powers of the European Parliament’.157 
The treaty proposed that the European Parliament could amend the Community’s ‘non-
compulsory’ budget. Compulsory expenditure was of greater significance as it encompassed 
‘spending on those policies that arose out of the founding treaties and their amendments’ 
which included the CAP.158 Non-compulsory expenditure were matters that fell outside this 
remit.159 The loose definition would cause great tension between the European Parliament 
and COM. The Luxembourg Treaty outlined the steps for the budget. First, the Commission 
would write a draft of the budget which would be deliberated between the Commission and 
COM. It would then be given to the European Parliament to make its amendments to non-
compulsory expenditure. The COM could further amend these changes, and then finally the 
European Parliament President would formally adopt the budget. This last step was critical as 
it gave the European Parliament the final word on the budget, a significant power, as it could 
potentially delay the entire budget.  
In 1970 a UK general election was held which saw Edward Heath and the Conservatives 
defeat Labour, and return to power with a majority of 31.160 Heath was a driving force for 
British accession and a decision to enter the EEC was carried in Parliament in 1971.161 
Stephen Wall has commented that ‘Heath was the only post-war PM that shared the same 
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views as the original Six’.162 However, Stephen George has attempted to suggest that Heath’s 
outlook towards the Community was no different to other leaders.163 Regardless, Heath 
appointed Anthony Barber (who was the Chancellor of the Exchequer from June 1970 to 
March 1974) to lead negotiations for Britain. Barber remarked early on that he was 
disappointed that the Community had rejected the budget without consulting Britain. This 
was a decision that would affect Britain’s relationship with the EEC for years to come. Heath 
pressed forward with negotiations and attempted to persuade member states that Britain was 
truly willing to become part of the EEC. As part of this approach Britain had joined the Snake 
in April 1972.164 The Snake originated from the Barre Report in 1969 which advocated the 
tying together of member-states’ exchange rates within narrow bands. British membership of 
the Snake, however, did not last long owing to international economic problems.165 The Bank 
of England was unable to maintain parity of Sterling and withdrew from the arrangement, as 
would other member states eventually. Regardless, this episode was still seen by member 
states as evidence that Britain was willing to make an effort to be part of the Community. 
Britain eventually acceded to the Community in 1973. They were the second largest 
contributor to the EEC budget behind Germany, had to impose a Value Added Tax (VAT) on 
goods worth eight per cent, and could no longer benefit from Commonwealth trade.166 Thus 
many have argued that Britain joined on relatively unsatisfactory terms, which was inevitable 
given the compromises it had to make regarding its arrangements with the Commonwealth.167  
Opposition to the Community remained amongst Conservative MPs as many had feared that 
Britain would indeed enter on unsatisfactory terms and damage the British economy. 
Moreover, as negotiations progressed, the number of Conservative MPs against membership 
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increased. Geoffrey Howe, who was the Solicitor-General responsible for drafting the 
European Economic Communities Bill, told the House of Commons that ‘the Communities 
were a dynamic organisation that would evolve and continue to evolve’.168 His comments 
added to the Eurosceptic Conservative MPs fears of a federalist Community. In his study, 
Philip Norton states that there were approximately 30 MPs who opposed membership since 
1961, and suggests that by the time of accession the number increased to 50 and that ‘there 
were a number of others that were uncertain about membership’.169 Thus even having agreed 
to membership there were still those who were sceptical of Britain’s future in the community.  
Heath did attempt to secure a deal to safeguard trade with the Commonwealth, particularly 
with regards to New Zealand, the budget contribution and fisheries. He had to accept the 
CAP and the budget as both these matters were decided prior to negotiations. The European 
Parliament’s control over the budget was another development Britain could not challenge. 
Yet David Hannay, amongst others, has argued that regarding fisheries, the exclusive 
boundaries around Britain’s shores should have been further extended.170 Heath did secure 
some arrangements for New Zealand ensuring a transitional period allowing Britain to import 
dairy products. Hence, the Conservatives under Heath entered a Community which had 
already made steps to deepen integration. Much of the literature regarding the third 
application has centred on Heath, John Young has stated that Heath’s ‘enthusiasm for the 
EEC over the US alliance was unique’.171 Whilst Stephen George has argued that Heath was 
no different compared to other Prime Ministers.172 Yet others such as Andrew Geddes 
suggests the importance of Pompidou replacing De Gaulle had allowed British accession to 
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succeed on the third attempt.173 Furthermore, the European Parliament had also changed over 
this period and gained powers over the budget. The Conservatives under Heath had acceded 
to the Community and were more pro-European then previous Conservative administrations. 
However, earlier in the post-war era the Conservatives had consistently made steps to work 
with Europe. Furthermore, internally there were generational shifts in the cohort of 
Conservative MPs which dated back to the 1950s during a time European institution regularly 
evolved and changed which caused more complexities in the internal attitudes of the 
Conservative MPs towards European integration. Despite this by 1972 the foundation of the 
Community was firmly cemented in a Franco-German alliance, an alliance Britain had to 
contend with since the Schuman Plan was proposed in 1950, and would continue to do so 
throughout the period this thesis covers. 
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Section One: British MEPs 1973-79 
 
By 1973 the powers of the European Parliament remained limited, despite acquiring control 
over the Community budget. Its greatest power in theory, though unlikely to be deployed in 
practice, was the ability to dismiss the European Commission through a two-thirds majority 
vote. The European Parliament was not a strong Community institution at the time and many, 
including the British Conservatives, wanted to increase its influence. MEPs, who were 
nominated, not directly elected, felt that if direct elections could be achieved the European 
Parliament would gain more influence and credibility. The issue of direct elections dominated 
this period until they took place in 1979.  
The Conservatives initially sent twenty representatives to the European Parliament. Although 
Britain was allocated 36 seats, sixteen remained empty as the Labour Party did not send 
representatives. British Conservative MEPs were selected by Heath and many were pro-
European. They held a ‘dual mandate’ meaning they held positions in the Westminster 
Parliament and the European Parliament. Despite this making the role of the MEPs 
challenging, it provided a method of communication between MEPs and MPs which ensured 
both could work together. The British Conservative delegation in this period created an 
independent grouping rather than sitting with the Christian Democrats (CD), the centre-right 
grouping of the European Parliament, and the decision to sit independently would have a 
lasting impact on the relationship between the two groupings. Many MEPs also enjoyed 
access to senior figures in the Conservative Party including Heath himself, a luxury MEPs 
after the Heath premiership did not have.  
This section will show that the MEPs had limited success in the European Parliament, as the 
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Chapter One: The Formation of the European Conservatives  
 
The following chapter will examine what the MEPs did in the unelected European 
Parliament. It will examine how Heath selected MEPs, the decision the MEPs took to form an 
independent grouping, the early positive contributions MEPs made including the introduction 
of a new question time and will discuss the legacy of a document published in the European 
Parliament, the Vedel report. The formation of an independent grouping has been discussed 
in the literature as Zig Layton-Henry suggests that opposition from Italian and Belgian MEPs 
in the CDs prevented the British Conservatives from joining the grouping in 1973 whilst 
Caroline Jackson correctly points that there were other groupings that the British 
Conservative MEPs could join such as the Gaullists.174 However, this chapter will show in 
greater detail that a combination of financial incentives and the desire by both British 
Conservative MEPs and Heath to make a distinct contribution to the European Parliament led 
to the MEPs forming an independent grouping and this thesis will demonstrate the lasting 
impact of the decision. Moreover, the chapter will highlight that there were a number of 
groupings the British Conservative MEPs could have potentially joined. It will also establish 
the concerns MPs had over the cost of MEPs and the effect this had on the relationship 
between the two. The chapter will reveal that communications between the Conservative 
Party and its MEPs were stronger because the dual mandate (though onerous) provided a 
method of clear communication.  
1973 was a turbulent year for the Conservative Party and the MEPs. Members were 
nominated and held a dual mandate which despite its benefits also made the job of a MEP 
demanding. However, the Conservatives sent a full complement of MEPs that were 
nominated by Heath who had taken the advice of the Conservative Whips, Heath personally 
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wanted to send a diverse and credible delegation, whilst the Conservative Whips favoured 
candidates with previous experience in working in Europe.175 Labour, for which continued 
UK membership of the EEC was an open question at the time, opted not to send 
representatives as in the period of 1973-75 the European Parliament was a very sensitive 
matter for the Labour Party and they feared sending representatives would create more 
internal divisions.176 Labour’s decision provided the Conservatives with a unique opportunity 
to press their policies in the European Parliament. The Conservatives immediately had to 
decide which grouping they wanted to join. They could have potentially joined the Gaullists, 
the Christian Democrats Group (CDs), or the European Progressive Democrats (EPD). They 
decided instead to create their own Conservative grouping marking the first major decision 
taken by the British delegation.177 The matter had been discussed at some length in the 
Conservative Research Department (CRD), as well as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
as it was linked to the cost of MEPs.178 The eventual decision taken to sit independently 
would have a lasting impact on the MEPs throughout the period from 1973 to 1992, 
particularly concerning the relationship between the British Conservatives and the CDs. The 
decision would also isolate the Conservative MEPs as they were seen as a small and non-
diverse grouping which limited what they could achieve in the European Parliament. 
In 1973 however, it was assumed by many in the European Parliament that the Conservatives 
would sit with the CDs, one of the largest groupings in the European Parliament, with strong 
ideological links to the British Conservatives. Moreover, Peter Kirk (Chairman of the 
Conservative delegation to the European Parliament) and the other Conservative MEPs had 
close personal ties with the CDs. It was felt by MEPs, including Hugh Dykes, that ‘this was 
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the natural home’ for the delegation.179 Dykes highlighted that British Conservative MEPs 
had direct contact with the CDs through conferences, youth movements and inter-party 
meetings.180 Another potential choice was the European Liberals who were more centre-right 
than the British Liberal Party. The other possibility for the Conservative delegation was to 
side with the European Progressive Democrats (EPD).181 The EPD was formed in 1965 after 
a faction of the Gaullist liberal grouping split, and on 16 January 1973 the EPD was officially 
named and recognised in the European Parliament, which was timely for British accession. The 
EPD also shared a similar view to the British Conservative Party regarding the reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), an issue at the forefront of British Conservative thought. 
However, both Douglas-Home and Kirk were reluctant to join the EPD. Their hesitancy 
stemmed from the issues surrounding some of its members, such as the Danish Conservative 
Kai Nyborg, who was facing an expenses scandal at the time. Kirk stated that ‘apart from the 
doubts about Nyborg’s personal reputation there is little common ground’ between the EPD 
and the Conservative Party.182 In 1972 Heath and Douglas-Home wanted to form their own 
Conservative group made up of British, Danish, and Norwegian Conservatives.183 The idea 
was made very difficult as Norway opted not to join the EEC in 1973. The country had held a 
referendum on membership on 25 September 1972. It yielded a 52 per cent no vote, 
preventing Norwegian accession.184 Despite the setback, a decision was made in 1973 that the 
Conservatives should still create their own Conservative grouping in the European 
Parliament. One of the main reasons for this decision was due to the financial incentives 
gained by creating an independent grouping. Creating a grouping gave each MEP in that 
grouping a subsidy of £2,500, and potentially a further subsidy for office staff which would 
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be paid for by the European Parliament.185 Moreover, as will be seen a key objective for Kirk 
and Heath was for the British Conservative MEPs to make a distinct contribution to the 
development of the European Parliament and an independent group provided this platform 
which was a large contributing factor to create an independent grouping. Yet other options 
were considered by the British Conservative MEPs. The decision to sit independently would 
ultimately have a lasting impact on the relationship between British Conservative MEPs and 
the CDs. 
The new independent grouping consisted of twenty British Conservatives, two Danish 
Conservatives, and one Danish Liberal.186 Peter Kirk and Douglas-Home believed that the 
Danish Conservatives had the most in common with the British Conservatives, and thus 
would be a good fit for the new Conservative Group. Kirk stated that the Danish MEP 
‘[Erhard] Jakobsen is an experienced politician who would be an asset to the Conservative 
Group’.187 The decision to sit independently has been briefly discussed in Zig Layton-
Henry’s work who suggests that British MEPs sat independently due to opposition arising 
from Italian and Belgian CD members.188 However, new archival material shows that a 
significant factor that led Heath’s government and Kirk were the financial incentives for 
forming a separate group, and for the desire for Heath and the British Conservative MEPs to 
make a distinctive contribution to the European Parliament.189 The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office believed that the financial incentives of an independent grouping 
would ease the burden of expenses for which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was 
otherwise wholly responsible. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office had pointed out that it 
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would be ‘unsustainable to accommodate MEPs through the department’s costs’.190 The issue 
of MEP costs needed to be addressed, as they were heavily scrutinised in the House of 
Commons even by fellow Conservatives. Neil Marten, (Conservative MP for Banbury) on 
one occasion asked James Prior, Leader of the House of Commons, ‘why the Committees of 
the European Assembly are meeting in Rome between 21 and 24 May; and what the extra 
cost is’.191 In 1973 MP pay was also being considered as MPs received £4,500 per year in 
basic pay.192 Formation of a group also provided organisational and financial independence 
as the British Conservatives received subsidies directly from the European Parliament; this 
did lead some MEPs to feel independent of the UK Parliament. Furthermore, MEPs at the 
time thought they could have a larger voice in the European Parliament and would be able to 
direct the group towards issues that the party prioritised. The decision was very significant in 
the long-term as it impacted relations with the CDs, who felt that the British Conservatives 
should have joined their grouping. The decision to sit independently was decided by the 
Conservative government, but MEPs, particularly Kirk, were consulted regularly and had 
often communicated with Heath on the matter.193 The decision shows that there was clear 
communication and understanding between the MEPs and Westminster; the dual mandate 
allowed for this to occur. Additionally, Heath had selected the delegation personally taking 
into consideration the advice of the Conservative Whips.194 Heath having input into the 
selecting of the delegation made working with the MEPs easier, a luxury Thatcher and Major 
would not have.  
Within the UK allocation of MEPs, twenty were taken by the Conservatives. Heath also 
provided the opportunity for the Liberal Party to have two seats in the European Parliament. 
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The Liberal Party selected Lord Gladwyn, who had held diplomatic posts in both France and 
the United Nations.195 Their second seat went to Russell Johnston (MP for Inverness, Nairn 
and Lochaber), the Liberal spokesman on foreign affairs in the House of Commons.196 
Additionally, as Britain was entitled to 36 seats and only twenty were occupied, Heath also 
allowed Lord O’Hagan (a crossbencher in 1973, he would from 1975 to 1994 be a 
Conservative MEP) to attend as an independent.197 As well as enabling the Conservatives to 
dominate the UK presence in the European Parliament, the non-participation of Labour also 
made the Conservative Party appear positive about the Community, having led Britain into it, 
and participating in the European Parliament. Heath had worked closely with the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office to pick a delegation prior to accession.198 He had wanted to pick a 
delegation that could support his pro-European agenda in the Community.199 Yet he also 
wanted the delegation to reflect the Conservative Party’s range of views towards the 
Community.200 The Conservatives eventually decided to appoint Peter Kirk as the first head 
of the Conservative delegation to the EP.201 Kirk was selected as he had been an active 
member of the Council of Europe during Harold Wilson’s government of 1956-63.202 He had 
also played a large role in the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU), being on 
various committees including the Politico-Military Working Group (PMWG), Kirk had also 
served as Under-Secretary for Defence for the Royal Navy from 1970 to 1973, and was fluent 
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reputation in Europe than he enjoys here’ and that he was an ideal candidate.204 Kirk also had 
a strong relationship with Heath, as both had ‘pro-European instincts’.205 Of the twenty 
eventual members that were selected to attend six were peers and fourteen were MPs. Eight 
of these members had government ministerial experience. All of the members had experience 
in the WEU or the Council of Europe. Heath had wanted to send experienced members to the 
European Parliament, to ensure member states saw British Conservatives taking the European 
Parliament seriously.206 Yet there were some Conservatives who saw the European 
Parliament as a ‘talking shop’ with little significance, and remained hostile.207 Thus, in this 
delegation were sceptics of the European Parliament such as Sir Derek Walker-Smith who 
had opposed entry outright. The issue of which members should be sent was decided prior to 
accession. Hostility towards the Community remained a consistent theme. In his work, 
George Wilkes supports this view as he examines in detail the ‘outbursts of hostility towards 
the EEC’.208 The selection of MEPs that opposed entering the Community in the grouping, 
however, demonstrates a more specific level of hostility aimed at the European Parliament 
which Wilkes does not discuss and is not examined in the literature. The delegation selected 
clearly had members who had strong European diplomatic experience, a decision that was 
engineered by Heath to legitimise the European Parliament as a serious institution of the 
Community. The selection of MEPs already shows that there would be a part of those sent 
that would not be supportive of membership. Heath had included these individuals (MEPs 
such as Walker-Smith) as he had to balance different wings within the Conservative Party 
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demonstrating the early divisions that Community membership created specifically around 
the European Parliament. 
The length of an MEP’s appointment had not been set and in 1973 it was decided that the 
Conservatives ‘do not need to take further action’ on the matter.209 It was also agreed that if 
an MP were to lose their seat they would retain their position as an MEP until a replacement 
was found.210 Other areas of concern that the Conservative Party had not clarified were the 
salary and expenses of an MEP. Both issues would continue to cause strains within the 
Conservative Party throughout the period this thesis covers. In 1973, however, a temporary 
measure was put in place for expenses as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was tasked 
with meeting the Conservative delegation’s transport costs.211 The lack of clarity in these 
aspects of European policy was overlooked by the Heath administration. It was a very 
turbulent period for the government, as the issues with Northern Ireland and industrial 
relations were key areas of concern. Moreover, despite the accession agreement being 
reached in 1972, enlargement had never occurred before, making it impossible for the 
government or Community to be fully prepared.  
The first time the British delegation took their seats in the hemicycle, there was enthusiasm 
amongst MEPs. They believed the British Conservatives would help to change and increase 
the powers of the EP. In her study of the first cohort of Conservative MEPs, Caroline Jackson 
suggests this was because European commentators believed that ‘coming from a country with 
a strong parliamentary tradition, they would inject a new vitality into the proceedings’.212 
This was proved correct by Jackson, as the Conservative MEPs were supportive of the 
European Parliament, and wished to legitimise the European Parliament’s role, although 
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Jackson’s work does not discuss in great detail the MEPs desire to be a successful alternative 
centre-right grouping to the CD and contribute to the European Parliament’s development 
throughout the period this thesis covers.213 The Conservative MEPs started strongly and 
tabled a resolution and memorandum in their first session regarding the conduct and the 
process of procedure in the European Parliament, which they deemed at the time as 
‘excessively lengthy’.214 However, the Conservatives misunderstood the degree of agreement 
within the European Parliament, particularly on the belief that the European Parliament’s 
powers were insufficient. 
Furthermore, steps had already been made to address this problem as the Commission had in 
1972 set up a committee to assess the powers of the European Parliament. The committee 
was led by a French academic, George Vedel who was keen to increase the powers of the 
European Parliament and curtail those of the Commission. He believed this could be achieved 
by giving the European Parliament powers to approve the presidency of the Commission, as 
well as giving it powers to select Commissioners.215 Additionally, Vedel’s report 
recommended readdressing the legislative powers of the European Parliament. However, the 
report struggled to achieve change due to opposition from member states who wanted to keep 
much of the Community’s power in the Council of Ministers.216 An enhancement of the 
power of the European Parliament might suggest movement in a more federal direction for 
the EEC.217 These member states did not want to see powers taken from national Parliaments 
and transferred to the European Parliament. As a result, little materialised from the Vedel 
report. Jean Blondel, Richard Sinnott, and Palle Svensson describe in depth the opposition to 
the European Parliament suggesting that ‘the perception of a powerful European Parliament 
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might be the perception of a threat rather than a promise of powers’.218 Yet it should be noted 
that aspects of Vedel’s report were eventually enforced in the Single European Act and the 
Maastricht Treaty, showing the long-term impact of certain European Parliament reports. 
During the period 1973 to 1975 the British delegation took a more confrontational stance in 
some areas. The approach stemmed from the British parliamentary tradition which was 
characterised by confrontation, but also because the Conservatives wanted to start their tenure 
in the European Parliament strongly. However, they were unsuccessful as the European 
Parliament worked more slowly than the House of Commons. Kirk would later state that ‘I 
am astounded at the impertinence of what we tried to do, and the forbearance with which our 
new colleagues received it'.219 The approach also created tensions with other groupings. 
Furthermore, British members were often disillusioned as they felt that they could not depend 
upon their European counterparts in certain debates and votes.220 Kirk wanted to bring the 
Community institutions (particularly the Council of Ministers and the Commission) to 
account and curtail the powers of the Council of Ministers (as advocated in Vedel’s 
report).221 He was especially passionate about this cause as he suggested that the ‘Council of 
Ministers in theory was supposed to be controlled by national parliaments but now operates 
almost without control’.222 Yet in early 1974, the Conservative Grouping in the European 
Parliament had little support from other groupings. They had issues with the CDs, who felt 
strongly that the delegation should have joined their grouping. Furthermore, the newly 
formed EPD was hesitant to side with the Conservative Group on a number of issues 
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regarding parliamentary procedure,223 showing again the effects of being in a small 
independent grouping.  
The memorandum the Conservative Grouping had issued in its first session in Luxembourg 
proposed the creation of a special committee composed of academics and national 
parliamentarians. The committee would determine how the European Parliament could work 
more efficiently and deal with the strains brought with enlargement.224 Kirk wanted to give 
the European Parliament more impetus, an outlook reflected in the memorandum. For 
example, the memorandum suggested that a new question time be introduced to the European 
Parliament which was similar to the House of Commons as, theoretically, intense debates 
would be held which could lead to clearer solutions to problems. If implemented it could 
speed up the overall decision-making process. The Conservative Grouping felt strongly on 
moving the committees away from working on very technical directives and towards 
considering long-term policymaking.225 The memorandum also wanted committees to have 
powers of approval on the various areas they worked within, a power that was held by the 
Council of Ministers.226 These changes in initiation and approval would, if implemented, 
place the European Parliament between both the Commission and Council of Ministers, 
making it a significant Community institution. Yet as suggested by Michael Shackleton, the 
European Parliament’s powers in the early 1970s already showed that there was some mutual 
dependence between the European Parliament and the Commission through the power to 
dismiss the Commission through a two-thirds majority vote.227 The more practical power the 
European Parliament held at the time was over the Community’s budget. It had control over 
both the operational and the administrative budget, but the memorandum suggested that the 
 
223 Ibid. 
224 European Parliament Archive, PE 32.103 (BUR), Conservative Group Archive, European People's Party 
Office, European Parliament, Brussels, 5 January 1973.  
225 Ibid, Conservative Group Archive, European People's Party Office, Revised Memorandum of the 
Conservative Grouping, European Parliament, Brussels, 5 January 1974. 
226 Ibid. 




effectiveness of this power was limited, and that the European Parliament would need powers 
to oversee the other Community institutions to understand better how the budget was spent.228 
The report also develops Richard Corbett’s conclusions which suggest that efforts were made 
more by large groupings such as the CD and the Socialists to increase the European 
Parliament’s influence.229 Yet the Conservative memorandum demonstrates that smaller 
groupings, such as that of the European Conservatives, contributed to the strategy which is 
not examined in the literature. 
The Conservative Group memorandum had only limited short-term success as it was brought 
into the lengthy and slow processes of the European Parliament. As noted above, most of its 
suggestions had already been raised in the Vedel report, prior to British accession. Yet it was 
received by the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliament which led to the eventual re-
examination of the procedural process for the European Parliament.230 The memorandum was 
timely as enlargement meant more pressures and shorter timeframes to work within. 
Additionally, the Council of Ministers, which already worked faster than the European 
Parliament, was trying to streamline its own procedural process by limiting consultations 
with the Parliament. Kirk was particularly wary of the Council of Ministers, stating that it ‘is 
one of the main brakes on future development’.231 Hence, due to a combination of the 
developments of other institutions, enlargement, and the Vedel report, the memorandum had 
some success. Its most substantial contribution was that it highlighted the intent of the British 
Conservatives to change the European Parliament. The memorandum also showed that the 
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With the success of introducing a new question time the MEPs also began to play a regular 
part in European Parliament affairs. Many MEPs now held positions on two or more 
committees and played an active role in them.232 Committee work was vital for the European 
Parliament as this was where the most important decisions were taken, more so than in the 
hemicycle. Being a small grouping, the Conservatives had to rely on votes from other 
groupings in committee work to influence decisions in the European Parliament. In 
committees Commissioners were also accessible and relationships could be built. The 
Conservative delegation worked on many committees throughout this period. The objective 
in 1974 was the same as in 1973. Kirk wrote that the aim was to make the ‘Parliament more 
efficient while avoiding amendments to the treaties’.233 Committee work was vital for the 
European Parliament throughout this period as it was where most of the European 
Parliament’s work took place. This was also an ‘important lesson for the Westminster 
Parliament whose committees were at that stage almost non-existent’ demonstrating an 
important difference between the European Parliament and Westminster in terms of 
function.234 It also shows an important background contribution to Norman St Stevas’ 
parliamentary invocation of all-party select committees. 
In January 1974 there was an issue regarding corporate mergers that highlighted the problems 
of being a small grouping. The Community sought approval of mergers between businesses 
valued at 1,000m units of accounts (£400 million).235 There was much concern over this for 
the Conservative delegation as it would directly affect 40 per cent of the EEC businesses that 
were British.236 The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) was deeply concerned as it had 
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always felt that the opportunity for large mergers was one of the greatest advantages of 
membership.237 On 15 January, the Conservatives led a move that forced the European 
Parliament to delay the report on European merger policy. John Peel, who was on the 
European Parliament economic affairs committee, stated that ‘the matter deeply concerned 
the UK’ and that ‘it should be given closer consideration’.238 He suggested that if the 
Community had to approve mergers it would cause delays and make businesses reluctant to 
merge. The British Conservatives had narrowly gained a majority of two with support from 
the French Gaullists and the CDs. It was becoming clear that the Conservatives would in 
future have to rely heavily on votes from other groupings to achieve their desired result, 
which was a consequence of forming a small independent grouping. However, in mid-
January the Conservative delegation failed to get a fundamental change to the merger policy 
due to opposition from the Socialist Grouping.239 The failure showed the disadvantages of 
sitting as an independent group. The Conservative MEPs, until they joined the EPP in 1992, 
felt that much of their time was spent building relations. 
Economic issues and the Community budget were large concerns for the European 
Parliament due to the energy crisis. In 1973 the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) imposed an embargo on oil which caused member states of the EEC to 
experience chronic economic difficulties.240 The crisis led to member states such as France 
and Britain putting their own agendas ahead of the community, as they sought their own 
arrangements to compensate for the embargo, as demonstrated by the work of Larry Neal.241 
Another concern was that the Community would have to combat inflation and ensure that 
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integration continued. The Conservative delegation believed integration could be maintained 
if the European Parliament had a larger role in the Community budget.242 The European 
Conservatives on the Budget Committee were Lord Lothian and Michael Shaw who was the 
committee’s rapporteur. Kirk wanted to develop the way the Community budget was 
structured. He believed there were many problems and struggled to understand ‘how an 
international or supranational parliament, part-time – as we are bound to be – can effectively 
control the expenditure of this House and how a supranational executive can present a budget 
strategy rather than present a series of estimates for public expenditure.’243 Kirk wanted the 
European Parliament to be a stronger consultative body on the budget. The CDs supported 
Kirk, believing that the European Parliament was very far from having adequate control over 
the budget. The CDs’ Chairman had stated that ‘for the Community to develop and be an 
effective counter-balance to the Commission … it had to have stronger budgetary powers’.244 
The energy crisis highlighted how fragile the Community was as a whole, and the limited role 
of the European Parliament. It was seen by many in various national parliaments as a part-
time assembly with little power. Many MEPs then began to believe direct elections presented 
an opportunity to legitimise the European Parliament. 
The last contribution the European Conservatives made in 1974 was in September when they 
published the document ‘Our Common Cause’,245 which assessed the Community and 
identified areas requiring improvement. Peter Kirk and Brendan Rhys Williams were 
primarily the authors of the document,246 again showing the importance of Kirk being a 
driving force in the grouping. It highlighted the cumbersome processes of the Community, 
and how this could be changed if the European Parliament was stronger. It also stated the 
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need to ‘rapidly move towards a European Union.’247 It placed a large emphasis on the 
Community institutions and wanted the Council to move towards majority voting. Regarding 
economics, it argued that member states adopt the ‘Europa’ as a common currency.248 The 
Europa would be used to stabilise capital and transactions across EEC countries. The 
document demonstrates the more federalist views of this particular delegation as seen by the 
suggestion of a common currency and a move to majority voting. Caroline Jackson argues 
that it shows the different direction in which the party could have developed regarding 
engagement with the Community, had they not become Eurosceptic.249 It also highlights the 
importance of the issue of reforming the decision-making process and the CAP. Although its 
main proposals on the CAP were not immediately adopted, the document was prescient. The 
report also reflects similarities between Heath and the MEP delegation in their outlook 
towards the Community. These similarities had allowed Heath and the delegation to work 
effectively together. Yet 1974 was a year dictated by external events illustrating the 
Community’s weakness. Whilst in Britain two general elections in 1974 also created political 
uncertainty. Kirk remained an influential figure for the British and European Conservatives 
and maintained his goal of making the European Parliament more powerful. The wider 
Conservative Party shared this goal and achieved some success as the budgetary powers were 
extensively discussed. Although this was made difficult due to the fluctuating membership of 
British Conservative MEPs in the 1970s which also impacted the relatively small grouping of 
the European Conservatives.250 Additionally, the Community would have to overcome 
chronic economic difficulties, eventually through deeper integration. Further integration was 
a traditional response by the Community to problems that is still used today, which supports 
the work of historian Harold James, who specifically develops the argument on how the 
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Community responded to crisis through deeper integration.251 Yet Harold James does not 
specifically explore the European Parliament in his account. 
The most significant contribution made by the British Conservative MEPs occurred in 1976 
when a censure motion to dismiss the Commission was placed. The matter originated from a 
powdered milk surplus which had been steadily increasing within the member states and 
which the Commission had not resolved. Yet by June it was clear that the motion would not 
advance as both the CDs and the Socialists had opted to vote against the European 
Conservatives.252 Despite this Kirk opted to go ahead with the censure in June. He stated that 
the Commission was ‘guilty of flagrant maladministration.’253 It marked the first time ever 
the European Parliament had voted on the possibility of wielding its greatest power. 
However, the motion was defeated with 109 opposing, four abstaining, and only eighteen in 
favour.254 The vote clearly indicated that the European Parliament did not hold the 
Commission accountable. Many members instead pointed to the Council and its failure to act 
earlier.255 Although the censure had little impact on the matter, it was the first time the 
European Parliament had expressly considered using this power, and it was led by the British 
Conservative MEPs. Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton argue that after this censure motion was 
placed, other groupings felt they could use this power if required.256  
Fisheries remained a concern from 1973 onwards. The first time the MEPs attempted to have 
an input on fisheries was in 1976 when the Conservative Scott-Hopkins took a lead on the 
matter. In 1975 he suggested the European Commission examine the fisheries industry. By 
the end of 1975, the European Commission then provided £9.5 million to assist with these 
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difficulties. Scott-Hopkins remained unhappy, suggesting the sum was not enough to remedy 
the chronic issues of the fisheries industry.257 Regardless, this demonstrates that MEPs such 
as Scott-Hopkins could effectively work with the Commission. Yet the OPEC oil crisis had 
greatly affected the cost of fishing through its impact on the price of fuel. Scott-Hopkins was 
supported by the Danish members of the grouping as Denmark suffered greatly from the 
downturn in the fishing industry. Wilfred Ewing and Labour MP Mark Hughes also 
supported Scott-Hopkins.258 They wanted the Commission to support a quota on fishing and 
to extend the exclusivity of British coasts. 
However, Pierre Lardinois, the Dutch Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural 
Developments, argued against this as he believed Scott-Hopkins was being too negative 
about the prospects for fisheries, stating that the industry had begun to recover from 1975.259 
Yet he agreed that the Community would have to do more regarding fisheries in the future as 
it was going to be a large concern for member states. The matter was discussed later in the 
year at a European Council meeting held on 1 April 1976 in Luxembourg. James Callaghan, 
who had been the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs under Wilson 
and became PM in 1976, had stressed the importance on fisheries and later stated in a UK 
Cabinet Committee that discussions had been informal though helpful.260 Fisheries, the CAP, 
the budget, and the site of the European Parliament would be constant problems throughout 
this period until the 1990s, and Conservative MEPs attempted to address these concerns. In 
doing so however, many British Conservative MEPs became alienated in the European 
Parliament.  
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As already seen, another aspect of the actions taken by the MEPs regarded their relationship 
with the CDs. Interactions between the European Conservatives and the CDs had been 
lukewarm since British accession. Opposition naturally arose because the European 
Conservatives attempted to be an alternative to the CDs. Kirk had also opposed the Bertrand 
Report, a document issued by the CD outlining how they felt the Community should develop. 
However, Thatcher, who would become leader of the Conservative Party in 1975,261 later 
viewed the European Parliament as a place where Conservatism could challenge Socialism 
and, as a result, was keen to cultivate a strong relationship with the CD.262 However, she did 
not suggest a merger between the two groupings; rather, she simply wanted closer relations 
while maintaining organisational separateness. The arrival of the British Labour Party in the 
European Parliament had also led to this view. The Conservative MEPs felt threatened by the 
prospect of the combination of the Labour Party delegation with the Socialist grouping.263 
Yet Kirk had appreciated the benefits of being in a separate grouping. There was also a 
fundamental difference between the CDs and the British Conservatives regarding how they 
viewed conservatism. Moreover, the British Conservatives had difficulties with Dutch, 
Italian, and Belgium CDs.264 Thus, in May 1976 Thatcher proposed a compromise at the 
CDU (the Conservative Party in Germany) pre-election conference. She stated that ‘we are 
not aiming at a single monolithic Party, but an alliance of autonomous parties co-operating 
for a common purpose.’265 The speech was received well by the CDs members as they, like 
Thatcher, saw themselves engaged in an ideological fight against Socialism.  
Thatcher also envisaged that the European Democratic Union (EDU) should reach beyond the 
Community. The concept was discussed further in a meeting that took place in May 1976 in 
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Nice, where Thatcher stated that ‘I have emphasised the need to build the closest possible 
friendship between our two’.266 MEPs from both the European Conservatives and CDs 
attended. Yet little materialised and no formal statement was issued subsequently. There was 
a greater sense of urgency later in 1976 on the part of both Thatcher and Kirk regarding the 
formation of an effective centre-right alliance. Geoffrey Pridham observed that due to the 
imminent prospect of direct elections, groupings began to work more closely together.267 This 
was the case with the European Conservatives and the CDs. Furthermore, it was noted by the 
British Conservatives that the Socialist parties of Europe had worked together in the Socialist 
International (which was similar to the CDU but for left-wing parties). It meant they had a 
framework for co-operation which allowed them to discuss matters and act in a more uniform 
manner.268 Hence, unlike the Conservative parties of Europe, the Socialists were able to 
resolve disagreements they had with one another and establish shared priorities. Conversely, 
the Conservative parties of Europe had hampered each other, illustrated by the various 
disagreements that occurred between the European Conservatives and the CD. In July 1976, 
the CDs also changed their grouping to form the European People’s Party (EPP), and Leo 
Tindemans, the Belgium Prime Minister, became the first President of the EPP in May. The 
change in name shows how groupings were becoming more responsive than they had been in 
previous years, motivated by fears of the expanding numbers of the Socialist grouping in the 
European Parliament.269 The second and more influential motive for the increased 
contemplation of alliances was the imminent prospect of direct elections to the European 
Parliament. Thatcher reiterated her views through the document produced by the 
Conservative Party in October 1976, The Right Approach, where she suggested that direct 
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elections would legitimise the European Parliament, and ensure it had powers to sufficiently 
carry out this task. Thatcher stated that:  
A directly elected European Parliament will provide the front line of democratic 
control over the Commission and the Council of Ministers, both in combination with 
the United Kingdom Parliament (where effectiveness in dealing with EEC matters 
needs to be improved) and in areas where the European Parliament has its own 
powers, for example over questioning Commissioners and controlling the 
Commission budget.270 
The document also suggested that the CAP had to be addressed. Kirk personally held views 
close to those expressed in this document. He had in 1976 discussed how direct elections 
would bring ‘democratic legitimacy’ to the Community.271 He had a cordial relationship with 
Thatcher, although more detached from the Heath government – as probably were the 
majority of Conservative MEPs than compared to Heath’s government. Moreover, Thatcher 
was able to hold strong working relations with other pro-European Conservative members 
such as John Davies (MP of Knutsford and not a MEP).272 Davies had been the Director-
General of the CBI from 1965 to 1969 and worked with Heath during the accession 
negotiations. From 1974 he worked as the chairman of the select committee on European 
secondary legislation (the scrutiny committee). Thatcher appointed Davies as Shadow 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in November 1976. Furthermore, 
when Britain had the opportunity to send two Commissioners to the EC, Thatcher suggested 
both Davies and Kirk (she recommended Davies ahead of Kirk due to fears over Kirk’s 
health, Kirk had a heart attack in 1975 and a second in 1977) as potential choices, the other 
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being occupied by Christopher Soames.273 Richard Corbett has argued that Thatcher was 
traditionally sceptical of MEPs as a whole.274 Although as seen from the above, Thatcher did 
regularly worked with pro-Europeans in her early years as party leader, and supported the 
strengthening of the European Parliament. 
In 1977 Thatcher maintained her support for closer relations between the European 
Conservatives and the CDs. Alliances and direct elections for Thatcher were interlinked as 
they both affected the balance between Socialism and Conservatism in the European 
Parliament. Thatcher assumed that an alliance between the majority of French Conservatives, 
alongside the European Conservatives and the EPP, would overcome the expanding Socialist 
grouping.275 This would also mean that the Conservative alliance would not need the support 
of the various European Liberals. It again emphasises Thatcher’s views of the European 
Parliament, which was an institution in which Socialism had to be overcome. Her views were 
shown in a speech to the Conservative Group on Europe, Thatcher stated:  
At the same time, as you know, we are busy making new contacts and friendships 
with like-minded parties across the Channel. It is essential that we should achieve an 
efficient working co-operation between these like-minded parties before, during and 
after the first round of direct elections. The political arithmetic of Europe shows why 
this is so. In the present European Parliament for example the Socialists are the largest 
single group. They outnumber the Christian Democrats, the next largest group, by 66 
seats to 51.  But if there is an effective alliance between the Christian Democrats, the 
Conservatives and the Gaullists and their allies, then our total rises from 51 to 85 —
enough to secure a majority against Socialists and Communists combined, even 
without the support of the Liberals.  
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I know the difficulties which history has created. I know the misunderstandings which 
have to be cleared up before we can achieve total unity between centre right groups. 
But, despite these, I feel sure we can and must secure a working co-operation which 
will enable us to fight the direct elections successfully, and to join together afterwards 
in the European Parliament to protect those values of freedom and human dignity 
which we hold in common.276 
The speech again shows that Thatcher wanted the European Conservatives to work more 
closely with the EPP. Additionally, she was encouraged by the meetings between Kirk and 
the new chairman of the EPP Leo Tindemans. Kirk had a stronger relationship with 
Tindemans than his predecessor Herr Hans-August Lucker.277 As a direct consequence 
political campaigning was regularly discussed between the two groupings. The EPP and 
European Conservatives also occasionally spoke jointly at seminars held for various media 
outlets to develop an understanding of how the EP functioned, thereby presenting themselves 
publicly as associates. Furthermore, there was regular contact between senior Conservative 
figures across Europe. Helmut Kohl, the West German Chancellor, had meetings with 
Thatcher and both spoke at CDU events regarding the economic problems Europe faced and 
how best to overcome them.278 Moreover, Conservative youth movements and women’s 
groups made substantial efforts to promote cross-European collaboration. They also held 
many events to encourage discussion about groupings and the EP. The cooperation led to a 
more systematic approach taken by the British Conservatives and their potential allies across 
Europe to communicate and work more efficiently. In Tony Jensen’s account, he explains 
that the efforts made by these groups allowed the EPP to limit the amount of work the actual 
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grouping had to do in its respective states.279 Nonetheless, there were important divergences 
of outlook to be overcome. A key area of tension involved the CAP, to which there was 
hostility from within the British Conservatives, while EPP members were in favour.  
Furthermore, with direct elections looming the European Parliament was under more 
scrutiny, particularly regarding its cost and how it should develop. The cost was a traditional 
point of contention which encompassed MEPs salaries, expenses, and the site of the 
Parliament; while on a more political level most feared the federalist threat the European 
Parliament carried. Since Britain had begun to send MEPs to Strasbourg, newspapers and 
anti-EEC MPs from both the Labour and Conservative parties often complained about the 
scope and influence of the European Parliament. In an interview with The Times, 
Conservative Neil Marten (MP for Banbury) stated that ‘the real intention behind the 
introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament was the creation of a federal or 
unitary state.’280 The EP had three areas of work and the inability to decide where the 
European Parliament should sit damaged its credibility.281 Some had wanted the official site 
moved to Brussels; others felt there was no need to change the sites as they stood in 1977. 
Moreover, politicians in Brussels were attempting to build a hemicycle and host plenary 
sessions also, due to the financial incentives of housing the European Parliament.282  Thus 
Giscard d’Estaing (President of France) and Thorn (Prime Minister of Luxembourg) brought 
the matter to the European Council meeting that was held in London 29-30 July 1977. Both 
the British Conservative and Labour parties had hoped not to become involved in the subject. 
However, by 1977 the Conservative government felt it was too costly and time consuming for 
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MEPs to commute regularly to Luxembourg and Strasbourg.283 Furthermore, since 1973 
MEPs on several occasions had struggled to return to the House of Commons in time for 
important votes. There was thus support for the idea of the site being moved to Brussels 
which was closer to London. Advocates of this change included Callaghan and the 
Conservative MEP delegation.284 Additionally, the European Parliament required better 
facilities to improve the efficiency of committee work which was conducted in Brussels. The 
Treaty of Rome, however, stated that if the site of a European institution was to be moved, it 
required a unanimous decision by all member states.285 Thatcher had also suggested it was 
important for Britain not to completely side with France and Italy, both of whom supported 
moving the location of the institution.286 She felt the matter could be used as a bargaining 
chip for future negotiations within the Community, demonstrating that the European 
Parliament was only one aspect of a much larger European policy under Thatcher. But as the 
European Parliament was a Community institution it still required the Conservative Party’s 
resources and efforts. The complexities around the site of the European Parliament and the 
inability to resolve the matter damaged the European Parliament’s credibility.  
Linked to the notion of the cost of the European Parliament, the subject of MEPs expenses 
began to surface. MEP expenses were often raised in the House of Commons.287 With much 
discussion of direct elections, anti-EEC members of the Commons attacked the 
ineffectiveness of the European Parliament. The criticism came from both Labour and 
Conservative MPs. When the problems of a dual mandate was discussed, the Conservative 
MP for Plymouth Sutton Alan Clark responded, ‘You can do anything on £40,000 a year’.288 
Callaghan thus decided that the issue of both the site of the European Parliament and the 
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salaries of the MEPs had to be resolved.289 It also demonstrates another early effect of direct 
elections: namely, that the European Parliament received more scrutiny. Those opposing the 
EEC would continue to attack the European Parliament as it had not gained any substantial 
powers yet remained costly which again damaged its credibility and created tensions between 
MEPs and MPs.   
The sudden death of Peter Kirk in April 1977 greatly affected the Conservative MEPs. James 
Scott-Hopkins, the agricultural spokesmen, stood in as the temporary leader of the 
Conservative delegation.290 One month later, Thatcher expressed interest in Geoffrey Rippon 
becoming the grouping’s chairman. Rippon was a leading member of Heath’s delegation that 
had negotiated entry into the Community. However, the MEPs felt that the chairman should 
be nominated and selected by them.291 Nevertheless, Rippon stood unchallenged and became 
leader of the Conservative delegation in June, although he stepped down soon after due to his 
lack of enthusiasm at the prospect of campaigning in European elections for his seat.292 He 
was replaced by Scott-Hopkins towards the end of 1977,293 who would play a larger role in 
the European Conservatives. He was less enthusiastic than Kirk about the European 
Parliament, an attitude that had a significant impact on Conservative thought regarding the 
European Parliament. The death of Kirk and the leadership of Scott-Hopkins played a critical 
role in the British Conservative approach to the European Parliament and changed the 
internal dynamics of the delegation.  
As in the previous year, the matter of the cost of the European Parliament continued to 
manifest itself. In 1978, with European Elections due, matters more specific to the cost of a 
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MEP surfaced.294 Once more, MPs voiced their opinions. David Stoddart (Labour MP for 
Swindon) stated that ‘We are told that an Assemblyman will receive between £25,000 and 
£30,000 per annum, plus expenses. That compares with only £6,270 for Members of this 
House.’295 The statement shows the particular focus on expenses and salary requirements that 
had long been a concern but which was becoming more prominent in British political 
debates. The European Election Information Programme (EEIP) was created because of these 
comments as it intended to explain the role of MEPs to the British public. Conservative 
MEPs strongly felt the need for public awareness on this issue. Originally, the British Labour 
government had proposed in 1978 that MEPs should receive 40 per cent of the salary of a 
British Commissioner.296 However, this method would mean that the salary of a MEP would 
be double that of a UK MP. The proposal was met with opposition particularly from Labour 
MPs (as seen above in David Stoddart's comments). MEPs, however, argued that even to 
receive double the salary of UK MPs was still insufficient, as it would entail British MEPs 
receiving significantly less than their European counterparts (see table below).297 Many 
British MEPs, including Conservatives, suggested that the salary remain the same, but that 
MEPs be heavily subsidised by expenses. Conservative MEPs argued that the cost of their 
work, when expenses such as travel were considered, was more than that of an MP. Salaries 
were a very sensitive subject for Westminster MPs too, who felt that MEPs were 
undermining their status.298 Corbett and Shackleton in their account suggest that the salary of 
a MEP created long-term tensions between British MEPs and MPs.299 
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Country Proposed Salary of 
MEPs 
Salary of National 
Parliamentarians  
Denmark £22,128 £11,750 
Luxembourg  £21,480 £4,500 
Belgium £21,480 £21,500 
Netherlands £21,000 £19,530 
Germany £20,976 £22,700 
France £19,224 £21,000 
Italy £14,232 £10,500 
United Kingdom £12,966 £6,837 
Ireland £12,756 £6,273 
Table 1. Proposed Salaries of MEPs300 
Winifred Ewing, the Scottish Nationalist MEP in 1978, argued that the rates being proposed 
‘would make us the laughingstock of Europe’.301 Lord Bethell (Conservative MEP for 
London Northwest) agreed and suggested that the cost of an overseas office and staffing were 
particular points that should be taken into consideration when discussing MEP salaries. The 
matter was brought to the European Parliament which struggled to further subsidise the 
salaries of all MEPs. It suggested that MEPs’ salaries be adjusted by application of the 
corrective coefficient system for purchasing powers in different member states as laid down 
for employees of the Commission.302 It also reiterated that the European Parliament had the 
right to determine certain indemnities and to fix expenses. These proposals were considered 
by the British government and were widely supported by the Conservative opposition. 
Thatcher had supported an increase to £21,000.303 The matter of MEPs’ salaries was an 
episode where Conservative MPs and MEPs worked together. However, there were some 
Conservative MPs who did oppose the wage increase.304 Due to this opposition the 
relationship between Conservative MPs and MEPs was strained, particularly because salaries 
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were a very sensitive matter. Internal disputes were evident despite Thatcher’s support for the 
MEPs over the issue.   
Yet by 1979 Conservatives MEPs understood the workings of the European Parliament. They 
understood the indirect influence they could have through their relationship with 
Commissioners. This is a significant point, as it impacted how decisions were made in the 
Community, which was very different to national Parliaments. As described in Johannes 
Lindner’s work, MEPs played a significant role in the formulation of the Community budget 
due to their role in approving the annual budget. Delaying the budget had great implications 
for the wider Community.305 Furthermore, MEPs could work within their own grouping, and 
align with others, in the European Parliament. MEPs were also important during this period 
when it came to domestic campaigning, another area in which the Labour Party lacked 
experience. However, in the 1975 referendum the Conservatives used MEPs to speak at 
events and work on the Yes campaign.306 Thus overall, the Conservatives had a better 
understanding of the utility of a MEP and as a result were more receptive to meeting the costs 
of the post. It also demonstrates that the MEPs were pro-European since accession, 
maintaining a Heathite presence from 1973 to 1992.  
Despite his different views to Kirk, Scott-Hopkins also wanted to develop the European 
Parliament’s influence in the decision-making process. Additionally, Kirk had had 
ambivalent views towards prominent figures within the EPP grouping which strained 
relations.307 The decision for the British Conservative MEPs to sit independently in 1973 also 
contributed to the lukewarm relationship with the EPP. However, Scott-Hopkins had stronger 
relationships with the EPP members, even with chairman Leo Tindemans. Scott-Hopkins 
proposed that a European Foundation should be formed to assist any existing bodies that 
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promoted the values of the Community, such as youth organisations, university exchanges, 
seminars etc. He believed this would promote a positive image of the Community and the 
European Parliament in particular, which was supported by Tindemans.308 Human contact 
across Europe was a matter that was implicit in the Treaty of Rome.309 The change of MEP 
leadership clearly placed the European Conservatives closer to the EPP, yet Scott-Hopkins 
had a different style of leadership to Kirk which would affect the grouping’s dynamics in the 
early 1980s. Some MEPs felt Scott-Hopkins in comparison to Kirk was less proactive and 
took a more formal approach to working with MEPs in the grouping.310 
The final change in 1979 was that the European Conservatives officially changed their name 
to the European Democratic Group (EDG). The EDG was picked because it was closely 
linked to the EDU, showing a connection to Conservativism both inside and outside the 
Community.311 Furthermore, the name change would align the EDG closer to the EPP: 
European Elections research showed that the public felt that the European Conservatives 
were not making the necessary effort required to work with the other centre-right groupings 
of the European Parliament.312 This was part of the wider Conservative policy to work more 
closely with the European Community, a policy endorsed by Thatcher as well as Scott-
Hopkins. Thatcher initially did not have a strong working relationship with Scott-Hopkins.313 
After the 1979 European Election she had wanted the Conservative Paul Channon, who had 
been MP for Southend West since 1959, to take over the leadership. However, he failed to be 
selected in his Essex seat, which was taken by the Conservative David Curry.314 Due to this, 
Thatcher was left without a potential leader. Scott-Hopkins had been temporarily leader 
previously and he was willing to give up some of his time in Westminster to once more lead 
 
308 UOP, European Integration Archive, European Parliament Plenary Session, 9 March 1978. 
309 European Parliament Archive, Treaty of Rome article 216, 25 March 1957, p.43. 
310 Author interview with Peter Price, 13 July 2016. 
311 CCA, THCR 2.11.12.1 European Conservatives Group Memorandum, 13 June 1978. 
312 Ibid. 
313 Author interview with Michael Welsh, 11 November 2016. 




the grouping in the European Parliament.315 As will be seen, however, Scott-Hopkins did 
eventually develop a strong relationship with Thatcher.  
Overall it can be seen that Conservative MEPs were proactive in the European Parliament 
since British accession. They also had some successes such as implementing a new form of 
question time in the European Parliament. The chapter in this regard agrees with the work of 
Caroline Jackson who also suggests that British MEPs were keen to make an impact in the 
European Parliament.316 This thesis differs from her earlier work as it firstly extends the 
period examined, but also shows in greater detail the complexities around the formation of 
the European Conservatives due to greater archival material being available.317 It also differs 
from Zig Layton-Henry’s conclusions which suggest that British MEPs were unable to join 
the CD due to opposition from Italian and Belgian members of the CDs.318 Instead, the 
chapter has shown that financial incentives as well as the need to make a distinct contribution 
in the European Parliament were both important in the decision to eventually create an 
independent grouping and that the Conservatives had even considered sitting independently 
prior to accession. However, Conservative MEPs were scrutinised by British 
Parliamentarians, as some felt that the European Parliament was a costly federal institution. 
In their account, Corbett and Shackleton suggest that the salary of the MEPs created long-
term tensions with MPs.319 Yet this chapter shows that the MEPs’ salary increase was 
supported by Thatcher. Hence Heath and Thatcher both supported the MEPs. Heath had 
strong relations with the MEPs as he selected the delegation. Communication between MEPs 
and MPs throughout was clearer than it would be after direct elections. This was a positive 
effect of the dual mandate as, despite MEPs being overworked, they had regular contact with 
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Westminster, and as a result some had strong relations with the Conservative MPs. Yet the 
chapter also demonstrates that important decisions regarding the European Parliament were 
led by either the government or the Conservative Party as seen with the site of the European 
Parliament, and salaries of the MEPs. However, the MEPs were also able to act 
independently as they were a multinational grouping consisting of Danish members, as seen 
in the memorandum tabled in 1973 and the introduction of a new question time which was 




Chapter Two: Introduction of Direct Elections 
 
The chapter will examine one of the most important developments in the European 
Parliament, that of direct elections. Matters ranging from seat distribution to promoting direct 
elections caused constant delays and damaged the European Parliament’s credibility. The 
chapter will also show that despite direct elections being central to the MEPs, elections 
occurred due to the work of other Community institutions and member-state governments. 
Moreover, many MEPs felt that the powers of the European Parliament would increase after 
elections occurred, which did not immediately happen. Direct elections also demonstrate the 
negative views of some MPs towards the European Parliament which contributed to some 
MEPs becoming more reluctant to work with MPs and instead spent more time working in 
European Parliament committees. Yet due to low turnout and lack of media coverage, 
elections remained a sensitive topic for MEPs throughout the period this thesis covers; low 
turnout also highlights that the European Parliament struggled to find a perceived visibility in 
British politics. The chapter will show in detail the contributions made by the Conservative 
Party, as they advocated direct elections. The party’s contributions will be seen through 
different plans for MEP constituencies or suggestions put forward regarding the distribution 
of seats for the member states. 
The idea of direct elections was a source of controversy throughout the 1970s.320 Jeremy 
Thorpe, the British Liberal Party leader (1967-76), was strongly in favour. Peter Kirk had not 
openly opposed the idea of direct elections but wanted to ‘let sleeping dogs lie’ in 1974.321 
He felt that the biggest objective for the Conservative delegation was to increase and define 
the powers of the European Parliament. Kirk also believed that having a high turnout for the 
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first direct elections was vital, because a low turnout would be seen as a vote of no 
confidence in the European Parliament and the Community.322 Moreover, as Michael Steed 
suggests there had been some opposition towards European Parliament fearing the federalist 
nature of the institution.323 Steed also stated in 1971 that MEPs were presumed ‘to be inferior 
calibre to fellow parliamentarians,’ despite them having the burden of a dual mandate.324 
Direct elections also went against the agenda of the Labour Party, who continued to be absent 
from the European Parliament. In contrast, they wanted to ‘strengthen the Council’.325 Hence 
they feared a high turnout for direct elections would provide the European Parliament with an 
opportunity to demand more powers. Turnout thus began to be a significant matter. 
The Labour government also had to decide on sending representatives to the European 
Parliament as it had reached its self-imposed six-month deadline for determining the matter. 
The Conservative delegation thought that Labour would take its seats after renegotiation in 
1975, posing a potential problem as it ‘would swell up the numbers of the Socialist Group’ 
and make it the largest grouping in the European Parliament.326 The Conservative delegation 
had enjoyed the freedom and financial incentives independence brought. They had also made 
progress in distancing themselves from the CDs as they did not want to be seen merely as a 
grouping the CDs could rely on for votes.327 Moreover, on certain votes (as mentioned 
previously on mergers) the Gaullists supported the European Conservatives.328 However, the 
European Conservatives did not want to align themselves too closely with the Gaullists due to 
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the credibility of some of their members.329 The objective until 1992 was to be an alternative 
centre-right grouping to the CDs (later the EPP).  
Yet fear of the Socialists enlarging their representation in the European Parliament led to a 
re-evaluation by the Conservative delegation. The European Conservatives shared a similar 
view to the CDs, believing that strengthening the powers of the European Parliament was 
essential in moving the Community in the right direction. Throughout the latter part of 1973 
and early 1974 relations between the two groupings strengthened. Eventually, on 11 
December 1974 Lord Bessborough announced his wish for the two groupings to merge.330 
The announcement occurred a day after the Paris Conference at which a date for direct 
elections was proposed. The timing demonstrates the concerns over direct elections, and how 
it could alter representation within the European Parliament. 
The Labour Party was certain that a decision on direct elections would be taken by the 
Council in 1976, and that elections would be held in 1978.331 Labour feared that nothing 
stopped other member states from moving forward without Britain in the following years. 
Additionally, it was becoming clear that the Conservative delegation had a large workload. 
Most sat on two or more committees which meant they spent almost 100 days away from 
Westminster annually.332 The workload worried both the Conservative and Labour Party as 
MEPs caused whipping problems since they were not always present at Westminster 
Parliament.  
Furthermore, it was clear that the Conservative delegation had to return regularly to London 
for Westminster business, which limited the amount they could achieve in Strasbourg, again 
showing the problem of the dual mandate. Due to these problems, steps were taken in 1974 to 
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address direct elections on both a legislative and political level. First, there were plans over 
the procedure for voting in direct elections. The independent MEP Lord O’Hagan proposed a 
plan in May which suggested that all 36 seats should be elected at a UK general election for 
electoral districts formed by groupings of existing UK parliamentary constituencies.333 The 
Conservative Lord Beamish also put a plan forward. He proposed that at a general election, 
certain candidates would be designated as candidates to the European Parliament.334 After the 
election, each parliamentary party would select their own MEPs. To counter the dual mandate 
problem Beamish proposed that each MEP have a ‘running mate’ who would deal with 
constituency matters in the MEP’s absence. The ‘running mate’ would also be able to vote on 
behalf of the MEP in Westminster.335 Both these plans were unofficially supported by Heath 
and Kirk, though Kirk still wanted to delay direct elections.336 The two proposed plans also 
demonstrate the sheer number of issues that direct elections had to address as well as the 
issue around a dual mandate. 
The prospect of direct elections raised numerous legal issues. A select committee of MEPs 
attempted to resolve some of them. The committee’s findings in 1974 argued that direct 
elections could be linked to the extension of powers for the European Parliament.337 It 
suggested granting comprehensive budgetary powers, introducing a legislative right which 
would be supervised by a second chamber, and to play a role in the initiation of policymaking 
in the Community.338 Kirk was a supporter of this report, as it proposed more powers for the 
EP, which was his fundamental goal.339 Claes Holger Vreese in his work similarly discusses 
the connection between direct elections and the powers of the European Parliament. He 
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argues that despite the failures of direct elections, they allowed the European Parliament to 
gain powers in subsequent treaty ratifications like the Single European Act.340 A decision on 
direct elections was eventually made late in December at the Summit Conference in Paris 
which stated that direct elections should take place in or after 1978. This again illustrates the 
complexities of direct elections as it was a large task, requiring all member states to ratify in 
their respective national parliaments. Moreover, opposition persisted in many member states 
as direct elections were seen as an attempt by the European Parliament to undermine national 
parliaments, as many correctly assumed the European Parliament would seek more influence 
if elections occurred which many member states thought would lead to an erosion of national 
sovereignty. 
Within the EP, by 1975 groupings began to prepare their campaigns for direct elections. The 
Socialist Grouping had even made a working group to compare member parties’ national 
views. Juliet Lodge has argued that the Socialists wanted a draft programme that would have 
a ‘short ideological preamble and set out a few points for action’.341 As direct elections were 
the first that would occur for a cross-national political institution, such programmes had to be 
broad in order to maintain consistency. The British Labour Party would eventually send 
observers to a working group of the Socialists to see whether it could join the Socialist 
grouping.342 Kirk felt that Labour would inevitably join the Socialist group, making it the 
largest grouping with 67 members, eclipsing the 51 seats held by the CDs and the twenty 
seats of the European Conservatives.343 The fear of the potential size of the Socialist 
Grouping had led to Kirk, however, wanting to work more closely with the CDs in the run-up 
to direct elections.   
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The CDs and the European Conservatives were still in disagreement regarding the Patijin and 
Bertrand reports, issued respectively by the Socialist Grouping and the EPP outlining their 
vision for the Community’s future.344 Moreover, similarly to the Labour Party they too were 
worried about the direction and speed in which the Community was moving. However, unlike 
the Labour delegation, the Conservatives under Kirk still wanted to develop the role of the 
European Parliament in order to make the Council of Ministers and the Commission more 
accountable for their actions.345 The one aspect the European Conservatives and the CDs 
agreed upon was the European Parliament having larger budgetary powers. They both 
envisaged that the Community’s decision making should occur through a representation of a 
Chamber of States. The relationship between the CDs and the European Conservatives ebbed 
and flowed in 1975 due to the two large reports, (the Bertrand and Patijin reports).346 There 
was also a mutual distrust between Kirk and Herr Hans-August Lucker, the CDs leader, 
which worsened the situation.347 The distrust stemmed from the decision taken by the British 
Conservative MEPs to form their own grouping. Yet both groupings saw the threat of a large 
Socialist grouping which ensured the CDs and European Conservatives worked closer 
together. In his account, Simon Hix concludes that the size and diversity of groupings became 
a concern after direct elections occurred in 1979.348 Yet as seen from above, direct elections 
also spurred the British Conservative MEPs to work with other groupings, namely the CDs. 
Despite an agreement being reached that direct elections should occur in 1978 or after, the 
Conservative Party felt it was highly unlikely. Thatcher and Kirk agreed that there were too 
many detailed issues that needed to be tackled in time for direct elections.349 Matters ranged 
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from what method should be used for the elections to legislative issues regarding the powers 
an MEP should hold.350 Yet it seemed to the European Parliament that Britain was still hostile 
towards elections. This was again due to comments made by MPs such as John Stokes 
(Conservative MP for Halesowen and Stourbridge) who said ‘I make no secret of my 
position. I do not want an Assembly of any kind in Scotland or in any other part of the United 
Kingdom.’351 Also, the European Conservatives noted the opposition by their Danish 
members towards elections being held in 1978. Many were concerned with the federal 
direction in which the Community could head if the European Parliament became more 
powerful.352 Denmark wanted to maintain the dual mandate believing Danish MPs could keep 
MEPs in line with their government.353 In 1978 Willy Brandt even proposed that one-third of 
the European Parliament’s MEPs should have a dual mandate.354 Similar to Britain, David 
Wood has suggested that direct elections did not happen in 1978 because of the internal 
situation in France.355 France had been the driving force for elections since the mid-1960s. 
France’s Georges Speanle, who was President of the European Parliament, was keen on 
direct elections, but the Gaullist wing in France’s national parliament was growing and 
opposed elections. Similar to Britain, they feared the European Parliament would eventually 
take powers from national parliaments, this was very different to  the West Germany view on 
federalism which functioned more as a decentralised state, and as Klaus Von Beyme argues 
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federalism in German history was deep rooted.356 Yet because of opposition it seemed that 
elections for the European Parliament would be deferred to a later date. However, by 1975 
Kirk felt that direct elections had to occur as the dual mandate was causing difficulties for the 
current Conservative delegation. He also felt that when direct elections occurred ‘everything 
else will follow’.357 MEPs thought that the elections would legitimise the European 
Parliament as a Community institution and thus were keen for them to occur. Moreover, 
further delay would damage the credibility of the European Parliament as it would be an 
ineffective institution that could not deliver large-scale projects.  
In the period 1976 to 1979 there were matters to address such as legislation for elections, how 
the number of seats should be allocated, the number of total seats, and how voting should 
occur. Throughout 1976 the European Parliament was anxious for the Council to make a 
decision on direct elections. At the March plenary session Schelto Patijn of the Socialists 
stated ‘that we cannot take no for an answer’.358 However, the European Conservatives still 
argued elections were unlikely to occur in 1978 due to the various related outstanding issues 
surrounding them.359 The Socialists demanded a decision on the matter be reached at the next 
European Council meeting which was meant to be in Luxembourg the following month on 9  
April.360 The Conservative MEPs agreed. The Luxembourg European Council meeting 
devoted much of its time addressing direct elections and narrowed the date for elections down 
to May-June 1978.361 Prime Minister James Callaghan supported these developments and 
suggested Britain would do everything to ensure British European Elections occurred on 
time.362 The meeting illustrates the importance of European Council meetings as these were 
 
356 K.V.Beyme, Pluralism and Federalism, International Political Science Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, (1984), pp. 
381-396.  
357 British Library, Newspaper Archive, The Economist, ‘It's a start’, 15 January 1975. 
358 UOP, The European Integration Archive, Parliament in session European Parliament, 8 August 1975. 
359 Bodleian Library, CRD 4/22/6, European Parliament: Direct Elections (4), 19 April 1976. 
360 UOP, The European Integration Archive, Parliament in session European Parliament, 8 August 1975. 





where final decisions were taken even though direct elections affected the European 
Parliament directly.363 Moreover, it highlights a moment when the Conservative Party and the 
Labour Party worked towards a similar goal in ensuring these elections occurred.  
The allocation of seats was also contentious and again highlighted the complexities around 
direct elections. The select committee for direct elections in Britain noted that the French 
President Giscard d’Estaing had originally wanted to allocate seats in proportion to national 
population.364 He then abandon this approach and proposed continuing with the existing 
number of seats allocated to member states.365 Callaghan also proposed that Britain form 
another select committee to further investigate the issues surrounding direct elections.366 His 
proposal was well received by other member states, as well as the British Conservative 
delegation of MEPs. Callaghan’s decision was an important moment for Britain as the direct 
election select committee provided experience to the British Parliament on how to effectively 
to incorporate committees into Westminster Parliament which eventually introduced in 
1979.367 Furthermore, this was the first time in which Denmark had a major disagreement 
with Britain. Denmark opposed the British variant of seat distribution. Denmark insisted on 
having more seats than Ireland despite Britain having developed a proposed seat allocation 
similar to that of France.368 Denmark was unsupportive of the plan as under these proposals 
Denmark and Ireland would have fourteen seats each. Hostility had not arisen from the 
Danish government but from the Veastre Party, which the minority Danish government relied 
heavily upon for support. The British Conservative Party felt that this was a step backwards 
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for Denmark.369 The Conservatives suggested that Denmark would try to negotiate for a 
graded reduction for the smaller nations (Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
and Belgium). It was decided that the matter of seat allocation would be resolved at the next 
European Council meeting held on 12 July, as Callaghan, like the Conservative Party, did not 
want to lose momentum for direct elections. The matter regarding seat distribution is an 
example of how internal opposition arose within a grouping as MEPs fought for their nation’s 
interests, and not always the grouping’s interest, as seen with Denmark. This was the first 
time in which Danish MEPs had a disagreement with the British Conservative MEPs 
demonstrating the two usually worked well together.  
At the European Council meeting on 12 July 1976, Giscard d’Estaing put forward the idea 
that seats would be allocated as followed: Luxembourg six, Ireland fifteen, Denmark sixteen, 
Belgium 24, Netherlands 25, with 81 seats each for the big four, with a total of 410 seats.370 
The French variant meant Belgium lost one seat to Denmark. Belgian President Leo 
Tindemans agreed to allow the matter to conclude. Callaghan was pleased with the European 
Council meeting and even pointed to the helpfulness shown by President Giscard d’Estaing 
and Herr Schmidt.371 The Conservatives also welcomed the outcome as Britain had gained 
more seats in the European Parliament, which would cause fewer problems in assigning seats 
to constituencies.372 Direct elections had also played a role in the relationships of groupings, 
particularly between the European Conservatives and CDs, and 1976 remained a year 
dominated by direct elections. The summit also showed the effectiveness of the European 
Council on reaching agreements on complex problems for the European Parliament, which 
was an important moment in the relationship between the various Community institutions. It 
also acted as a catalyst for the European Conservatives to move closer towards the CDs. It 
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was a move that was encouraged by Thatcher as she had consistently advocated stronger links 
to the CDs. Yet the matter of seat allocation was resolved by member states and not the 
European Parliament, which again shows that in 1976 major decisions regarding the 
European Parliament were taken by other Community institutions and member states.  
The timing of direct elections was another pressing concern. It had arisen when Denmark 
suggested in the previous year at the European Council meeting that it might not be ready for 
direct elections in time. Many Conservative MEPs, such as Hugh Dykes, demanded the 
Council did not delay the matter any further stating, ‘it was fair and reasonable for elections 
to occur in 1978.’373 The Council also proposed that if one nation could not agree to hold 
direct elections the following year the member state would be able to nominate MEPs itself. 
The proposal worried MEPs as an election not taking place uniformly across Europe would 
damage the legitimacy of the European Parliament and its ability to deliver on large-scale 
projects. Furthermore, the European Conservatives were still anxious about seat distribution. 
Scott-Hopkins had stated that a decision had to be made swiftly or elections would be 
subjected to ‘further lengthy delays’.374 At the March plenary session, Kirk urged the Council 
again to take a final decision on direct elections at the following European Council meeting 
which was scheduled to be held on 1 April 1977.375 All the groupings in the European 
Parliament grew frustrated by the lack of progress in the Council. Kirk supported the 
proposal that direct elections be held by 1978 as he believed this would democratise the 
Community and legitimise the European Parliament.376 Again this shows the sheer number of 
issues surrounding direct elections. Moreover, with the date of elections being consistently 
pushed back, MEPs grew more frustrated, which was an issue on self-imposing deadlines in 
the Community as they were often delayed. Direct elections also damaged the European 
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Parliament’s credibility as they appeared unable to deliver on large projects. The delay also 
damaged the European project as it would remain undemocratic until direct elections 
occurred. 
Furthermore, Kirk stated that ‘we cannot be held to be totally committed to every dot and 
comma’ of a document drafted by the Community.377 He proposed that the total number of 
seats should remain between 300 and 400 and that they should be distributed in accordance 
with Patijn's report.378 France had managed to resolve one matter around direct elections. 
There had been concern that the French constitution would prevent direct elections. Yet, by 8 
June 1977 it was ruled that the constitution did allow France to hold them.379 Other member 
states were (similar to Britain) keen for elections to take place the following year, apart from 
Denmark. Groupings began to work more closely together on campaign strategies. The 
British Labour Party began to further integrate within the Socialists grouping despite having 
differences on the direction and speed in which the Community was developing. The British 
Conservative delegation had still not joined the CDs. Disagreement on an ideological and 
personal level separated the two. However, in 1977 both worked closely together to apply 
pressure on the Council to take a decision on direct elections. Hence it can be seen that direct 
elections had aligned the two groupings closer together for two reasons. First, to enable a 
coordinated campaign effort, and secondly to ensure the Council took a decision on the date 
of the elections.  
Additionally, there were still issues surrounding the dual mandate, as the British 
Conservatives felt that holding both roles was too onerous. After his death, Kirk’s election 
agent Kenneth Baker stated in an interview that ‘I have no doubt that Sir Peter’s death is a 
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result of the pressure and overwork caused by his dual mandate’.380 However, other nations 
including Germany and Denmark felt that a dual mandate was beneficial, claiming that it 
would allow clearer communication between the European Parliament and the members’ 
national governments.381 In 1976 it was decided that a dual mandate was compulsory.382 This 
changed after direct elections, and from 1979 onwards the MEPs could opt to have a dual 
mandate.383 Watts and Pilkington suggest that the dual mandate began to disappear in the UK 
after 1979 as many MEPs were discouraged from holding both posts.384 Over time fewer 
MEPs held dual mandates which was important as communication between MEPs and MPs 
worsened. The issue was not fully resolved until 2009 under the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
prohibited MEPs from holding a dual mandate. The link between dual mandates and 
communication for national parliaments is also covered by Watts and Pilkington who 
conclude that fewer MEPs wanted to hold two posts simultaneously as it was too arduous to 
balance the responsibilities of their national parliament and the European Parliament.385 
However, their account does not examine the British Conservative MEPs. 
Another issue for Britain was on the system of voting. MPs were divided: some supported 
Proportional Representation (PR) while others supported a First Past the Post system (FPTP). 
Conservatives such as Bernard Braine were in favour of FPTP as they felt that it would be 
incorrect to have two systems of voting, one for European Parliament elections and another 
for Westminster elections.386 In 1977 there were almost 100 MPs that were against PR for a 
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similar reason.387 Thatcher saw the European Parliament as a place where Conservatism 
competed against Socialism. She felt that if PR voting went ahead it would be a victory for 
the Liberals and make the task of defeating Socialism difficult.388 Thatcher remained firm in 
her anti-PR views as there were fears that some of the Conservative MPs who had been 
against PR would change their views to ensure elections occurred on time, particularly those 
who were Conservative MEPs.  
The Conservative MEPs supported Thatcher on the voting system believing a switch to PR 
could further delay direct elections.389 Later in the year the House of Commons voted in 
favour of FPTP. The Labour Party had voted 146 for PR and 116 for FPTP. All thirteen 
Liberals voted in favour of PR, while 61 Conservatives voted for PR and 196 for FPTP.390 
The result led to the Community being unable to set a date for European Elections, as other 
member states would use PR voting. Furthermore, there were still legislative and 
constitutional issues surrounding elections for the other eight member states to resolve. All 
this amounted to an early indication that the member states would struggle to pass legislation 
in their respective countries to allow European elections in 1978. However, by 1977, the 
states shared a similar view, which was that a date had to be set by the Council for elections 
in May 1978 to prevent momentum from being lost and to avert damaging the European 
Parliament’s reputation. The system of voting again highlights the multi-level complexities 
surrounding direct elections. It also shows Thatcher being supportive of direct elections. This 
is very significant as it shows again her effort to support the Conservative MEPs. Her support 









is not discussed in other works such as Simon Hix’s which examine grouping relations prior 
to direct elections.391   
In early 1977, the Community had to determine how to promote direct elections. It could not 
mount a large campaign as it lacked the finances and expertise.392 The Commission in 
conjunction with the European Parliament felt that the best course of action was to try to raise 
the interest of ‘opinion makers.’ Juliet Lodge argues that the Community hoped it would lead 
to a multiplier effect as large media organisations would be able to convey the information to 
their wide audiences.393 They wanted to reach farmers, consumers, and youth organisations, 
amongst other groups.394 The Commission also agreed to hold a series of seminars on direct 
elections for journalists, at which MEPs were also invited to speak.395 The Community also 
arranged visits to Brussels for some of their target groups, particularly senior civil servants, 
and in 1977 the European Parliament received almost 20,000 visitors.396 These activities 
raised awareness of the Community and its infrastructure. Richard Corbett highlights that an 
important by-product of the European Parliament’s activities was the cultivation by the 
Community of its relationship with large media outlets that would be used in future years to 
communicate complicated developments to a wider audience.397 However, as can be seen the 
promotion of direct elections was a Community effort which was not led by the European 
Parliament, showing in this period in time the limited influence it had in the Community. 
The Commission had also agreed to publish a European Election Institution Programme 
(EEIP) which Juliet Lodge argues had three objectives. First, it provided non-partisan 
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information about the Community and its institutions’ accomplishments, policies, and 
prospects to the public. Secondly, it assisted the European Parliament in raising awareness of 
the institution to ensure a large turnout for voting; and thirdly, it increased public knowledge 
of the Community.398 The Commission placed emphasis on the non-partisan role of the 
EEIP.399 However, it struggled with the timing of the EEIP as the question of when elections 
would occur remained an issue due to member states not passing the necessary legislation. 
However, Britain unlike other member states, had experience of how to coordinate a large 
campaign effort for the Community, because of the 1975 referendum.  
The Conservatives had begun to suggest how the Community could assist with the chronic 
economic difficulties faced throughout Europe including in Britain. They also made a greater 
effort in trying to address how they would help keep the traditions and individuality of 
Britain intact in the face of a more united Europe.400 This was an important point as polls in 
1977 suggested that 50 per cent of the public were interested in how the Community would 
ease chronic economic difficulties, while 31 per cent were concerned with how Britain could 
keep its individuality in Europe.401 All this demonstrated the need for the large effort behind 
raising public interest in the elections. The Community also used this media coverage to try 
and understand the European public. Moreover, Richard Corbett argues that the Commission 
for the first time tried to explain how the Community functioned.402 The British 
Conservatives had been supportive of elections and promoted the positives of membership 
and the role of the European Parliament in Britain. It was the first time a joint effort had been 
made across all the member states to raise awareness of the Community. It also shows that 
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the Conservative Party under Thatcher supported and worked with their MEPs on direct 
elections.  
Furthermore, with direct elections looming the European Parliament was under more 
scrutiny, particularly regarding its cost. MEPs were consistently attacked regarding the site of 
the European Parliament. Neil Marten (Conservative MP for Banbury) stated that:  
It is the longest running farce in Europe, and the people responsible for it are sitting 
round me now. I say that because they have done nothing about it. They have not 
blocked it or had a ‘demo’ about it. They go on and on from one place to another. I 
hope that they realise how very foolish they look in the eyes of those of us who sit 
outside the Community.403  
Comments that were made by MPs such as Marten greatly contributed to causing a divide 
between MPs and MEPs. It even led to certain MEPs feeling disillusioned as was often seen 
in the comments made in the British Conservative MEP committee meetings where MEPs 
such as Hugh Dykes stated in response to Marten’s comments that  ‘we are not bound by our 
Westminster colleagues we are part of a multi-national grouping and can act accordingly’.404 
Regarding the site of the European Parliament, Conservative MEPs wanted this to be 
Brussels although some felt that there was no need to change where MEPs met in 
Luxembourg and Strasbourg.405 Giscard d’Estaing and Thorn brought the matter to the 
European Council meeting in London on 29-30 July 1977. Conservative and Labour views 
aligned at the meeting as both agreed that Britain should remain uninvolved.406 However, by 
1977 some had begun to feel that it was too costly and time consuming for MEPs to regularly 
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commute to Luxembourg and Strasbourg.407 Moreover, as mentioned previously, on several 
occasions British MEPs struggled to return to the House of Commons in time for important 
votes. Prime Minister James Callaghan and Kirk supported the idea of the site being moved. 
Furthermore, the European Parliament required better facilities in order to improve the 
efficiency of committee work which was undertaken in Brussels. Thatcher had also suggested 
that it was important for Britain not to completely side with France and Italy on changing the 
location of the institution.408 She still felt the matter could be used as a bargaining chip for 
future negotiations within the Community.409 The site of the European Parliament was a 
controversial topic as Belgium, Luxembourg, and France wanted the permanent site due to 
the financial incentives it provided. The issue was raised in the House of Commons on a 
number of occasions.410 With much discussion of direct elections, anti-EEC members of the 
House of Commons attacked the ineffectiveness of the European Parliament. The select 
committee for direct elections thus decided that the issues of both the site of the European 
Parliament and the salaries of the MEPs would be discussed in the near future.411 It is clear 
from this that direct elections encouraged more scrutiny of the European Parliament. It also 
provided an opportunity for MPs such as Neil Marten to attack the European Parliament and 
its ineffectiveness on core issues such as its location. The negative remarks in the House of 
Commons contributed to some Conservative MEPs acting more autonomously in the 
European Parliament. 
The European Election Information Programme (EEIP) led by the European Commission 
London Office in 1978 also faced difficulties as direct elections neared. Initially, the London 
Office had not selected the advertising agencies that would be used to develop the EEIP. The 
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situation was exacerbated as the other eight member states had already selected and 
announced theirs in the European Parliament.412 It also gave the impression that Britain was 
uninterested regarding European elections. However, the London Office was not accountable 
for this as it required approval by the government which was still forthcoming. There were 
factors that both the Conservatives and the Labour government felt should be taken into 
account when selecting a public relations organisation for the EEIP. The Conservatives did 
not want organisations that were American-orientated or working on political campaigns in 
the near future.413 The Labour government agreed, and also preferred approaching public 
relations organisations rather than advertising firms. Juliet Lodge argues this was because 
they felt that public relations organisations could be more ‘neutral’, rather than advertising 
firms who specialised in the ‘hard-sell’.414 The decision was eventually fast-tracked, and it 
was announced that Lintas had won the contract in late autumn 1978.415  
By 1978 the Conservative Party and Thatcher wanted the government to provide funding of 
up to 50 per cent of the maximum permitted election campaign cost for prospective MEPs.416 
This was meant to be a ‘one-off’ arrangement to ensure the first European elections ran 
smoothly. Thatcher’s shadow cabinet also proposed that certain expenses for campaigning in 
a European election should be reimbursed by the government in this arrangement.417 It was 
clear from this that the Conservative Party wanted to minimise the cost of European 
elections. It shows that the European election for the Conservative Party as a whole was 
another obstacle which needed to be overcome as elections required financial resources. 
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Regarding legislative matters, the government had not completed all the work necessary for 
European elections to take place in 1978. Regardless of the direct elections select 
committee’s achievements, its work could not be made law until May, when direct elections 
were meant to occur. The Conservatives proposed that the committee met more than once a 
week, which would allow the bill to get royal assent by June.418 However, this would still 
mean that the UK would miss the Community’s May-June election deadline.419 Additionally, 
the Conservatives demanded that the Boundary Commission immediately produce its work 
after royal assent. Again, this demonstrates the number of difficulties surrounding direct 
elections, as well as the problems of the Community imposing deadlines for direct elections. 
There was some division over how constituencies should be divided for MEPs. The first 
proposal was known as the ‘Lawson system’, which envisaged that there should be 54 
constituencies electing 78 MEPs. The second proposal was the ‘Roper system’, which 
grouped together parliamentary constituencies to form Euro-constituencies.420 Both systems 
had similar advantages and disadvantages. The positives were that they both offered simple 
solutions to complex problems as they could be implemented with relative ease. The Lawson 
system particularly simplified the matter as the electoral register was already based on local 
governmental areas and counties were familiar with natural divisions. The major drawback 
with Lawson's proposal was that there was a significant difference in size between 
constituencies: the electorate per Euro-member varied from 187,000 (Highlands and Islands) 
to 742,339 (Surrey).421 However, the underlying problem for both systems was that the 
Labour government could reject them as each assumed that Parliament was doing the work of 
the Boundary Commission. The Labour government stated that it took these suggestions into 
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consideration and that the issue of direct elections would be solved at the Copenhagen Heads 
of Government meeting scheduled for April 1978. The issue of constituencies again shows 
the multi-level complexities of implementing direct elections. It also shows that the 
Conservative Party supported and worked with MEPs to ensure elections occurred.  
Prior to the European Council meeting, economic issues were a major concern for the 
Community members as unemployment was high, and this was coupled with economic 
instability.422 Due to this, the issue of European elections, though important, was not the 
central topic of discussion at the meeting. The Council meeting demonstrates that the 
European Parliament was not central to the heads of government or their overall European 
policy. After discussions it was determined that due to the legislative difficulties, member 
states were hoping that elections would be deferred by a year and should be held on 7-10 July 
1979.423 The meeting concluded the issues surrounding direct elections in 1978, as another 
year provided ample time for member states to make arrangements.  
A set date for elections was difficult to achieve, as it required a cross-country collaborative 
effort which had never been done before. Furthermore, legislatively, a number of issues had 
to be ratified by all states involved which could be a lengthy process. Lastly, for Britain, 
Eurosceptics delayed the process through challenging matters including the role of the EEIP 
and how it should be used, as seen above in the issues surrounding the wording adopted by 
the EEIP, although this Eurosceptic bloc towards the European Parliament at this time was 
not very organised and consisted of four MEPs and twelve MPs approximately.424 
Throughout the period, the Conservative Party as a whole stayed committed to direct 
elections and wanted them to occur in 1978. It maintained the view that European elections 
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and the powers of the European Parliament were interlinked.425 Overall, 1978 was a year in 
which the Community was placed under immense scrutiny because of direct elections. This 
intensified in 1978 because of the chronic economic difficulties member states were facing. 
For Britain the situation was further exacerbated because a UK general election and a 
European election would occur in 1979 both of which provided opportunities for MPs to 
question the role and function of the European Parliament. 
Matters came to a head in 1979, with two issues resolved. The first was regarding the EEIP, 
which was due for publication prior to the election campaign. Lodge and Herman argue that 
the major obstacles to this occurred following a private lunch hosted by Roy Jenkins on 17 
January 1979 in Strasbourg.426 With prominent figures present from both the British Labour 
and Conservative parties the role of the EEIP could be discussed. It was reiterated again that 
the role of the EEIP was to provide educational material to the general public. It was also 
decided that this would be overseen by the European Commission offices including the 
London office.427 As a result, Lintas was able to act swiftly to produce pamphlets to assist the 
public on the upcoming elections in a neutral manner. The matter was compounded by the 
role the Organe de Contact played which was to oversee the EEIP and approve the work of 
Lintas.428 The decision allowed the EEIP to be produced quickly and in time for European 
elections.  
The second issue which needed to be resolved was the date of the European elections. It was 
finally decided that they would be held on 7-10 July.429 These dates were chosen for two 
reasons. First, in order to accommodate Britain as a general election was scheduled to take 
place in May. Secondly, it also allowed enough time for the other eight member states to 
 
425 UOP, European Integration Archive, Session of European Council, 7-8 April 1978. 
426 J. Lodge and V. Herman, p.114. 
427 Ibid. 
428 The Organe de Contact were officials from the European Commission who oversaw direct election matters. 
See J. Lodge and V. Herman. 




resolve any legislative issues that might arise. There were no more delays on this front and 
elections went ahead on the proposed date and both Labour and Conservative MEPs focused 
on campaigning. The issues surrounding direct elections were multi-levelled as it effected the 
Community and member states entirely. Due to this an immense effort by all member states 
was required to achieve direct elections. Moreover, as seen on a number of occasions it was 
at European Council meetings that major decisions were taken, highlighting the importance 
of the forum. The matter of direct elections was one example of why the European Council 
became a legitimate Community institution under the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.  
Regarding campaigning, the Labour Party disagreed with the Socialists grouping of the 
European Parliament who suggested members of the grouping should hold conferences 
targeting media members.430 The Labour Party opted instead in May 1979 to hold an eve-of-
poll rally in Leeds.431 Labour had decided to run on an anti-European platform, with leading 
political figures such as Barbara Castle reiterating the party’s concerns regarding the 
perceived federal direction in which the Community was heading. The three large issues that 
were attacked were Britain’s budget contribution, the CAP, and the European Monetary 
System (EMS). Labour proposed that the British people, like Labour, opposed 
supranationalism.432 In contrast, the Italian, German, and French Socialist MEPs focused 
more on the benefits of the European Parliament and what changes could make it a better 
institution.433 The ability of the Socialists grouping to resolve internal disputes had been one 
of its greatest strengths. However, since the British Labour Party joined this became more 
difficult and made more acute due to direct elections.   
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Unlike Labour, the British Conservatives were not attached to a large grouping and thus did 
not have similar problems. Conservative MEPs ran a campaign similar to that of the UK 
general election held in the same year. It proposed that the Conservatives were the European 
Party in Britain but would continue nonetheless to safeguard parliamentary sovereignty. 
Thatcher and senior Conservatives wanted most of the decision-making process to remain in 
the Council of Ministers.434 Yet the EPP had different views and objects in its programme. It 
wanted the European Council to provide direction to the Community. It envisaged the 
European Parliament gaining more powers and influence over the decision-making process, 
and specifically wanted the conciliation procedure to be used more regularly.435 Finally, the 
EPP sought a framework for a United Europe consisting of a European Government and a 
Chamber of States as well as directly elected MEPs.436 The Conservatives, like the Labour 
MEPs, did not agree with the views of their European counterparts. Thus, the campaigns 
show that as a whole, British MEPs had differing views to their Continental counterparts on 
the speed and direction the Community should develop.  
The results of the European elections were similar to those of the general election in the same 
year which saw a victory for the Conservative Party. The Conservatives won 60 seats, Labour 
seventeen, and the SNP one.437 Northern Ireland made up the remainder of the three seats out 
of the allocated 81. The newly elected Conservative MEPs could be split into three broad 
groups.438 The first consisted of senior figures, including Sir Frederick Warner who had been 
the UK’s ambassador to Japan, Sir Frederick Catherwood who was a director of the 
Development Council and Sir Henry Plumb, who had been chairman of the National Farmers 
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Union and the European Farmers Union (Plumb would later go on to becoming the leader of 
the British Conservative MEP delegation). These members felt the European Parliament ‘was 
the future – and committed themselves thoroughly to it’.439 The second group were younger 
politicians including Peter Price, Michael Welsh, Amédée Turner, and Christopher Prout.440 
Many of this group came from a legal background. Lastly, there was the so-called H-bloc, 
who were hostile to European integration, members of which included Brian Hord and 
Alasdair Hutton.441 Twenty per cent of the Conservative MEPs were Eurosceptical, while the 
remainder were pro-European.442 Moreover, James Spicer (MEP for Wessex) was the one of 
the two members who held a dual mandate, which is very significant. Despite its burden, the 
dual mandate had previously ensured clear communication between the European Parliament 
and Westminster and with the reduction of MEPs holding dual mandates after direct 
elections, communications would worsen in the forthcoming years; this thesis argues that this 
development damaged the relationship between MEPs and MPs. More importantly, the three 
groups and the majority of the individuals mentioned from this delegation remained MEPs 
until the early 1990s.443 
Yet overall, the Socialists grouping had the most success in Europe as a whole taking 113 
seats out of a total of 410 in the European Parliament. They had great success in Germany, 
France, and Italy making them the largest grouping in the European Parliament despite the 
lack of seats won by the British Labour Party. The EPP totalled 107 seats, doing similarly 
well in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.444 Hence they were the second largest grouping 
in the Parliament. However, due to the British Conservatives winning 61 seats and Denmark 
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three seats, the European Democrats totalled 64 seats which made them the third largest 
grouping. The British Conservatives thus had a strong independent base. But a drawback for 
the Conservatives was that they would be seen as a non-diverse British lobby as the grouping 
had only managed to secure two seats in Demark outside of the UK. The European election 
also illustrated how they could be used to assist in forecasting general election results or test 
the public attitudes on European policies. 
A weakness of the European elections was the low turnout of voters, which showed a lack of 
confidence in the Community by the people of Europe. The Community as a whole had a 
turnout of 61 per cent. Britain had the lowest turnout of the nine with 33 per cent, less than 
half that expected in a general election.445 Turnout was low in Britain for a number of 
reasons. First, the largest decision regarding the Community had been made only four years 
earlier in the referendum. Richard Corbett suggests that between this and the 1979 general 
election the British electorate was fatigued.446 The low turnout was also attributed to a lack of 
prominent candidates. However, Lodge and Herman oppose this argument, suggesting that 
even where there were prominent figures standing, such as Barbara Castle in Greater 
Manchester, the turnout was still relatively low.447 A more convincing explanation for the 
low turnout was the lack of media priority attached to the European Parliament, something 
that would remain a concern throughout the 1970s and beyond. Under-reporting was a 
problem on radio and TV, reporters for both of which did not attend the European Parliament 
outside of the run-up to direct elections. One of the main reasons British media neglected 
European Parliament matters was the cost of broadcasting from the European Broadcasting 
Union, and sending camera crews, presenters, and reporters to Strasbourg or Brussels.448 
Thus the British public were less informed about European Parliament affairs and more 
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concerned with issues such as unemployment and industrial relations. The public felt these 
were issues for MPs in Westminster and not for MEPs. Moreover, it was easier to convey the 
problems with the European Parliament through its cost, which would be an underlying long-
term problem for the European Parliament.   
Overall, it can be seen that in the 1970s direct elections were the largest issue for the 
European Parliament, as they involved a tremendous cross-country effort, due to their multi-
levelled concerns. It impacted the Conservative MEPs greatly from the time they entered the 
European Parliament in January 1973. The MEPs and the wider Conservative Party were in 
favour of direct elections. They contributed a great amount to this policy throughout the 
1970s, including on the distribution of seats and how they should be shared amongst the 
UK’s constituencies. Thatcher and her cabinet were supportive of British Conservative 
MEPs. They also worked and agreed with the MEPs on many matters on direct elections. 
However, direct elections led to some MPs speaking negatively about the MEPs which 
caused some of the latter to become disillusioned with Westminster. As observed by Richard 
Corbett, hostility arose because many feared direct elections would lead to the European 
Parliament seeking more powers.449 This view is also shared by Claes de Vreese.450 A side 
effect of European elections was that the Conservative delegation worked more closely with 
other groupings, namely the EPP, more than it had previously, which also concurs with 
Simon Hix’s account.451 Yet the accounts above do not discuss the importance of Thatcher 
supporting direct elections. Her support also encouraged Conservative MEPs to work closer 
with the EPP as has been shown in this chapter. The largest failure regarding direct elections 
was the lack of support by the British public as manifested in the low turnout, and this would 
continue to be a problem throughout the 1980s. The chapter demonstrates that despite the 
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importance of direct elections, many significant decisions were taken by the Labour 
government, other member state governments and other Community institutions as a whole 
which shows the limited influence of the European Parliament in this period. The European 
Parliament being viewed as an insignificant institution also contributed to the low turnout in 
Britain. Moreover, low turnout remained a sensitive topic for all British MEPs as it damaged 
the legitimacy of the EP. Lastly, with direct elections complete and fewer MEPs holding a 
dual mandate, communication between Westminster and the European Parliament would be 





Section Two: European Integration and the Conservative 
Party 1973-79 
 
The following section will explore the internal situation of the EP as the Community 
considered Greek membership of the Community. The Conservatives were divided on this 
matter as some felt that enlargement would mean Britain would have to contribute more 
financially to the Community. Others, including MEPs, felt that in a Cold War world Greek 
accession would prevent the Soviet Union expanding. 
The other matter that arose was the development of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 
response to the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil crisis. Many 
felt this crisis had highlighted the weakness of the Community as members (including Britain 
and France) sought bilateral agreements with OPEC member nations over oil. Thus, EMS 
was meant to lead to a commitment to deeper integration, over which the Conservatives were 
hesitant. Yet EMS was suggestive of an important recurring theme for the Community, which 
was the tendency, when faced with crisis, to seek further integration.  
The section will show that under Thatcher, Conservative MEPs continued to hold strong 
relations with the Conservative leadership. Moreover, it will demonstrate how Thatcher took 
a pragmatic approach to the European Parliament: a significant point, as by demonstrating her 
pragmatic approach to the European Parliament, the thesis will contribute to the wider debate 




Chapter Three: The Conservative Party Leadership and the 
European Parliament 
 
The following chapter will discuss the wider problems within the Conservative Party in the 
period from 1973 to 1979, in which occurred the 1975 referendum and three general 
elections. MEPs played an active role in all of these events. It is important to discuss how 
these events effected the Conservative MEPs, they campaigned in the referendum and due to 
the dual mandate, some MEPs lost their seats. The chapter will assist in examining the 
complex relationship between MEPs and MPs, particularly in relation to their differing views 
on the EP. It will also show that Thatcher took a pragmatic approach to the development of 
the EP and supported the Conservative MEPs on important matters such as increasing their 
salaries.  
1973-74 was a very difficult period for the European Parliament as external events influenced 
its conduct. The energy crisis had caused economic problems. Moreover, the EEC was 
hampered by vast changes occurring within the Nine.452 Willy Brandt, West Germany’s 
Chancellor, was forced to resign, French President Georges Pompidou also died in the same 
year, and this coincided with the end of the Heath government. Furthermore, seven of the 
member states had coalition governments, while the other two (including Britain), had 
minority governments. The Labour Party had a majority of three, and Harold Wilson had 
promised Britain’s renegotiation with the EEC and a referendum on British membership. By 
1977 Labour had lost its majority and formed a pact with the Liberal Party which meant the 
Liberals would support Labour in return for pre-legislative consultation.453 The arrangement 
showed the difficult position the Labour government was in at the time which limited the 
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amount they could achieve.  Internally, the Conservative Party was also in a difficult position 
following the departure of Enoch Powell, who had provided leadership to the right-wing of 
the party. As Philip Norton argues, following Powell’s departure, the right-wing group 
‘ceased to be systemic or clearly identifiable’.454 Without Powell in 1974 many backbenchers 
and anti-marketers did not take positions on European legislative matters in a systematic 
manner as they had under Powell. Moreover, Thatcher replaced Heath as leader of the 
Conservative Party in 1975. All these matters impacted Conservative MEPs, which will be 
explored in greater detail. 
The 1974 general elections were a major concern for those in the Conservative delegation, as 
they too had to campaign to retain their seats which limited their work in the European 
Parliament, highlighting another issue of a dual mandate. Additionally, the Conservatives 
faced open criticism by MEPs. The Socialist Group’s French leader Francis Vals gave his full 
support to the British Labour Party in the upcoming general election. He suggested that it was 
‘the only party capable of solving Britain’s economic and social difficulties’.455 Additionally, 
another EPP support staff worker Aden Jensen had stated that the Conservative delegation 
was filled with ‘has beens or time wasters’.456 Conservative MEPs retorted by criticising the 
lack of enthusiasm showed by members of the EP to changing the cumbersome procedures 
and processes of the parliament.457 However, despite the Conservatives losing both general 
elections in 1974, and Heath’s support within the party dwindling, there was little change to 
the personnel of the British delegation of MEPs.458 This continuity was a consequence of 
Labour winning more seats in the House of Commons in February 1974 but not having an 
 
454 P. Norton, Conservative Dissidents: Dissent within the Parliamentary Conservative Party 1970-74, (London: 
Temple Smith, 1978), p.280. 
455 British Library, The Economist, ‘The sovereignty stakes’, 16 February 1974. 
456 Ibid.  
457 CCA, GNWR, Baron Gordon-Walker of Leyton, Private Papers, MEP morale, 21 October 1974. 





overall majority.459 Peter Kirk suggested that if the Liberals and Conservatives wished they 
could re-evaluate the MEPs and select new representatives. However, he later preferred to 
‘let sleeping dogs lie.’460 Kirk did not want his delegation to change drastically as it would 
impact the conduct of the grouping that was only formed one year earlier. The 1974 elections 
also showed how much a general election could potentially affect the MEPs. It also 
encouraged the MEPs to push for direct elections.  
The changes that did occur, however, strengthened the experience available to the 
Conservative delegation. The most significant member to join was Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker 
who had experience of European politics having served on the British delegation to the 
Council of Europe. Dodds-Parker avoided the issue of the dual mandate as he had lost his 
seat in the UK Parliament, while opting to stay on as an MEP.461 Hugh Dykes who worked in 
the Minister of Defence in Heath’s government also became a MEP in 1974 and was 
supportive of the EP, as was Ralph Howell who was a British farmer and a chair of a local 
National Farmers Union.462 However, while there were further seats that might have been 
replaced, there was also a lack of enthusiasm among Conservative MPs about becoming 
MEPs. A reason for this was the dual mandate. Neil Marten, who was a leading opponent of 
the EEC even commented that ‘physically, it could lead to a breakdown for people’,463 while 
others had opposed the European Parliament, believing its ultimate objective was to 
undermine national parliaments. Some Conservative members felt that the European 
Parliament was a weak institution and with ‘almost negligible powers had little purpose or 
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function’.464 There were, however, members in the House of Lords who found the post of 
MEP appealing. Six out of the twenty original MEPs were Lords. Unsurprisingly, then, the 
two general elections did not alter the conduct of the Conservative delegation in the European 
Parliament. However, as seen from the remarks by MPs above there was some hostility 
towards the MEPs which alienated some of the MEPs as these MEPs tended to avoid 
engaging with Westminster Parliament and focused more on their European Parliament 
duties, such a Committee work.465 The general elections also illustrated how mandatory dual 
mandates remained a concern for the Conservatives. 
The replacement of Heath by Thatcher also affected the wider Conservative Party as well as 
the MEPs. Eric Caines observes that ‘her elevation to the leadership had taken many by 
surprise’.466 Furthermore, MEPs including Kirk were initially sceptical of Thatcher.467 Heath 
had selected the delegation and had worked closely with the MEPs. However, Kirk feared the 
MEPs would not work as closely with Thatcher on central concerns.468 Yet as seen 
previously, Thatcher, in this period from 1975 to 1979 would support the MEPs on a number 
of issues including increasing their salaries, working towards direct elections and ensuring 
that MEPs would have stronger ties with the EPP. Much has been written about Thatcher’s 
early European policy. David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger have argued that she had little time 
to outline her views on European policy with an impending referendum on Community 
membership.469 Others such as Richard Vinen have also suggested that ‘Thatcher had never 
opposed British membership of the European Community/Union.’470 John Young, however, 
suggests there is evidence that she was more Eurosceptic in her views as all anti-EEC 
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Conservative MPs had given their support in the candidacy race.471 It is clear that Thatcher 
took the leadership at a time where the party was divided over the Community. However, as 
mentioned above, she had supported the MEPs in many areas, which adds to these debates. 
Conservative MEPs are rarely mentioned in any of the literature which examines Thatcher, 
despite it clearly showing her pragmatic approach to European policy. Moreover, MEPs 
including Kirk were able to communicate their views with Thatcher clearly; again, this was 
partly due to the dual mandate.  
The referendum in 1975 was a historic event in British–Community relations, Butler and 
Kitzinger stated that it was ‘the most exhilarating event in British politics since the war’.472 
Furthermore, MEPs, like MPs, played a role in this process. MEPs at European Parliament 
plenary sessions asked questions that would demonstrate the value of the Community.473 
Lord O’Hagan played a vital role in convincing the European Parliament to agree to produce 
European pamphlets that could be distributed in Britain.474 Heath also played an active role in 
the ‘Britain in Europe’ campaign, as did the British Conservative MEPs, many of whom were 
selected by Heath. Peter Kirk, Brendon Rhys, and James Scott-Hopkins all travelled to 
various parts of the UK to promote the advantages of membership.475 Henry Plumb (who 
would later become an MEP and leader of the MEP delegation) also worked to promote the 
EEC, and was even considered as a potential director for the ‘Yes’ Campaign.476 Butler and 
Kitzinger note that Thatcher, Wilson, and Thorpe were all participants in the Yes campaign, 
and the fact that the leaders from the three major parties were on the same side played a 
significant role in deciding the referendum.477 Additionally, Mark Baimbridge suggests that 
British business was crucial in funding the 'Yes' cause: the ‘No’ campaign had £133,000 
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available, while the ‘Yes’ campaign had £1.3 million.478 These two factors worked in 
conjunction for the eventual result, with the Yes vote amounting to 67 per cent. The 1975 
referendum was a historic event, and much has been written on the subject. Butler and 
Kitzinger have suggested the referendum served as a tool for party management as it 
provided a platform for various opinions to be voiced.479 Stephen Wall has argued that it gave 
Wilson the necessary support for membership at a time when many in the Labour Party were 
turning against membership.480 The legacy of the referendum, as Chris Cotton has argued, 
was one of great importance, since it created memories of bitter party infighting which served 
to create long-standing cross-party divisions over Europe.481 However, these accounts do not 
take into consideration the role of the Conservative MEPs. As seen above, many 
Conservative MEPs played an active role in the 'Yes' campaign. 
Following the result, the European Parliament was galvanised by the outcome and started to 
suggest ways the Community could develop. Many of the proposals envisaged a federal 
Community, with both economic and political union. However, the European Conservatives 
and Kirk disagreed, as Kirk believed that ‘it was a referendum and a massive majority in 
favour of the Community as it is today’.482 He believed that if progress towards a political 
union was pursued slowly then public opinion would organically follow. Regardless of Kirk’s 
outlook, the fact that France had re-joined the economic Snake and that British membership 
of the Community was assured meant that key member states had shown their support for the 
Community.  
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There were still many issues for Britain post-referendum, especially for the Labour Party, as 
it had to decide its future role in the European Parliament and the wider Community. The 
referendum was a significant moment in British history; as seen, the MEPs played an active 
role by securing funds and campaigning alongside Heath. Despite the vote to remain Kirk 
was quick to play down any plans the European Parliament had for immediate integration. 
Kirk’s attitudes highlighted how the Conservative MEPs wanted integration to occur more 
slowly compared to their European counterparts. A view that is consistent throughout the 
period from 1973 to 1992. The referendum was a significant moment, and this thesis shows 
that MEPs contributed greatly, including securing funds and promoting the Community 
across Britain. Despite Butler and Kitzinger discussing the importance of party leaders 
supporting the ‘Yes’ vote and the role of British business funding the campaign,483 they do 
not mention the MEPs and the important role they played. 
Days after the referendum Labour had to determine responsibility for the party’s affairs in the 
EP. The first possible option was that the National Executive Committee (NEC) should take 
control. However, the NEC’s chairman was Tony Benn, who had opposed membership, and 
the balance of opinion on the NEC had been openly hostile towards the EEC, lobbying for 
Britain’s withdrawal throughout 1974 and 1975.484 Due to this hostility, it was decided that 
the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) Liaison Committee should take charge of European 
Parliament matters.485 The relevant committee was made up of Labour ministers and 
backbenchers. After initial disagreement on which Labour members should be sent to the 
European Parliament, the Committee and Wilson had selected 48 potential candidates who 
reflected the varying views on Europe in the Labour Party.486 Members included pro-
Europeans such as Tam Dalyell (MP for West Lothian) and anti-Europeans such as John 
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Prescott (MP for Hull East). However, a second issue still remained regarding the number of 
seats Labour could occupy. Britain was entitled to 36, and prior to this the Conservatives held 
eighteen, the Liberals two, and Lord O’Hagan sent as an independent. Labour wanted the 
same number of seats as the Conservatives, despite Wilson initially wanting to cut the Labour 
contingent to seventeen.487 But pressure was placed on Wilson to obtain eighteen seats for the 
Labour delegation. Again it can be seen that Labour, like the Conservative Party had to make 
adjustments to incorporate MEPs into their overall party structure. 
Prominent figures within the party such as Barbara Castle, despite having anti-European 
views, also wanted Labour to fully participate in the European Parliament. Most anti-EEC 
MEPs saw it as their duty to provide a counter-balance to the federal tendency of other 
MEPs. Hence Castle saw the EP ‘as a good place to carry on the fight’.488 The Conservatives 
were also determined to keep all their seats, and Kirk felt that this was reasonable as it 
reflected the results of the 1974 general election and he was supported on the matter by 
Thatcher,489 again showing that the two were willing to work together. The obvious candidate 
that was first to depart was Lord O’Hagan. His European counterparts were saddened by this 
as he had regularly contributed to the EP’s question time.490 The second seat lost was Lord 
Gladwyn from the Liberal contingent.491 Regardless, the Conservative delegation in the 
European Parliament was faced with another problem, as the arrival of Labour would 
strengthen the Socialist grouping, making it the largest in the European Parliament. 
Moreover, on reflection, some Conservative MEPs believed a tactic that benefited Labour in 
years to come was the application of Labour members for Community civil service posts, 
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impacting upon the wider workings of the Communities.492 Some Conservative MEPs 
believed this practice assisted in making the Conservative Party more Eurosceptic, as they 
felt it made the Community more left-leaning.  
With Thatcher as Conservative leader and the referendum ensuring Britain’s continued 
membership, the Conservative Party had to determine its wider policy regarding the various 
Community institutions, and how they should develop.493 Thatcher felt the European 
Parliament’s power and direct elections were interlinked and needed to be addressed together. 
The Conservatives created a policy group which aimed to examine the relationship between 
the EP and the Westminster Parliament.494 The Conservative Party was more concerned with 
European integration, which included the manner and speed in which the Community should 
develop. Thatcher felt that ‘setting dates are not the best spur to progress’.495 Kirk agreed, and 
both felt that ‘member states should develop the habit of working together’ to develop the 
Community.496 Thatcher suggested that the Conservatives should be more pragmatic towards 
the developments of the EP.497 Her statement here is very significant as her views towards the 
EP help illustrate her wider attitudes towards the Community which have been discussed in 
the wider literature. David Reynolds suggests that she was no different to any other European 
leader and defended British interests.498 Hugo Young has likened Thatcher’s views on Europe 
to that of ‘an agnostic who still attended church'.499 However, her view towards the European 
Parliament adds specifically with John Young’s examination of her, who concluded that she 
was pragmatic in her policy towards Europe (like Harold Wilson).500 Her pragmatic attitudes 
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towards the European Parliament from 1976 to 1988 supports Young’s argument as she took 
a pragmatic view of the European Parliament. 
There were also other points of division between Conservative MEPs and MPs, namely their 
preferences over the way in which the Community should develop. The Conservatives 
wanted the Council of Ministers to remain the decision-making body in the Community. 
Douglas Hurd (MP for mid-Oxfordshire) reiterated the point in a speech after the referendum 
at Swinton Conservative College. The Conservatives did not want the Council to be ‘pre-
empted or deflected by the European Council’.501 They also wanted to maintain the veto 
option in the Council of Ministers, a view that was shared by other member states.502 MEPs, 
however,  disagreed, as they wanted the Commission to remain the principle initiating body 
of the Community as well as providing administrative services necessary to carry out the will 
of the Council of Ministers.503 However, Thatcher insisted that the Commission should take 
on a limited say on foreign policy, arguing that the area of foreign policy was not adequately 
provided for in the treaties.504 On this, Conservative MEPs agreed.505 The European 
Parliament was an institution to provide some form of democratic control over draft 
Community legislation. However, the Conservatives were unclear on how the EP should 
develop, hence the need for the creation of the working group.506 In general, the only 
disagreements between MEPs led by Kirk and the Conservative Party led by Thatcher were 
regarding the relationship between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. 
The MEPs wanted more powers for the EP which would limit the influence of the Council 
and Commission. This was because they shared views with Thatcher’s predecessor, Edward 
Heath, who had originally selected the delegation which added to the image of the MEPs 
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being a Heathite wing of the party. Yet Thatcher’s views towards the EP were not 
Eurosceptic between 1975 and 1979, and she was willing to be pragmatic towards its 
developments.  
The looming issue of direct elections and the referendum meant that Thatcher as leader had 
little time to outline her own European policy. Moreover, less than a year after the 
referendum the political focus shifted to Wilson’s resignation as Prime Minister and the 
Labour succession battle, which meant that Thatcher was again side-tracked and did not have 
the political space to outline her own agenda. However, in April 1976 with Callaghan 
installed as Prime Minister, she took the opportunity to outline her own views on the 
Community, amongst other issues, in a document entitled The Right Approach. Regarding 
defence, Thatcher advocated that NATO should provide the framework for Britain. She 
believed that the European Community was increasingly playing a larger part in domestic and 
foreign policy. She went on to state that ‘we forget the opportunities within the Community 
and seem obsessed with the difficulties it faces’.507 Again this shows similarities between 
Heath’s and Thatcher’s policy towards the Community in this period. Moreover, in 1976 the 
Community was also very active regarding European Parliament matters particularly in 
resolving problems surrounding direct elections. Hence, the European Parliament received 
more attention from the British government.  
A general election took place on 3 May 1979, five months before the end of the Labour 
government’s maximum possible five-year term. It occurred after the Scottish devolution 
referendum held on 1 March 1979 failed to deliver a sufficient number of Yes votes to meet 
the threshold of 40 per cent of registered voters which caused a divide between the Labour 
 




Party and the SNP, this left the Labour government in a vulnerable position.508 Thatcher took 
this opportunity to table a motion of no confidence, which was passed by one vote: 311 for 
and 310 against.509 The Conservatives also appeared more willing to engage with the 
European Community than Labour. However, the Conservative manifesto reiterated its 
concern over Parliamentary sovereignty, stating that ‘we will see that Parliament and no other 
body stands at the centre of the nation's life and decisions’.510 The statement was partly a 
reference to the supposed rival power base represented by the trade unions, with their strike 
committees and pickets. Additionally, this statement also suggested that external 
organisations should not have a say in Britain’s decision-making, amongst which might be 
included institutions such as the European Parliament. For this reason, Thatcher wanted to 
keep the Community’s powers within the Council. The internal situation for Labour was 
worse because of the division in the party, with some Labour MPs feeling that the party had 
moved too far to the political left. Furthermore, the Community divided the party on another 
axis, as the party overall took an anti-European line. This was despite members such as Roy 
Jenkins, David Owen, and Shirley Williams who had all expressed their pro-European views. 
As described by Gilmour and Garnet, this, combined with rising anti-trade union sentiment, 
helped ensure that the Conservatives won the general election.511  
At the European Council meeting held in Dublin 29-30 November 1979 Thatcher failed to 
secure a reduction in Britain’s net contribution to the Community. Resolving Britain’s budget 
contribution had been a core objective for the Conservative government with Thatcher stating 
that she had hoped for a ‘catalytic decision to be taken in Dublin’.512 Because this did not 
materialise many Conservatives felt that the Council members had acted unfairly towards 
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Britain. In his account, Alex May suggests that it was at this Council meeting where the 
rebate 'argument got into full swing';513 while John Young argues that the rebate had the 
potential to create a strong Franco-German alliance putting Britain in the position it was in 
prior to accession, 'sidelined in Europe, without direct influence on the Continentals'.514 The 
European Parliament was important in this debate as will be seen in the following chapter as 
it controlled the mechanism to authorise a rebate which meant the outcome of the Dublin 
Council meeting also led the Conservative MEPs into disputes with other groupings.515 Early 
signs of this can be detected amongst Conservative MEPs.516 In December Scott-Hopkins 
called Thatcher to suggest that the EDG could attempt to reject the 1980 budget in the EP.517 
The suggestion was met with opposition by other EDG Conservative members. Alexander 
Sherlock (MEP for Essex South West) wrote to Thatcher stating that Scott-Hopkins did not 
speak for the entire grouping on this matter.518 The MEPs believed the rejection of the 
European Parliament budget would damage relations which in turn would make it 
increasingly difficult to readdress Britain’s budgetary problems. Alexander Sherlock's 
response also shows that Scott-Hopkins did not command the full support of the grouping.  
Scott-Hopkins’s suggestion to withhold payments reveals a difference between himself and 
the delegation which led to tensions within the grouping. As a result, Sherlock contacted 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Treasury officials to prepare a report on the 
consequences of rejecting an EP budget.519 The report had concluded that even if the budget 
was rejected the Community would not come to a financial halt due to the ‘twelfth regime’ 
which stated that the Community could spend up to one twelfth of the 1980 budget as it saw 
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fit every month.520 Additionally, the report suggested that Britain should use this as an 
opportunity to ensure that less of the budget was focused on agricultural affairs and was 
instead put towards structural expenditure or regional funds. The matter shows the first-time 
divisions began to occur between British MEPs for the EDG, and some believe this was 
partly because of the leadership style of Scott-Hopkins,521 whose leadership would continue 
to be a concern heading into the European Parliament presidency election in 1982.  
Additionally, because of these problems the Conservative Party at Westminster wanted the 
Council of Ministers to play a larger role in shaping the Community’s budget. This would 
limit the amount of powers the European Parliament had over the budget, which was 
arguably the only real power it held. Furthermore, there was limited opposition to the Council 
gaining powers and the European Parliament losing influence. It was the first time in which 
little opposition arose from Conservative MEPs on the EP potentially losing powers. 
Previously, under Kirk’s leadership the position was that the European Parliament should be 
strengthened. However, under Scott-Hopkins, ‘the EDG was less resistant to change’.522 The 
matter was exacerbated as Conservative members, including Thatcher, wanted to ensure that 
power resided within the Council. Britain’s net contribution to the Community had caused 
many problems and after the European Council in Dublin, more issues regarding net 
contributions arose. Lastly, Sherlock’s work with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
Treasury shows that MEPs could work with these two departments. Moreover, in the future 
both these departments worked with European Parliament committees to ensure the British 
government’s policy on specific matters were administered.523 
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Since Thatcher had become leader of the Conservatives, her view on the way the Community 
should develop had changed. She and other Conservatives wanted to keep powers within the 
Council of Ministers, limiting the role of the European Parliament; the Heathite delegation of 
Conservative MEPs disagreed.524 Moreover, the death of Kirk led to Scott-Hopkins becoming 
the grouping’s leader and he was less enthusiastic about the Community. Yet Thatcher had 
communication with the MEPs and supported them on central matters such as salaries. Her 
views regarding the EP were depicted in 1976 when she suggested that the Conservatives 
should take a pragmatic approach to the development of the European Parliament, an 
approach she maintained until 1988. It marked an important moment in the relationship 
between Thatcher and the MEPs as the two worked together on several issues in her 
premiership. Thatcher’s attitudes towards the European Parliament is important as it 
contributes to the wider literature surrounding her attitudes towards the Community. As has 
been noted previously, David Reynolds argues that she was no different to any other 
European leader and defended British interests.525 Hugo Young has suggested that Thatcher 
was like ‘an agnostic who still attended church' regarding her views to towards the 
Community.526 However, her views towards the European Parliament as seen in this chapter 
are best seen through John Young’s work, who concluded that she was pragmatic in her 
policy towards Europe (like Harold Wilson).527 Although John Young and other accounts 
mentioned do not make specific use of her views towards the European Parliament despite its 
significance. The European Parliament provided democratic legitimacy to the Community 
through direct elections and had oversight of the Community budget, which is necessary to 
consider when examining Conservative attitudes towards the Community in this specific 
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Chapter Four: European Developments 
 
Since British accession in 1973 the Community had grown to nine member states. 
Enlargement encouraged many member states to believe deeper integration would be the 
future for the Community and believed this could be achieved in two ways. The first was 
through another round of enlargement; the second through further economic integration 
between member states. The Community felt this would ease economic tensions throughout 
Europe. However, the British Conservatives as a whole were ambivalent towards this as they 
did not wish to see a federalised Community that would take powers away from the British 
Parliament. The EP had a role in both aspects, and this chapter draws together archival and 
published sources that can shed light on the Conservative MEPs role in the European 
Parliament.   
Mediterranean Enlargement 
The following section will examine the issues surrounding the potential membership of 
Greece and Turkey.528 It will show that despite opposition from member states the European 
Parliament supported Greek enlargement as MEPs feared the potential of Greece falling into 
the Soviet Union's orbit.  
Enlargement was on the agenda in 1975 as both Greece and Turkey had made enquiries about 
joining the Community. The European Conservatives and the CDs agreed that both nations 
could join if the region became more stable, Scott-Hopkins stating that ‘it is possible for both 
countries to eventually join’.529 This view was shared by the Community as a whole, although 
the EP did feel it needed to be prepared for enlargement. Because of this the Dutch Socialist 
C. L Patijn prepared a report regarding the future of the European Parliament. It envisaged a 
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larger European Parliament with 355 seats, an increase from the then total of 198 with all 
members being directly elected.530 The report had much support, mainly from German and 
Dutch Socialists in the European Parliament as well as certain Commissioners. Kirk and the 
EDG likewise supported the report but were less enthusiastic about the 1978 deadline for 
direct elections.531 A second report was produced by the Christian Democrat Alfred Bertrand, 
entitled the Bertrand Report. This outlined the future of the Community suggesting a political 
union. It stated: ‘a single decision-making centre which will be in the nature of a real 
European government, independent of the national government and responsible to the 
Parliament of the future.’532 The report was opposed by the European Conservatives who did 
not want to develop the Community as quickly as the report suggested. Kirk felt strongly on 
the matter, specifically because he felt the timing of this report was too premature.533 The 
Bertrand Report appeared at the same time as the Socialist grouping had published their own 
Patijn Report in the run up to direct elections. Due to this, the CDs felt that they had to 
respond and outline their future for the European Parliament. 
Within the European Parliament there was support for Greek accession. However, Harun 
Arikan has argued that some member states worried about Greece joining. They felt the 
internal stability of Greece would damage the Community.534 Eirini Karamouzi’s account 
also suggests that due to the inability of the nine to come to a common position regarding 
Greek membership, accession was unlikely to occur in the 1970s.535 The British Labour 
MEPs took the view that the internal structure of the nine would be compromised. Tam 
Dalyell, a Scottish Labour MP and a member of the Socialists grouping, warned fellow 
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European Parliament members that Greece’s application should ‘not be used to create a two 
tier European Community’ with developed members such as the big four in one tier, and 
developing smaller countries in another.536 However, other Socialists disagreed, particularly 
the German Socialists who felt that membership would help consolidate a young democratic 
nation like Greece.537 They believed that the European Parliament could specifically help 
Greece, and hoped that the Council would consult the European Parliament, and Scott-
Hopkins agreed.538 However, the EDG had mixed views on Greek accession and were 
ambivalent as a whole. For example, despite Scott-Hopkins’s views, Lord Bethel suggested 
that excessive haste would be incorrect.539 Others agreed, with Christopher Soames stating in 
March 1976 that ‘we think it right to put some economic water into the somewhat heady 
political wine’.540 Yet the work of David Clark suggests this attitude reflected the European 
Commission’s view on the matter as it had taken a pragmatic approach to Greece’s 
application.541 Greek accession also brought the question of Turkish accession.542 The 
European Parliament feared that Greece’s application would further exacerbate the 
Community’s ‘already stormy relationship’ with Turkey.543 Due to this, the European 
Parliament motioned for the nine member states to offer better concessions for Turkish farm 
exports.544 Furthermore, the Commission’s official policy regarding this matter was that both 
nations were associates of the Community. They believed that both could eventually be 
members, though the timetable for accession might vary. However, negotiations formally 
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began between Greece and the Community in September 1976. The Conservatives displayed 
ambivalence on the matter of a second Mediterranean enlargement, and the subject also 
divided the European Parliament.  
With Greek accession becoming a larger concern, MEPs became more involved in accession 
matters, which would increase in future years. But the immediate concern for Britain was the 
effects that Greek membership would have on its budget contribution which was a highly 
sensitive topic. British Conservative MEPs expected that as 60 per cent of Greek agricultural 
output was in fruit, vegetables, and wine it meant Britain’s net contribution to the Community 
would not increase.545 The Commission agreed, but certain commissioners and MEPs led by 
Germany and Italy dissented. They calculated that Britain’s contribution would increase with 
Greek accession, and from 1978-79 could increase by over £470 million, which Britain 
refused to accept.546 Geoffrey Rippon insisted in the European Parliament that the British 
Conservatives remained supporters of enlargement. He noted that the Treaty of Rome ‘did 
not envisage a Community limited to six or nine’.547 However, there were concerns over the 
growing disparity between the needs of the Southern and Northern European countries. It led 
to certain Conservatives such as Lord Bruce of Donington urging that the Commission make 
a bigger effort to hasten the procedure for Greece’s eventual accession, as he, like other 
Conservatives, felt the Community could help secure a democratic future for Greece, and that 
this could then have a knock-on effect in other Southern European countries.548 Furthermore, 
a second round of enlargement would lead to more Community reforms presenting the EDG 
with an opportunity to push forward European Parliament reforms. Additionally, it could be 
timely as direct elections would allow the European Parliament to gain more recognition. 
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Regardless of the potential benefits of enlargement it remained an immense task. The 
economic and political situation of Greece were very different to that of Britain, Ireland, and 
Demark in 1973. The consensus of the Community supported Greek accession. This was 
because in 1977 the Cold War context was still profoundly important, and Western European 
nations feared that Southern European countries could potentially become Communist states. 
Many in the European Parliament even felt that nations such as Greece could learn from the 
way the European Parliament worked. The episode shows how MEPs had input on significant 
Community matters such as enlargement, an area where the European Parliament’s influence 
would grow in this period. 
Economic integration 
The following section examines the introduction of EMS. The EMS began operating in May 
1979 and continued to be a concern despite weaker economies beginning to improve. Scott-
Hopkins held reservations, suggesting that if Britain joined it would have had to intervene as 
Sterling would be hitting the upper band of the EMS, within three weeks of the system 
starting.549 Geoffrey Howe, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer, also raised this specific 
point with Thatcher.550 This part of the chapter will show that the Conservative MEPs and 
Thatcher shared a similar view: that Britain should join at a time of economic stability. 
Through the EMS it can be seen again that on central matters, Thatcher and the MEPs 
worked effectively with one another.  
There were also many economic difficulties which had hampered the development of the 
Community. Ian Cawood proposes that this was because of the chronic effect of the 1973 oil 
crisis which was still being felt in 1978.551 Britain had not hit its growth target and 
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unemployment remained high. Other member states were in a similar position. Moreover, 
Britain’s large budget contribution to the Community provided opponents of integration 
within the UK opportunities to attack the Community. Austin Mitchell (Labour MP for 
Grimsby) stated that ‘An anti-European feeling was developing rapidly and on a considerable 
scale’.552 It also encouraged scrutiny of the functions of the European Parliament, the cost of 
European elections, and the cost of MEPs. Overall it entailed the depiction of the Community 
negatively. Furthermore, with the potential accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal there 
were further economic concerns. Members of the Conservative Party, including figures such 
as Christopher Soames, were hesitant over Greek accession.553 Roy Jenkins also feared that 
accession of three more countries would potentially weaken the Community. The economic 
data had shown the Community’s trade growth decreasing from an average of nine per cent 
per annum to two per cent in 1977 which Jenkins suggested was caused by the oil crisis of 
1973.554 The situation was exacerbated as other countries rebounded from the crisis quicker 
than the Community, particularly the US and Japan. The US dollar was at the time the only 
effective medium of international trade which greatly impacted the European currencies 
along with intra-Community relationships. Jenkins argued that the dollar having withdrawn 
from its responsibilities under Bretton Woods was ‘like a legion without central 
command.’555 The Conservative delegation led by Rippon wanted the Community to act. 
MEPs felt that further integration might be necessary since the Bretton Woods system had 
collapsed in 1971,556 which brought to the forefront the idea of the European and Monetary 
System (EMS). The EMS was meant to establish an area of economic stability for member 
states by preventing large fluctuations in exchange rates. In Cobham and Zis’s account, they 
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suggest it was also an attempt to deepen economic integration.557 Eirini Karamouzi even 
argues that 'the genesis of the European Monetary System (EMS) came to be linked 
with enlargement'.558 Regardless, the EMS would ensure that the Community would be more 
prepared for economic difficulties in the future, drawing on lessons learnt from the OPEC oil 
crisis.  
Jenkins and the EDG held divergent views on how the Community should address economic 
issues. The EDG wanted to develop a common economic policy to tackle problems, as 
illustrated in the Blumenfeld Report.559 This suggested that ‘links between the Foreign 
Ministers of the Nine and the European Parliament must be improved and strengthened'.  The 
Blumenfeld Report is also an example of how the EDG was able to work with other MEPs, as 
it was a revised version of the Bertrand Report, which as seen previously, was opposed by the 
EDG. Moreover, Thatcher emphasised that a coordinated effort was required, stating that ‘the 
joint declarations issued by Foreign Ministers and heads of government certainly have their 
significance, but what really matters is joint efforts to translate words into deeds. If Europe 
speaks with many voices her views will be lost.’560 The statement again shows that Thatcher 
and the Conservative MEPs were in agreement. The statement was also supported by most of 
the European Parliament who, as did the EDG, argued that action needed to be taken 
urgently.561 They believed that with direct elections approaching and more scrutiny being 
placed on the Community the issue should be resolved. 
Jenkins however, wanted instead to develop the European unit of account. This could be used 
to settle internal exchange rate matters and ensure that the economic ‘snake’ system worked 
correctly. Yet Piers Ludlow argues that Jenkins remained hesitant of the scheme due to its 
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cost ‘which had been most clearly spelled out’.562  This was despite the European unit 
potentially preventing deeper integration, which would appease Labour and Conservative 
Eurosceptics, but could also ease the economic strain on the Community.563 The matter was 
decided at the Copenhagen European Council Summit, again highlighting the importance of 
these summits. The subject dominated proceedings, not only because of the situation in 
Europe, but also because a Western Economic Summit was set to occur in 1978. 
At the Council meeting it was decided that over a three-month period a common economic 
policy would be developed.564 The main objective of the EMS was to create a ‘zone of 
monetary stability’.565 EMS did, however, have characteristics of the Bretton Woods 
monetary system. The EMS involved a fixed exchange rate that could be adjusted 
accordingly. EMS also included a European Currency Unit (ECU) in which each member 
state had a central currency rate determined by the ECU. These central rates would then 
determine the upper and lower bands of the ERM. It would then be the duty of member 
states’ central banks to ensure their currencies stayed within these bands, replacing the 
European ‘snake’ mechanism.566 Prior to the European Council meeting, over a three-month 
period French President Giscard d’Estaing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had held 
bilateral discussions to develop an EMS. Callaghan was not involved and felt that the UK 
was being alienated regarding economic integration.567 Both Conservative and Labour 
members were concerned, as they wanted certain conditions for an EMS. For example, they 
wanted a level and fair contribution to be made by poorer member states as well as more 
developed ones. They also wanted to ensure that adequate financial support mechanisms were 
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in place for both short- and medium-term credit.568 This demonstrates that the Conservatives 
were open to the idea of deeper integration but cautious about EMS. Regarding EMS, 
tensions began to rise as Britain felt side-lined by Franco-German relations. It was decided 
that Britain would not fully participate in EMS, although sterling would be in the basket of 
currencies that formed the ECU. This was a tactic that would later be used in the Maastricht 
negotiations.569 Britain had not joined the EMS because of the objections of Callaghan, and 
Alex Wright argues that his scepticism stemmed from seeing the failure of the ‘snake’ in 
previous years.570 Yet Alex May has suggested that Callaghan sought concessions because of 
the internal disputes regarding the Community in the Labour Party.571 The EDG differed in 
their views on this development as they, like Thatcher, were also hesitant over the EMS. Yet 
some MEPs wished to join, the grouping as a whole wanted integration to occur more 
slowly.572 The Conservative MEPs, again, were a group within the Conservative Party whose 
views have not been fully explored in the literature regarding Britain and the EMS. 
There were other problems that the EMS presented to Britain. For the Conservative Party, 
namely that Britain would have constraints on the ability to manage its own exchange rate. 
The EMS also suggested that economic integration could potentially lead to further political 
integration. The Conservative government believed that the EMS could eventually align 
domestic economic policies of member states.573 Hence EMS was widely viewed as a tool for 
further integration which the Conservatives approached with caution. Furthermore, joining 
the EMS would require a change to be made in the way the Conservative government was 
using monetary policy to tackle inflation. Howe stated that the EMS ‘put the cart before the 
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horse’.574 He suggested a case could be made for member states to individually resolve their 
economies before committing to EMS, which had not been proven. Moreover, as observed by 
Cobham and Zis, the EMS 'was a threat to America whether it successfully survived or 
spectacularly failed'.575 Thus Britain fully supporting the EMS could have potentially affected 
its relationship with the USA. Thus, it can be seen that there were many reasons to oppose the 
EMS which also caused some Conservative MEPs to be split on the matter. 
There were however, many potential benefits of joining the EMS. First, there were economic 
benefits that could be amplified if Britain joined, as it gave the British government the ability 
to choose the starting rate in the EMS. Additionally, EMS was not a rigid fixed exchange rate 
system hence Britain would not lose complete control over exchange rate policies. This was 
an argument used by some MEPs, including members of the EDG.576 Joining the EMS also 
had certain political advantages, Howe suggesting that it would be a ‘firm indication that we 
are breaking from the past’.577 Again, some Conservative MEPs felt this could improve 
relations with the Community. Scott-Hopkins believed Britain should join under stable 
economic conditions and that joining should be exploited to its fullest.578 He and others 
wanted to use joining the EMS as a tool to ensure Britain’s contribution to the Community 
was lowered. It would also assist in developing the MEPs’ relations with other groupings. 
France, however, remained hesitant over Britain joining the EMS, as Sterling would be a 
strong currency. In turn, this would have a large impact on the Franc, weakening the position 
of France in matters of the EMS.579 It can be clearly seen that there were many obstacles for 
the EMS, since it started in June 1979 Britain’s attitude was that they should join the EMS in 
a period of economic stability. 
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Another immediate issue was the question of whether Britain should swap some of the UK’s 
reserves for European Currency Units (ECU). In 1979 Britain’s attitudes towards these 
matters were addressed at the European Council meeting in Strasbourg. Thatcher announced 
that Britain would deposit some of its dollar and gold reserves in the European Cooperation 
Fund in exchange for ECUs.580 She also stated that Britain would reconsider its position on 
the EMS after a review in September, proposing that Britain would contribute to certain 
aspects of the EMS.581 Britain’s aim in 1979 under Thatcher was to join the EMS, but in a 
period of economic stability. Her views again reiterated that she was willing to be more 
cooperative in the Community than the Labour Party. The matter also demonstrates that 
Thatcher and the British Conservative MEPs as whole worked together on the EMS as they 
both shared a similar view.  
Overall, the death of Kirk and the eventual leadership Scott-Hopkins was critical as it would 
shape the British Conservative approach in the European Parliament and the wider 
Community. Direct elections had also played a part in developing the relationship between 
the EPP and the European Conservatives. However, the largest factor for overall deeper 
integration which encompassed enlargement, closer relations with groupings, and the EMS 
was within the context of the Cold War: Europe still had to secure its own future. The 
importance of the Cold War in Community developments is discussed in the work of Steve 
Marsh and Wyn Rees.582 Additionally, Andrew Moravcsik has also argued that the economic 
difficulties in Europe illustrated the weakness of the Community during this period.583 
However, neither account discusses the views of MEPs. This chapter has shown how some 
MEPs believed the Community’s difficulties could be overcome through deeper integration, 
which the EMS represented. British Conservative MEPs wanted deeper integration but more 
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slowly to ensure public opinion followed, a view shared by Conservatives at Westminster; 
again, demonstrating that Thatcher and the Conservative MEPs in the mid to late 1970s 





























Overall, the 1970s demonstrated developments in the Community and the contribution made 
by the Conservative MEPs. The Conservative delegation started their tenure in the European 
Parliament strongly as they were instrumental in introducing the new question time procedure 
in 1973. They wished to make the European Parliament a more efficient institution, as seen in 
section one. Furthermore, the new question time provided the European Parliament with 
informal influence in the overall decision-making process of the Community. Corbett and 
Shackleton argue it provided ‘opportunity to obtain precise information on particular points 
or to force a policy statement to be made’ by the Commission.584 Caroline Jackson suggests 
that ‘the British popular press [saw it] as a victory for Westminster procedures’.585 Section 
one adds to these debates by highlighting the role of the British Conservative MEPs in 
introducing this process through their memorandum tabled in 1973. Moreover, the 
introduction of question time as seen in section one allowed MEPs to debate freely with 
Commissioners which led to better relations between the two. The new question time also 
shows that Conservative MEPs shared a similar view to Heath at the time as they wanted to 
legitimise the European Parliament. 
The Conservative MEPs as seen in chapter one were able to form their own grouping which 
gave the MEPs an opportunity to provide a distinct British contribution to the EP particularly 
with Britain joining the Community late in 1973. The accounts of Nelsen and Guth as well as 
Heuser and Buffet suggest that due to religion, the CDs were unwilling to accept British 
Conservative MEPs.586 Yet the relationship between the British Conservatives and the EPP 
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was lukewarm not only for religious reasons but because the EPP believed the original 
Conservative delegation should have sat with them immediately in 1973.587 Moreover, on a 
personal level the senior figures of the two groupings had many differences. Kirk felt that 
British Conservatives viewed Conservatism differently to the CDs members. Furthermore, 
they had concerns regarding the manner and speed in which the Community should develop, 
which was reflected in the Bertrand Report which the European Democratic Grouping (EDG) 
opposed, as seen in section one.588 These concerns about the report was not examined in other 
works as the sources were not available to many at the time; hence an original contribution is 
made regarding these reports. The differences in the reports add more to the literature 
regarding the relationship of the EPP and EDG.589 The differences between the two groupings 
led to difficulties as the EDG could not push through its policies when votes from other 
groupings were required, since the EDG was a small group. The size of the grouping made 
the job of Conservative MEPs difficult as they spent much of their time building relations. In 
his account, William Riker has more broadly discussed small groupings within the European 
Parliament, and proposes that through bartering votes in one area smaller groupings could 
gain support in another area: he refers to this as the ‘minimum-winning’ 
tactic.590  Additionally, Bernard Steunenberg describes the creation of smaller groupings in 
the European Parliament as a ‘costly move’ although his account examines the Italian 
Communist grouping created in 1989.591 Section one has shown the struggles that a small 
grouping, specifically the EDG, faced in getting support, as seen regarding the motion to 
censure the European Commission in 1976 and the issue of company mergers.  
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The most significant development regarding the European Parliament throughout the 1970s 
was the advent of direct elections. Juliet Lodge has suggested these would ‘erase the 
Community’s democratic deficit’.592 Richard Corbett also explains how many felt that the 
European Parliament’s powers would increase after direct elections.593 Nicholas Crowson 
discusses the attitudes of Conservative MPs who feared the loss of parliamentary sovereignty 
to the European Parliament if direct elections occurred.594 Section one, however, through 
using more archival material, shows that many, including Peter Kirk, felt that the powers of 
the European Parliament would increase after direct elections. The section however 
ultimately showed that elections were led by other Community institutions and national 
governments ahead of the European Parliament demonstrating the limited influence the 
European Parliament had in this earlier period which would differ greatly in the 1980s 
onwards. 
However, there were failures regarding direct elections that damaged the European 
Parliament’s credibility, and much has been written on the topic. Follesdal and Hix argue that 
direct elections did not reduce the democratic deficit within the Community as the powers of 
the European Parliament remained limited.595 Richard Corbett has suggests that the lack of 
interest shown by the British public damaged the European Parliament.596 Furthermore, 
David Gowland suggests that ‘the episode further strengthened the image of Britain as a 
recalcitrant member state’.597 Section one shows that the date for elections was repeatedly 
moved back illustrating a lack of coordination between member states and the cumbersome 
decision-making process within the Community. It also damaged the credibility of the 
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European Parliament. Moreover, turnout for Britain in the European Elections was a mere 33 
per cent. Franklin and Hobolt have explained that low turnout damaged the legitimacy of the 
European Parliament in Britain, which had a lasting effect on subsequent European Elections 
as turnout remained low.598 The low turnout was attributed to the fact that the public felt that 
issues such as industrial relations and unemployment were best dealt with by Westminster 
rather than the European Parliament. Section one showed low turnout in direct elections also 
marked a significant moment in the relationship between the European Parliament and Britain 
because it showed a disconnection between the public and MEPs. It meant that the public 
would look more towards Westminster than towards MEPs to press European policy. The 
Conservatives, however, had some success in these elections which reflected the results of 
the general election in 1979.  
Section two showed that domestically, the MEP’s role was scrutinised specifically regarding 
the balance between the costs and benefits. Nicholas Crowson has suggested that 
parliamentary sovereignty was a concern for MPs.599 In contrast, Anthony Forster has shown 
that opposition, specifically regarding the European Parliament, arose more from the Labour 
Party.600 As seen in section two, even after the referendum, Labour MEPs could be a counter-
balance to the European Parliament and prevent its federalist agenda. Section two showed 
how the Conservative Party as a whole was less hostile towards MEPs, particularly regarding 
their salaries. These were a very sensitive topic on which Thatcher supported Conservative 
MEPS, a matter not discussed in Forster's examination of the EP. The salary increase was 
supported by the Conservative Party ultimately as they had developed a better understanding 
of the advantages of MEPs and the role, they played in Community decision-making, 
particularly in campaigning and the support they provided in administering European policy. 
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It was demonstrated in 1975 when Lord O’Hagan was pivotal in ensuring the Community 
provided funds for the Yes campaign, and many MEPs, such as Henry Plumb and Scott-
Hopkins, campaigned across the country for Britain's continued membership. Moreover, 
unlike Labour, Conservative MEPs had some successes in the European Parliament as seen 
by the introduction of a question time.  
Both sections have touched on the relationship between the Conservative leadership and the 
MEP delegation. Section one showed that Heath had chosen a delegation, many of whom, 
such as Peter Kirk, had strong relations with him. Moreover, both sections argued that despite 
the burden of the dual mandate many MEPs were able to have clear communications with 
Westminster and Whitehall departments. This continued to be the case when Thatcher 
became leader of the Conservative Party. Thus, overall in this period the MEPs and the 
Conservative leadership were able to effectively work together.  
Nonetheless, both sections have demonstrated the hostility some MPs showed towards MEPs 
in House of Commons debates and, as a consequence, some MEPs became disillusioned with 
Westminster over the course of the 1970s. Much has been written on Thatcher’s attitudes 
towards the Community in this early period of British membership. John Young has drawn 
comparisons between Thatcher and Wilson suggesting that she took a pragmatic view on the 
Community.601 Richard Vinen has commented that Thatcher consistently supported 
membership of the Community,602 while John Turner observed that Thatcher came into 
power at the time of the referendum and thus had little time to outline her European policy.603 
Seldon and Collings also suggest that Thatcher had to maintain party unity, even in the 
document The Right Approach, noting that she ‘had to move stealthily, coaxing and cajoling 
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her shadow cabinet behind her’.604 Section one and two have added to these debates, by 
offering a much more granular and empirically rich case study of Thatcher’s attitudes, 
specifically towards the European Parliament and the Conservative MEPs. As seen in section 
two, she was willing to take a pragmatic view on the European Parliament’s development. 
Moreover, she held strong working relations with the MEP delegation and supported them on 
central matters including that of salary increases. Thatcher and the MEPs even held a similar 
position on many issues such as the EMS and Greek accession. The two sections show 
Thatcher's pragmatic approach to the European Parliament which should be considered when 
assessing her overall policy towards the Community. Thatcher was, however, assisted by 
many MEPs holding dual mandates which made it easier to communicate with the MEP 
delegation. Yet communication between MEPs and MPs would become increasingly difficult 








Section Three: The Conservative Party and the 
Community: 1980-85 
  
The period of 1980-85 was dominated by the debate surrounding Britain’s budget 
contribution to the Community and reform of the CAP. Both these matters were fundamental 
to Thatcher’s overall European policy. The matter culminated in 1984 when Britain began to 
receive a rebate from the Community, although the CAP remained untouched despite the 
efforts of the Conservative government and the MEPs working in committees. Additionally, 
the newly elected European Parliament worked hard to gain new powers. It became clear in 
this period that the committees ‘were the engine room of the Parliament’.605 The Rules 
Committee was important and Conservative MEPs contributed greatly to the development of 
the European Parliament. Christopher Prout, Amédée Turner, and Ben Patterson all assisted 
in this through utilising the European Parliament’s power to delay decision making. The 
section will also demonstrate how some MEPs, such as Christopher Prout, Diane Elles, Henry 
Plumb, Scott-Hopkins and Christopher Jackson were able to build strong relations with MPs 
and Whitehall departments.  
1980-85 was a turbulent time for the Conservative MEPs as Scott-Hopkins was replaced by 
Henry Plumb as leader of the EDG and head of the British Conservatives in 1982. 
Furthermore, in 1982 Scott-Hopkins and the grouping had supported the election of the 
Socialist Pieter Dankert to be the European Parliament President ahead of Egon Klepsch of 
the EPP. The episode had a long-lasting impact on the relationship between the British 
Conservatives and the EPP. Klepsch was disliked by the grouping, which shows that the 
division between the EPP and EDG arose from significant moments such as the 1982 
European Parliament Presidency election or the decision to sit independently as a grouping in 
 




1973. The change in leadership was a traumatic moment for the grouping as Scott-Hopkins 
was ousted due to the outcome of the European Parliament Presidency election. Plumb came 
from a farming background and held strong relations with EPP members.606 Yet Conservative 
MEPs worked closely with the Conservative government in this period on various matters 
ranging from European Parliament reports on Northern Ireland and the Falklands, to defining 
the mechanism used to pay Britain’s rebate. The rebate will demonstrate the role 
Conservative MEPs played alongside Thatcher, and was an example where Thatcher made 
efforts to work with the MEPs. However, the array of concerns surrounding the European 
Parliament, which included direct elections and the cost of MEPs, meant that the incident of 
the Northern Ireland report in 1983 damaged the relationship between the MEPs and the 
Conservative government. Some MEPs began to become increasingly disillusioned with 
Westminster. MEPs discussed how frustrated they were in the lack of understanding by the 
public regarding the sheer workload and the strain being a MEP put on their personal 
relationships.607 However as will be seen, Thatcher continued to work with the MEPs, and 
some held strong relationships with her. 
Lastly, Greece formally joined the Community in 1981 increasing the total number of MEPs 
from 410 to 434. Negotiations for further Mediterranean enlargement also took place with 
Spain and Portugal. Due to the 1979 direct elections, the European Parliament was better 
equipped to manage enlargement. However, it felt that its powers should increase with many 
believing the Council of Ministers and Commission had too much influence in the 
Community, a view shared by EDG members. A problem for the EDG, however, remained 
the size and lack of diversity in its grouping. As a result, throughout this period it had to rely 
on relationships with other groupings to have a say in the European Parliament. Members of 
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the EDG even contemplated joining the EPP unless it was able to attract MEPs from 





















Chapter Five: EDG in the European Parliament 
 
The following chapter will discuss significant events that shaped the EDG, namely the 
European Parliament presidency of 1982 and how this had a long-lasting effect on its 
relationship with the EPP, as was the ousting of Scott-Hopkins as leader. It will also examine 
the impact of the Northern Ireland report, which was a key moment for the relationship 
between MEPs and MPs. The Northern Ireland report will show that MPs and MEPs were 
able effectively to work together despite the meeting at Number Ten which led to some 
MEPs falling out with Thatcher. Lastly, it will analyse the early ideas of Delors in his 
presidency and the EMS. 
Conservative MEPs were left frustrated as they struggled to build relationships in the 
European Parliament. The size of the EDG was becoming a concern, a legacy of the decision 
taken to sit alone in 1973 as seen in section one. Moreover, as also seen in section one, major 
decisions were led by governments or other Community institutions. As a result, Thatcher 
and her advisors were concerned for MEPs and commissioned a report on their morale.608 It 
again demonstrates that Thatcher and her senior advisors thought it was best to engage with 
the MEPs and to be kept abreast of developments within the delegation. This was because the 
MEPs were still a valuable resource in providing insights into the workings of the 
Community as many worked on multiple European Parliament committees and held relations 
with European Commissioners. Thatcher and her advisors understood that if they wanted to 
secure a rebate on Community contributions the European Parliament and MEPs would play 
a significant role.609 In November 1980, Robert Jackson (MEP for Upper Thames) wrote a 
report on the state of British Conservative MEPs, and his findings suggested that out of the 
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30 hardest working MEPs, seventeen were British Conservative.610 Jackson went on to argue 
that it would eventually lead to some MEPs becoming disillusioned with both the 
Conservative Party and the European Parliament.611 The report highlighted the sheer amount 
of work MEPs had, as this covered constituency work, work in the European Parliament and, 
for some, their responsibilities as an MP. Yet certain MPs still undermined them, such as 
Tony Marlow (Conservative MP for Northampton), who stated that MEPs needed to ‘justify 
the glory of their own lame institution’.612 However, Jackson’s report had shown that MEPs 
did not have a clear direction from the Conservative Party on what  goals they should pursue 
in the European Parliament.613 Hence, if membership of the Community turned out to be a 
failure, the MEPs’ morale would be further damaged. The report urged for clear 
communication between the two Parliaments.614 Whilst the lack of direction by the 
Conservative Party encouraged MEPs to act more autonomously. By commissioning this 
report, Thatcher and her advisors showed interest in the Conservative delegation. Thatcher 
was interested in the MEPs because, being elected Conservative officials, they could create 
internal divisions within the party. Moreover, she understood that the MEPs could also be 
utilised to carry out her wider European policies and provide insights into the workings of the 
Community as many worked on multiple European Parliament committees and held relations 
with European Commissioners.615 Hence Thatcher and her senior advisors took the decision 
to consistently engage with the Conservative MEPs as seen in the previous two sections and 
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There was also an issue over the leadership of the Conservative MEPs. Scott-Hopkins was to 
be challenged by Frederick Warner (MEP for Somerset).616 Warner had been an ambassador 
to Japan under Heath and was elected a MEP in 1979. However, Scott-Hopkins had been 
selected as the leader by Thatcher. The Conservative Research Department advised Thatcher 
that the leadership of the British Conservative delegation of MEPs should be decided by the 
party leader.617 Personally Thatcher was open to Scott-Hopkins to stand again. This, however, 
led to complaints from the EDG, who wanted MEPs to vote for their own leader.618 
Moreover, the leader of the EDG did not necessarily need to be the leader of the British 
Conservative delegation as it was still a multinational grouping consisting of 60 British 
MEPs, three Danish MEPS, and one Ulster Unionist MEP. Thus, the MEPs felt that MPs 
were undermining them, even after direct elections had given them democratic legitimacy. 
The leadership matter marked the first real divide between the Conservative MPs and the 
Conservative MEPs. This divide was an effect of direct elections as many MEPs no longer 
had a dual mandate, worsening communication between the two Parliaments. Moreover, with 
direct elections and MEPs belonging to a multinational grouping, they were an elected 
independent bloc. Scott-Hopkins’s leadership had been questioned as he failed to have the 
full confidence of the grouping on key matters such as the rebate.619 His leadership would be 
placed under increasing pressure until 1982 when he was replaced by Henry Plumb.  
Due to the report on morale steps were taken to improve lines of communication between 
MEPs and MPs. James Spicer (MEP for Wessex) was central to this plan. Spicer had held a 
dual mandate since 1979 and was also the chief whip of the EDG. It was decided that his 
responsibility at Westminster was to liaise between the chief whip’s office in London and 
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Strasbourg to ensure clear communication between the two Parliaments.620 Yet one year into 
his role he had begun to dislike this position. He felt it was an ineffective post as there were 
still problems regarding communication between MEPs and MPs, which led to confusion on 
both fronts.621 Spicer proposed that the two whips’ offices deal with each other directly, 
which would be a more efficient way of liaising. He also asked Scott-Hopkins if he could be 
‘phased out’ of his role.622 In 1981 Scott-Hopkins agreed to this course of action. 
Communication between the two Parliaments was an issue throughout this period and some 
argued it was worsened by the civil service. Some MEPs argued that civil servants failed to 
see where MEPs fitted into the government machinery. They felt that even the civil servants 
that did work with them saw MEPs as an extension of the government and thought they 
should pursue the government’s European agenda.623 However, as will be shown later, the 
civil servants did show an interest in European Parliament committees specifically. As a 
result, certain MEPs were able to build relationships with Whitehall departments.624 The 
work of Spicer again shows the issue of communication between the two Parliaments. Yet 
Spicer’s position also shows that the Thatcher government tried to immediately remedy the 
concern over communication and were thus fully aware of the problems it could create. It 
again supports the view that Thatcher wished to have an effective relationship with the 
MEPs. Although because of poor communication and some Conservative MPs being 
traditionally hostile towards the MEPs, led to some MEPs acting more autonomously and 
were seen as a Heathite wing of the party.  
However, James Spicer still wanted to play a role in the party regarding the Community. He 
believed that major opposition towards the Community would continue in the House of 
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Commons.625 Spicer had a vast amount of European experience as he had been the party’s 
director for the group on Europe and subsequently served as the group’s chairman. He had 
also been a important MP for Edward Heath as he campaigned widely in the south of England 
for EEC membership in 1970 and 1971.626 Spicer is an example of how some Conservative 
MEPs were still former Heathites with strong pro-European inclinations. Like other 
Conservative MEPs, he wanted the European Parliament to be a success. Yet this view 
caused friction with the Westminster Parliament who did not support the European 
Parliament and ‘the distinct aroma of federalism’ it carried.627 They instead saw the Council 
of Ministers as the most effective Community institution.  
Despite the issues of direct elections being resolved by 1979 there were still matters that the 
Conservative Party were forced to address. One of these regarded the electoral system used 
by member states. The Treaty of Rome stated that European elections for the Community 
should be carried out under a uniform system.628 However, Britain opted to use the FPTP 
system while other states chose to use PR. In 1981 this issue arose again as the European 
Parliament’s Political Affairs Committee suggested that it might adopt a report on the 
uniform electoral process for direct elections making all member states conduct elections 
under PR.629 The EDG was, in principle, supportive, but they wanted to maintain some form 
of FPTP in the election of seats. They wanted 75 per cent of seats to be determined by PR and 
25 per cent by FPTP.630 Conservative MEP Alan Tyrrell highlighted the advantages of PR 
arguing that it would prevent big swings in European elections, which would otherwise have 
a high probability of occurring.631 Low turnout coupled with the divide between rural and city 
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constituencies made this possible. There was, however, opposition within the EDG: Danish 
members had traditionally opposed PR, as did other MEPs such as Eric Forth (a member of 
the H-bloc) who argued that PR would provoke a negative reaction from the British public. 
He felt that if the EDG supported the proposal it would be interpreted as a ‘precedent for PR 
upon which the liberals/SDP alliance could build’.632 His suggestion was loosely supported 
by other MEPs such as William Hopper.633 Scott-Hopkins supported the idea of PR but 
suggested that a decision had to be reached swiftly as the proposal still had to go before the 
Council, which would delay the outcome.634 Thus, for these reasons, the EDG accepted the 
proposal. The debate around the system of voting shows the division within the EDG. 
Moreover, there is little archival evidence to show that government departments engaged 
with the MEPs on the matter as they would on other issues like Northern Ireland.  
Thatcher and the Minister for Europe Douglas Hurd accepted PR as it prevented a potential 
rift being created between Conservative MEPs and MPs.635 It also illustrates consistency in 
the wider Conservative policy towards the Community, which was to be accepting and non-
confrontational on matters that were not central to their overall European policy. The 
proposal would have limited impact on Westminster as it was a procedural matter for the 
European Parliament to decide. Again, this demonstrates that the EP was not an integral part 
of the Conservative government’s European policy. Yet direct elections and PR were very 
significant as they meant that smaller parties could gain seats in the EP providing them with a 
platform to build upon, pushing them into national parliaments. Moreover, it shows internal 
divisions within the EDG, which would continue to occur as the size of the grouping was 
larger than it had been prior to direct elections.  
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Another internal matter for the EDG in 1981 regarded the grouping’s leadership, which 
coincided with the 1982 election for the presidency of the European Parliament. These 
matters were linked as Scott-Hopkins wanted to be a candidate for the EP presidency as well 
as to be re-elected EDG chairman. He had some support from the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Carrington, who did, however, emphasis that the 
government should remain neutral on the presidential candidacy as to not impact relations 
with other member states.636 However, it was highly unlikely that Scott-Hopkins would win 
the European Parliament presidency as he would be unable to win votes from the other 
centre-right groupings. Egon Klepsch, a German member of the EPP, was also running for 
presidency and had the support of the EPP and most of the Liberal grouping, giving him 170 
potential votes. If the EDG members all voted for Scott-Hopkins this would amount to a mere 
64 votes. Moreover, there was a fear that EDG members would vote for the Dutch MEP 
Pieter Dankert who was favourite to win the presidency.637 Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton 
comment that the 1982 election was ‘dramatic’ due to the division of the right-wing 
groupings.638 They also suggest that the EDG were ‘personally unenthusiastic’ about Klepsch 
as a candidate.639 Many EDG members had a personal preference for Pieter Dankert despite 
him being from the Socialist grouping. Klepsch was deemed less approachable, while 
Dankert was charismatic and willing to engage with the EDG.640 Overall, it was very unlikely 
that Scott-Hopkins would be elected president which would also impact the decision on the 
chairmanship of the EDG. 
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 In 1980 there were fears that Scott-Hopkins would be opposed, and in 1981 some EDG 
members had expressed their dissatisfaction about his leadership.641 Brian Hord (part of the 
H-bloc and the MEP for West London), was willing to stand against Scott-Hopkins. Hord 
was an influential MEP with a high profile following his refusal to take his new office in 
Strasbourg.642 Despite this, the Conservative Party’s chief whip Michael Jopling believed that 
Scott-Hopkins would only win a handful of votes.643 But the EDG whip John de Courcy Ling 
warned that Scott-Hopkins would struggle to be re-elected as chairman if he did not win the 
presidency as this would further damage his reputation within the EDG. MEP Sir Henry 
Plumb had the most support internally but was not willing to oppose Scott-Hopkins.644 Scott-
Hopkins had mentioned to the whips that he had no intention to continue his leadership after 
the 1984 European elections.645 Thereafter, a compromise was reached in which Scott-
Hopkins would remain leader until 1983 and would then be succeeded by Plumb.646 Thatcher 
approved of this arrangement, as Plumb had pre-existing relations with French Community 
members who were important regarding the CAP and budget contribution reform. Plumb had 
developed strong relations with European politicians prior to 1973 due to his position of 
being a member of the National Farmers Union (NFU) in 1965, and the NFU president in 
1970. Plumb had been president of the NFU during British accession negotiations and 
negotiated for greater support for British farmers.647 Thatcher, however, requested that Scott-
Hopkins engage with the public more as it would assist in the general public recognition of 
the EP while also highlighting the major contributions made by Conservative MEPs.648 
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Again, this would also address the concerns surrounding MEP morale which shows that 
Thatcher and her senior advisors saw the benefits of Conservative MEPs. Scott-Hopkins 
being told to engage more with the public again shows his different leadership style to Peter 
Kirk who was willing to be more proactive on matters. The presidency and chairmanship, 
however, show that the EDG was not one cohesive unit as their numbers had increased from 
23 prior to direct elections to 64 thereafter.  
The matter of the EP presidency was a major event that all MEPs focused on in 1982. West 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl even contacted Thatcher regarding the elections. He wanted 
to confirm that all non-socialists would vote for either Scott-Hopkins or the EPP candidate 
Egon Klepsch to prevent a socialist candidate from winning.649 Originally, the EPP in 1979 
had agreed to support an EDG member for presidency in the 1982 elections in exchange for 
British Conservative support of Simone Veil (the outgoing president) in 1979. The EDG had 
on several occasions attempted to negotiate with the EPP, to little avail. British Conservatives 
were left frustrated and brought the matter up in the European Democratic Union (EDU).650 
However, the EDU felt that it was a subject best left to the MEPs to resolve, which further 
frustrated members of the EDG.651 Klepsch was not supported by the British Conservative 
MEPs as they felt he had been unsatisfactory in his dealings with the EDG.652 It was against 
this background that the elections opened without a firm agreement between the two non-
socialist groupings. The first ballot went ahead with Pieter Dankert gaining 106 votes, 
Klepsch 140, and Scott-Hopkins 63.653 It became clear that if an agreement was not reached 
between the EDG and EPP Dankert would win the election. The EDG reiterated that they 
could not accept Klepsch as a candidate, although no agreement had been reached going into 
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the second ballot, the result of which saw Pieter Dankert winning 114 votes, Klepsch 130, 
and Scott-Hopkins 67.654 Again the EDG sought an agreement with the EPP, this time, 
however, with the support of the Liberal grouping, as it became clearer that Pieter Dankert 
was looking likely to win the presidency. The EDG were willing to accept any candidate 
from the EPP apart from Klepsch. Scott-Hopkins himself was willing to withdraw his 
candidacy at this point if such a candidate could be agreed upon. But again, no agreement 
was reached. The British Conservatives believed that blame lay with Klepsch’s campaign 
team.655 It was under this confusion that the third ballot was contested with Dankert winning 
162 votes, Klepsch 157, and Scott-Hopkins 67.656 The EDG and EPP disagreement meant the 
Socialists going into the fourth and final ballot had a relatively large lead.        
With Scott-Hopkins no longer in the running, the EPP suggested they would support an EDG 
candidate in the next presidency election if the EDG used their 67 votes to support Klepsch in 
the final ballot.657 The EDG’s votes would be enough to ensure Klepsch’s electoral victory. 
However, the EDG could not trust the EPP regarding the support of a future EDG candidate 
because of this election. Scott-Hopkins also encouraged his grouping to vote freely in the 
final ballot and there is no evidence to suggest Scott-Hopkins or other MEPs consulted 
Thatcher or the Conservative Party on this matter. The result of the election saw Dankert win 
the presidency with 191 votes against Klepsch’s 175.658 Many EDG Conservatives had voted 
for Dankert citing ‘the importance of having a leader with genuine integrity’.659 The episode 
worsened relations between the EPP and EDG. The EPP felt the EDG were at fault as voting 
for Dankert ensured that Klepsch lost; while the EDG felt they would struggle to work with 
the EPP in the future as they could not be clearly communicated with or trusted.  
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Many British Conservative MEPs felt disappointed by the EPP.660 Some EDG members, 
however, believed that they would be forced into working with the EPP in the future.661 
Regardless, this was an important moment in the EPP–EDG relationship as Klepsch remained 
active in the EPP until the early 1990s. One Conservative MEP stated that ‘he never forgot 
this election, and deeply distrusted the EDG’.662 In his memoirs, Henry Plumb refers to this 
episode as one ‘of the great low points’ in the EDG and EPP relationship.663 After the 
election, Thatcher and the MEPs proposed that the best way to work with the EPP would be 
by consulting them through the EDU.664 The election also highlighted the difficulties for 
Conservative MEPs as they had to continually attempt to work with many MEPs from 
different European nations. Building and maintaining these relationships was vital to a small 
grouping such as the EDG, but, as has been shown, this proved difficult between some 
members of the EPP and EDG due to personality clashes. The long-lasting impact of Klepsch 
and the EDG was significant in the relationship between the two during this period. It 
demonstrates the that divide between the two groupings was not largely due to religious or 
ideological reasons, as argued by Nelsen and Guth.665 Disagreement arose out of differing 
personalities, and how a key event like the 1982 presidency election was handled. This 
election was very significant for the future relationship between the EPP and EDG. 
Moreover, Thatcher had worked with the MEPs on the election and had suggested working 
with the EDU in the future which again shows that she was aware of developments in the EP.  
In the aftermath, the EDG lost confidence in Scott-Hopkins as a leader following his heavy 
defeat in the presidency election. Moreover, the EDG had struggled to be an effective, 
alternative centre-right grouping to the EPP under Scott-Hopkins as they failed to persuade 
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Greek members to join the grouping.666 Additionally, many groupings still saw the EDG as 
an extension of the British Conservative government which made the EDG MEPs’ job 
difficult. Because of these factors, the EDG opted to replace Scott-Hopkins in 1982. The 
decision triggered an internal leadership election in which Plumb won with 36 votes, against 
Scott-Hopkins’ thirteen, and Fred Catherwood’s eleven.667 In his memoirs, Plumb suggests 
that he was saddened by the departure of Scott-Hopkins but was excited by the potential 
challenges the leadership brought.668 Despite Plumb having the support of the Conservatives 
in Strasbourg there was some apprehension from the party in Westminster. Many were 
sceptical about Plumb due to his links with the NFU and wondered how this would affect his 
outlook on the EEC’s agricultural policies.669 Thatcher herself had selected Scott-Hopkins as 
the leader of the British Conservative MEPs (though he was not her first choice). But as 
Plumb was made EDG leader, Thatcher moved quickly to make him leader of the British 
Conservative MEPs. Many felt that with the departure of Scott-Hopkins, Thatcher was losing 
a major ally in Strasbourg.670 The reasons that MEPs had turned against Scott-Hopkins were 
the election of Dankert as European Parliament president and his inability as leader to attract 
MEPs from other member states to the grouping. As it stood in 1982, 60 members of the 
EDG were British, three Danish, and one Ulster Unionist. The consequence was that Plumb 
become leader in February. The episode shows that there was more internal division within 
the grouping, which occurred due to direct elections increasing its size, but it was also 
exacerbated by the leadership style of Scott-Hopkins, which differed from Kirk’s and 
eventually Plumb’s. 
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Plumb was a charismatic leader, and his ‘great talent in life was knowing his own 
limitations’.671 He would eventually be the most successful leader due to his ability to 
delegate.672 He delegated David Curry to assist in the day to day running of the group  in his 
earlier years as leader, and would then utilise Robert Ramsey in a similar capacity which 
freed him to be active in leading the grouping. Moreover, with his farming background. 
Plumb’s first action as the grouping’s leader was to urge the government not to block the rise 
in farm prices.673 Plumb’s actions led to the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs Lord Carrington reiterating the government’s stance, that Britain 
would oppose any attempt to approve the annual farm price review unless some progress was 
made in reducing Britain’s EEC contribution.674 Plumb was not, however, punished for 
opposing the party’s policy, but his actions caused concern amongst Conservative 
backbenchers. Ian Gow, the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, raised concerns about the 
‘wide spread consternation regarding Plumb’s conduct’ as well as that of other British 
Conservative MEPs.675 Plumb also disputed the idea that if an agreement was not reached on 
Britain’s budget contributions, this in turn would force Britain to block the rise in farm 
prices.676 The block would inevitably create further tensions in the Community. Yet the 
biggest matter for Plumb in 1982 centred on majority voting in the Council of Ministers, 
which was debated in the European Parliament. Moving to a majority voting system would 
eliminate the Luxembourg Compromise, which, in the past, had allowed member states a 
veto. EDG members and the Conservative Party had initially been ambivalent towards the 
matter.677 The early actions of Plumb highlight the active and vocal leader he would become. 
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Moreover, because Plumb had worked at the NFU since 1965 he had worked with many 
Continental MEPs and officials in the past and held good relationships with them.678 It meant 
that he had the strongest working relationship with Continental MEPs, more so, than any 
other British Conservative MEP covered in the period of this thesis. His relationship with 
them would also allow him to achieve his goals in the European Parliament. From a grouping 
perspective this was convincing MEPs from European nations to join the EDG. However, in 
1982 there was still concerns with the British Conservative government of Plumb. 
However, it was becoming increasingly likely that the EEC would adopt majority voting. 
Craig Parsons explains how the idea of majority voting dated back to 1973 with the first 
round of enlargement.679 In 1982 the EDG had decided to favour majority voting as it would 
speed up the decision-making process in the Community, and Plumb even argued this was an 
important step for the EEC.680 Moreover, it would also limit France’s influence as it would 
prevent it from blocking proposals from which it did not benefit. France was a major obstacle 
for Britain, as in 1982 alone it had successfully blocked over 100 proposals.681 Majority 
voting was an important matter as it gave smaller countries a larger say in Community affairs. 
Thus, smaller nations that had limited global influence could have a greater impact on the 
direction of Europe, a matter not fully grasped by Britain which enjoyed a traditional global 
role. It is clear that from the outset Plumb wanted to make a large impact. However, the 
replacement of Scott-Hopkins demonstrated the lack of control the Conservative Party had 
over the multinational grouping of the EDG. Regardless, the election of Plumb changed the 
dynamics between Conservative MEPs and Conservative MPs. It was clear from the farm 
price review that Plumb was willing to act more independently.  
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Fisheries remained a concern for the Community with Mediterranean enlargement and the 
subject was important to both British and Danish MEPs. In 1983 EDG member Kent Kirk, 
who was also a Danish fisherman, threatened to fish in British waters.682 These threats were 
highly problematic as Britain reserved the right to fish exclusively in a twelve-mile radius 
around its coast, as was agreed in the accession treaty. Neither Denmark nor Britain wanted 
Kirk to break this arrangement. Many Danish MEPs and Commissioners were quick to voice 
their concerns, fearing that Kirk’s actions would create ‘a Falklands attitude’ towards 
Denmark.683 Despite this, Kirk broke the agreement and fished in British waters, his reason 
being that Britain should break its restrictive policies on fisheries and be a more effective 
member state.684 Many of the EDG members had lobbied for Kirk to be ousted from the 
grouping as his actions had alienated the EDG. Kirk's actions showed how individuals could 
create problems within the EDG. 
The Labour MEP for Tyne and South Wear Joyce Quinn accused Kirk of being 
irresponsible.685 Kirk continued to face open hostility from fellow MEPs during European 
Parliament sessions. Barbara Castle, the leader of the British Labour MEPs, supported by 
Winfred Ewing, suggested that it was ‘offensive for Kirk to address the Parliament’.686 
Because of this, other members were forced into defending Kirk. For example, the 
Conservative Lord O’Hagan objected to the criticisms of Ewing and Castle.687 The situation 
was exacerbated by the fact that the EDG as a grouping was in a transitional period: Scott-
Hopkins was the outgoing chairman in his final year. Moreover, Christopher Prout (MEP for 
Shropshire and Stafford) was elected the EDG chief whip. Brian Hord (MEP for West 
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London) was also made deputy chief whip in the same year.688 The fisheries matter was 
contentious, and Kirk’s attempt had led to the media placing closer scrutiny on the affair. 
However, it did not worsen Anglo-Danish relations as Denmark had swiftly condemned 
Kirk’s actions.689 The episode worsened the EDG’s standing with other groupings, which 
impacted their conduct in the European Parliament as they were a small grouping, this in turn 
emphasised again the need for the EDG to expand.  
In 1983 the European Parliament felt necessary to conduct a detailed study into Northern 
Ireland. Throughout the early 1980s there had been a number of attacks on British soldiers 
causing multiple deaths and casualties.690 Thus Northern Ireland was an extremely sensitive 
and important matter for the British Conservative government. As a result, the British 
Conservative government made steps to oppose the report and were supported in this by the 
EDG.  Eammon O’Kane has shown just how sensitive and significant the topic was to the 
Conservative government.691 The EDG brought the matter before the Bureau of the European 
Parliament to vote against this initiative, and to prevent the report form being commissioned: 
unsuccessfully, as it struggled to gain the support of the EPP.692 Michael Welsh commented 
that the EPP struggled to work with the EDG in 1983 due to the impact of the presidency 
elections of 1982.693 The vote again showed that the EDG was becoming a less effective 
group in the European Parliament due to its size in comparison with large and diverse 
groupings such as the EPP or the Socialists. Meanwhile, Conservatives in Westminster also 
attempted to thwart the report. They wanted to examine the powers of the European 
Parliament and whether it had the ability to produce such a report. After consulting with the 
Attorney General it was agreed there was little hope for Britain to successfully stop the 
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European Parliament, even if the matter was brought before the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ).694 The Community treaties allowed the European Parliament to conduct studies such 
as that proposed into Northern Ireland’s social and economic situation. However, the 
European Parliament did not have powers to provide a report on the internal political 
situation in Northern Ireland.695 Both the EDG and the Conservative government emphasised 
this to their European counterparts. The commissioning of the Northern Ireland report 
showed that the European Parliament by 1983 did have some influence in the Community. 
Yet the EDG continued to lobby against the report arguing it could have an impact on Anglo-
Northern Ireland relations. They also ensured the report would not examine political issues. 
The Minister of Europe Douglas Hurd raised the matter at an EEC Minister meeting. Here it 
was suggested that many other member states shared Britain’s views. At the meeting, Hurd 
requested that Ministers should attempt to ‘head off’ their MEPs.696 Baroness Diana Elles 
(MEP for Thames Valley and a member of the Political Affairs Committee in the European 
Parliament) was also consulted. She argued that the government and the EDG should not 
oppose the report strongly as this would portray Britain as an unenthusiastic member state.697 
Additionally, she suggested it could draw unnecessary attention to Northern Ireland’s 
political matters, which could damage both Britain and Northern Ireland.698 It was thus 
decided that the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Francis 
Pym privately oversee the report with the chairman of the Political Committee.699 The 
Northern Ireland report is an example where Whitehall took interest in an European 
Parliament committee and MEPs had stepped in to ensure that the potential political fallout 
was minimized. As a result, Diane Elles developed a stronger link with Foreign and 
 
694 TNA, PREM 19/168, Coles minute to MT, 3 March 1983. 
695 Ibid. 
696 Ibid.  






Commonwealth Office officials and Thatcher.700 Regardless, Pym’s position allowed the 
Conservatives to influence the report effectively. Many also felt that other member states 
were ‘in no position to exert necessary control over their MEPs even if they wanted to do 
so.’701 The approach succeeded as it made discussing the report with the chairman easier. It 
also demonstrates how other member states were less successful than the British 
Conservatives in managing their MEPs.  
The EDG managed to gain concessions from the Political Committee and the Bureau for the 
European Parliament, as it was agreed that the report would not trespass into constitutional 
matters.702 The report was an instance where an MEP such as Elles worked effectively with 
Ministers including Pym and Thatcher to gain concessions on European Parliament matters. 
Regarding the report, it was decided that the Danish MEP Niels Haagerup, who sat with the 
Liberal Grouping, would be the lead.703 Fortunately, the Danish MEPs of the EDG held good 
relations with Haagerup and worked with him on the report.704 The House of Lords also had 
confidence in Haagerup, the Labour Baroness Felicity Ewart-Biggs even commented that she 
did ‘not think that there should be any concern as to the calibre of that very serious and 
cautious Dane, Mr. Niels Haagerup, in whose hands the inquiry will lie.’705 Plumb later stated 
that Haagerup being selected ‘ensured the report was heading in the right direction’.706 Due to 
Haagerup’s selection, the EDG managed to secure further concessions as he agreed to take a 
‘low key’ approach.707 He agreed to hold no public discussions and did not visit Dublin. Jim 
Prior, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, believed that the government should 
encourage Haagerup to attend an informal meeting in London to discuss the report. Prior also 
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stated that he would use his influence in the European Parliament to attempt to persuade 
moderate MEPs, in tandem with efforts made by the EDG.708 Haagerup also agreed that no 
major developments in the report would occur in the run up to the UK general election which 
was to be held in the same year (1983). The concessions the EDG managed to secure shows 
that the effectiveness of the grouping in the European Parliament on the Northern Ireland 
matter, as the concessions meant that attention was not drawn to a very sensitive topic for 
Britain. Moreover, the report was an example of how Conservative MEPs and MPs could 
work together successfully to achieve their goals, demonstrating how the two could work 
effectively together if necessary. 
The report, however, had drawn the attention of Thatcher as demonstrated at a meeting held 
for the MEPs on 1 March 1983 in Downing Street, where she reiterated her stance on the 
matter, believing that the duty of the European Parliament was just to ‘rubber stamp a 
decision made by HMG.’709 Henry Plumb and Diane Elles attempted to ease tensions but 
were unsuccessful as Thatcher went on to state that the report was undermining British 
sovereignty, which was exacerbated by the attendance of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office’s legal team. Thatcher continued discussions, moving onto matters of the CAP and the 
withholding of Britain’s budget contribution. MEP Michael Welsh commented that ‘the 
trouble is that she [Thatcher] has nothing but contempt for “The Assembly” and for us 
regarding any sort of interference in inter-governmental negotiations as an insult.’710 After 
the meeting had finished the MEPs left Downing Street and were confronted with members 
of the media including John Sargent and George Clark (European correspondents for The 
Times and the BBC), but avoided answering any questions. However, the following day many 
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newspapers accurately reported on the meeting.711 Thatcher then held an emergency meeting 
with Plumb in which she suggested the trust with MEPs had been damaged.712 Many MEPs 
denied they were responsible for the leak, while others stated that ‘it was a stitch up’ and that 
Number Ten officials had been responsible, while shifting the blame onto the MEPs.713 
Regardless of how the leak occurred, some MEPs became increasingly disillusioned and 
began to act more autonomously from the Conservative Party. The decision to act more 
autonomously by these MEPs was not solely from this meeting but also from the way some 
MPs in general viewed MEPs: as shown throughout this thesis they often questioned the 
function of the European Parliament in House of Commons debates. Moreover, a significant 
factor that led to certain MEPs acting more autonomously was that only two MEPs held dual 
mandates after 1979. Although the dual mandate had been very demanding, it had provided a 
method of clearer communication between MEPs and MPs which was lost by 1983.714 It is 
also important to consider Foreign and Commonwealth Office thinking in this period as the 
above has situated the Prime Minister’s thinking as part of mainstream government attitudes, 
rather than her personal predilection to present herself as isolated, and at odds, with Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office which was part of a consciously manufactured political image. 
Additionally, from Thatcher’s perspective relations with MEPs had not worsened only 
because of this meeting. It was a culmination of events that led to some Conservatives 
becoming more dismissive of the MEPs. Matters from direct elections, MEPs’ salaries, and 
the site of the European Parliament were all obstacles that the Conservative Party had to deal 
with, despite the relatively minor role the European Parliament played in the government’s 
overall European policy. However, Thatcher supported the MEPs on many of these issues. 
Furthermore, she would continue to build relationships with individual MEPs, working 
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closely with them on matters such as the rebate.715 The meeting, however, was an important 
moment as it builds on literature regarding Thatcher’s attitude towards the European 
Parliament. It can be argued that the meeting adds a new strand of thinking regarding 
Thatcher and the Community, on which much has been written. Hugo Young stated that 
Thatcher ‘at important moments [gave] Europe the loudest place on the agenda’.716 Yet, the 
1983 meeting corroborates more the view of David Reynolds who suggests that Thatcher was 
no different to Mitterrand or Kohl: they were ‘all playing the same game’.717 Thatcher was 
confrontational in defending British interests. France was just as vocal on matters central to 
them such as the CAP and the site of the European Parliament; as was Germany over the 
ERM. With Northern Ireland being a sensitive and central concern for the Conservative 
government, the meeting in 1983 is an example of how Thatcher was willing to take a more 
confrontational stance on an important matter. Yet the literature mentioned above does not 
consider the Conservative MEPs or the European Parliament when assessing Thatcher's 
attitude towards the Community. Additionally, following chapters will show Thatcher 
remained pragmatic towards the European Parliament and even worked with MEPs on 
matters such as the rebate. 
Haagerup’s report was due to be released on 1 December 1983, and he forwarded a copy to 
Michael Butler, the UK representative to the EEC, on 30 November 1983. Butler concluded 
that the report was both ‘balanced and moderate’, as promised.718 It called for the Community 
to provide economic support for Northern Ireland, while condemning the acts of terrorism 
and violence.  Importantly, it mentioned nothing regarding constitutional change. The single 
point of contention was the resolution that argued for the creation of a joint Anglo-Irish 
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parliamentary institution with representatives from both countries,719 a matter the EDG and 
the Conservatives feared would be picked up by the media and which would harm both the 
UK and Northern Ireland. Additionally, it stated that there was no simple solution to resolve 
the problems Northern Ireland faced, and that British withdrawal from Northern Ireland 
would not end the acts of violence.720 The report also suggested that the Community believed 
Britain played an important role in finding an overall solution. Lastly, it urged for Britain to 
join the EMS as this would eliminate obstacles to trade. Britain joining the EMS would 
stimulate trade between Britain, Ireland, and Northern Ireland which could potentially lessen 
the chances of further violence.721 Overall, the report was balanced, the EDG and 
Conservatives worked in conjunction to ensure this outcome and were assisted by Haagerup’s 
leadership who was sympathetic towards Britain. However, the very fact that the report was 
commissioned despite opposition from member states demonstrated the growing influence of 
the European Parliament in the Community.  
Northern Ireland continued to be an issue in 1984 as the Parliament voted to adopt the 
Haagerup report. The vote occurred on 29 March with 124 votes in favour, three against, and 
63 abstentions.722 Though other MEPs still felt Britain was responsible for the situation. John 
Hume of the Socialist grouping, for example, stated that Britain ‘in fact is a part of the 
problem’ and that Northern Ireland could not be united ‘at the point of a gun’.723 EPP 
member Jean Pender restated that the Community did not have powers to interfere with 
political and constitutional matters. However, like many other MEPs he suggested that the 
Parliament could not ignore violence within a fellow member state.724 Diane Elles of the 
EDG emphasised that the Parliament could not discuss political, legal, and constitutional 
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matters of member states. She also drew attention to the fact that the vast majority of people 
in Northern Ireland wanted peace and wanted to remain within the UK. She concluded by 
praising Haagerup on the report and his personal handling of a very sensitive subject.725 EDG 
member Sir Fred Catherwood also praised Haagarup, but argued that the EDG felt 
uncomfortable in voting for it.726 This was because the British members of the EDG 
represented the Conservative government as well as their constituencies; hence the majority 
of the EDG abstained, feeling that supporting the report could jeopardize the whole matter, as 
well as causing more friction between MEPs and Westminster Conservatives.  
MEPs then looked towards the Commission to address the overall stance of the Community 
regarding Northern Ireland. Lorenzo Natali, the Italian Christian Democrat, clarified the 
Commission’s position.727 He suggested that the Commission lacked powers to pass political 
judgement on Northern Ireland, and wanted larger emphasis placed on alleviating Northern 
Ireland’s economic and social problems which were matters where the Community could 
play a role. Moreover, this would not create tensions between Britain and Northern Ireland. 
The Community had already started providing aid to Belfast but the Commission wanted this 
to be extended to border areas. The request would be more difficult to fulfil as it would 
require the full support of both Britain and Ireland. The proposal could also have a political 
impact on Northern Ireland, hence the Commission agreed to set up a group of 
Commissioners to examine the matter. Michael Cunningham has argued that Britain had 
struggled to deal with Northern Ireland since 1972.728 That it was an extremely contentious 
matter for Britain is highlighted by the utter discretion with which the Commission handled 
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heavily upon their MEPs to deliver on a sensitive topic. Yet despite this, relations after the 
Downing Street meeting were damaged. Andrew Moravcsik has argued that the primary 
concern for the Community related to economic matters.729 This to a very small extent is 
evidenced by the Northern Ireland report, particularly the recommendations made by the 
Commission. 
A big change occurred in January 1985 when Jacques Delors become President of the 
European Commission. Delors greatly reformed the Community which affected the 
relationship between the Community and the British Conservative government, hence it is 
important to examine his early ideas, and what impact they had on the European Parliament 
as well as on Britain. Helen Drake has stated that Delors ‘provided a form of European 
leadership which in its duration and imagery was unprecedented in the history of European 
Integration’.730 In his tenure there would be significant treaty reforms which would also give 
the European Parliament more powers. Delors had been part of the French Socialist Party 
since 1974, and in 1984 was France’s Finance Minister. He was quick to outline his views for 
the future direction of the Community and believed that deeper integration was required for 
the Community to develop and he wanted to build a ‘tangible Europe.’731 Delors wanted the 
changes to have taken place by 1992. Neil Nugent explains that Delors wished to focus on 
three areas that would develop the overall Community.732 First, he wanted to enlarge the 
internal market, promoting economic growth in member states, which in turn would provide 
jobs. Unemployment was a central issue for the Community in the 1980s. Secondly, he 
wanted to strengthen the EMS. This was linked to his third area of focus: the development of 
a system of convergence of economies.733 These three objectives were to work in tandem to 
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improve the overall economy of Europe, which at this time was lagging behind Japan and the 
US. Initially, Delors had three methods to re-launch Europe: closer foreign policy 
cooperation, closer monetary cooperation, and the single market. Of these, the single market 
had the least opposition from the heads of member states. Delors was aware that ‘Thatcher 
had played a large role in [his] nomination’ and he wanted to pick an ambitious project that 
had Thatcher’s support.734 The single market greatly appealed to Britain. However, as 
suggested by Desmond Dinan, Thatcher had opposed the idea of treaty reform which Delors 
was considering.735 Delors’ relationship with Thatcher was very significant in the period 
between 1985 and 1990 and much has been written on the subject. Brendan Evans stated that 
‘Thatcher, who recognised Delors abilities, hated his politics’.736 Stephen George concludes 
that she had supported Delors initially because he would ‘rein back the left-wing socialist 
policies implemented by Mitterrand’.737 Their relationship would have a significant impact on 
the future of the Community, as well as on the relationship between the EDG and Thatcher.  
Delors’ plan required a commitment to deeper integration which the Conservative 
government opposed. He was heavily influenced by the Albert-Ball report which was 
released in 1983 and written by French economist Michel Albert and James Ball (at the 
London Business School). The report was extremely popular in France and outlined a plan 
for a single market.738 Later, in January 1985, Delors’ also suggested that he wanted to 
strengthen the European Currency Unit (ECU) through creating an official ECU which would 
be managed by the US.739 Delors understood that previous Commissions had struggled to 
achieve their agendas due to unanimous voting in the Council of Ministers, and he therefore 
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wanted to move to a majority voting system. However, forcing policies through the Council 
would effectively bypass the European Parliament causing further problems between the 
Council and the European Parliament. Lord Cockfield would also play a central role in 
expanding the internal market. Cockfield was a Commissioner appointed by Thatcher in 
1984. At his inaugural speech to the European Parliament, Delors stated that he sought a 
larger role for the Parliament. He argued that both the Commission and the European 
Parliament would have to work closely together if the Community was to move forward.740 
Although many agreed with this, EDG members were split. Some supported Delors while 
others were reluctant to see the European Parliament’s powers increase too quickly.741 
Despite this, the European Parliament voted in favour of Delors’ plan for a stronger EMS by 
207 votes to 34 (there were 37 abstentions).742 Delors had a clear plan for streamlining the 
Community’s decision-making process. Moreover, with the need for the development of the 
internal market, he placed emphasis on economic growth. His ideas, however, required 
deeper integration, a matter opposed by the British Conservatives. Thatcher herself and many 
in the Conservative Party saw Delors’ plans as an encroachment on British sovereignty. From 
the outset it was clear there were differences between the way Thatcher and Delors wanted 
the Community to develop, and the speed in which it should. Delors’ plan also meant that 
MEPs would once more have to work together with Conservative MPs in the future. 
Britain, like other member states, was still experiencing the effects of the recession and, 
despite some Conservatives opposing Delors’ early ideas, some Conservative MEPs were in 
favour of deeper integration. Plumb argued that Britain should join the EMS. In January 1985 
Plumb argued that sterling could have been protected against the US dollar had it been in the 
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EMS.743 He also understood that the EMS would force the Bank of England to intervene in 
the currency markets at an early stage which would have a profound effect on sterling. 
However, he also believed that if the UK were to join the EMS after a decline in the value of 
sterling it would be seen as trying to prop up its currency at a time of crisis.744 Delors, who 
had wanted to strengthen the EMS, also encouraged Britain to join.745 Lord Cockfield had 
discussed the matter with MEPs and stated that the Commission had little influence over 
Britain’s future regarding the EMS, regardless of the new Commission’s position. The EMS 
question again shows how Plumb was willing to be more vocal than previous leaders of the 
EDG. 
Furthermore, there were many who opposed the EMS, including John Redwood who was an 
advisor to Thatcher in 1985. He argued that North Sea oil had a large impact on sterling, 
unlike other currencies that were tied to the EMS.746 He also believed that pressure would 
continue to be put on sterling by speculators and Britain would have to defend its value. He 
likened it to the crisis that Labour experienced in the 1960s (when the decision to devalue the 
pound was taken under Wilson).747 Thatcher also believed that joining ‘would inhibit some of 
our present freedom of action’.748 The reaction of Plumb also shows that the Conservative 
MEPs disagreed with Thatcher and contributed to the division over EMS in the Conservative 
Party. The EMS was the first major issue on which Conservative MEPs and the party 
disagreed. The disagreement arose mainly due to the leadership of Plumb who, as seen in 
1984, was willing to be more vocal and outspoken then his predecessor. His actions 
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encouraged other MEPs to do the same. The differences of opinion over EMS also displayed 
the divisions within the Conservative Party as a whole over the Community. 
Overall in this period, the 1982 European Parliament presidency election greatly damaged the 
relationship between the EDG and the EPP, as Klepsch would remain a central figure in the 
EPP. Furthermore, it has shown that some EDG members felt they could not trust the EPP 
which supplements the existing literature regarding the relationship between the British 
Conservatives and the EPP which suggest that divisions occurred due to religion. Nelsen and 
Guth suggest that the religious divide between the British and Continental Conservative 
MEPs caused underlying tensions;749 while Heuser and Buffet argue that religion was very 
important to the EPP and that the situation was exacerbated by the ambivalent views British 
Conservative MEPs had towards religion.750 The chapter suggests divisions were created due 
to disagreements and differences in personalities as seen in the European Parliament 
presidency election. The period also saw a change of leadership in the EDG which affected 
the dynamics of the grouping. Plumb’s leadership impacted the relationship between the 
Conservatives at Westminster and the MEPs. Although MEPs disagreed with the party 
regarding the EMS, on many other issues they agreed, and worked effectively together as 
seen with the Haagerup report. However, the Downing Street meeting with MEPs in 1983 
damaged the relationship between some MEPs and Westminster. It is important to bear in 
mind that the relationship worsened due to other reasons such as some MPs criticising the 
European Parliament openly in the House of Commons. More importantly, the relationship 
between some MEPs and MPs was strained because fewer MEPs held a dual mandate, which 
led to a weakening in communication between the two parliaments. The meeting also adds to 
literature regarding Thatcher’s attitudes towards the Community. John Young suggests that 
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Thatcher was pragmatic towards the Community,751 while David Reynolds argues that she 
was no different to other European leaders in only defending her nation’s interest.752 
Furthermore, Hugo Young states that 'at important moments [she] gave Europe the loudest 
place on the agenda'.753 It again shows that she was willing to be pragmatic and 
confrontational on matters that were central to the Conservative government such as Northern 
Ireland when examining the European Parliament in this period. 
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Chapter Six: Enlargement and Powers of the European Parliament 
 
The following chapter will examine the importance of Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese 
accession. Accession enlarged the European Parliament and provided a chance for the EDG 
to add to its numbers. The EDG failed in securing Greek members but succeeded in securing 
Spanish MEPs. Adding Spanish MEPs to the grouping marked the first real success for the 
EDG since 1979 as they were no longer seen as a non-diverse grouping. The second part of 
the chapter will discuss the powers of the European Parliament. It will describe the issues 
surrounding the site of the European Parliament and the importance of the Spinelli report. By 
doing so, it examines the powers of the European Parliament as well as examining the effect 
this had on the relationship between Conservative MEPs and MPs.  
Mediterranean Enlargement  
This section focuses on the EDG attempting to expand and will show how the grouping failed 
to secure Greek MEPs which contributed to the downfall of Scott-Hopkins. It will also 
illustrate how, under Henry Plumb's leadership, the EDG was able to expand and gain 
Spanish MEPs, which marked the first real success for the grouping since direct elections as 
the EDG was no longer stigmatised as being a British Conservative lobby. 
In 1980 the Community had to prepare for Greek accession which would officially occur in 
1981. The distribution of seats in the European Parliament had already been resolved in 1979. 
Direct elections had spurred on developments in the European Parliament which meant that 
many matters had already been addressed. However, the number of Commissioners for 
Greece had not been decided, and with a European Council meeting set for April 1980 Britain 




the number of Commissioners universally despite enlargement.754 Ministers for Britain 
remained neutral as they had not fully considered the matter in 1980.755 The European 
Parliament was already prepared for enlargement and could cope with new members despite 
it having to manage a larger number of personnel in comparison to other Community 
institutions. It also showed that the European Parliament was better equipped for enlargement 
than the other Community institutions, especially if a decision on the number of 
Commissioners was not taken soon. The EDG was keen to accelerate the cumbersome 
procedures of the European Parliament to keep up with the other institutions of the 
Community.756 However, Greek accession provided a unique opportunity for the European 
Parliament to lead matters on coping with new members, partly because of the disagreement 
between the Commission and the Council of Ministers over enlargement. Desmond Dinan 
concludes that the Council of Ministers ‘disregarded the negative opinions of the 
Commission’ on Greek accession.757 Maresceau and Lannon give a more detailed study on 
the struggles of the Commission regarding Mediterranean enlargement and the economic 
problems they might cause.758 Enlargement also highlighted a stark difference in British 
Conservative European policy when compared with the CAP and budget contribution. 
Ministers were more proactive on those matters as there was some clarity from the 
Conservative leadership, in contrast to the lack of clarity regarding the number of Greek 
Commissioners. The confusion caused meant that Conservative MEPs and Commissioners 
could act more independently. It also shows the limited role the European Parliament had in 
the overall European policy of the British government.  
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Greek accession provided the opportunity for groupings in the European Parliament to 
expand their numbers. EDG members, particularly Lord Bethell, were keen on the Nea 
Demokratia (New Democracy) members joining the EDG.759 The EDG needed to expand and 
be more diverse to have greater influence in the European Parliament. New Democracy was a 
Conservative Party that could potentially join the EDG. New Democracy and the British 
Conservatives had a history of working together since Greece became a democratic state in 
1974. Lord Bethell, who had been part of the original cohort of British Conservative MEPs in 
1973, had been put in charge of European Conservatives’ (as they were known then) relations 
with New Democracy in 1975.760 Geoffrey Rippon, when he became leader, and 
subsequently Scott-Hopkins, both supported Lord Bethell’s work with New Democracy.  
Since 1975 Bethell had regularly attended meetings between the European Parliament and the 
Greek Parliament, and was also an observer on the committee for Greek accession to the 
Community.761 In 1979 he had even led a small group of EDG members to Athens where 
they had discussions about the Community with George Rallis the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Constantine Stephanopolous the Minister for the Presidency, and Evangelos Averoff 
the Minister of National Defence.762 Bethell, however, began to grow anxious on the question 
of where the Greek MEPs would sit as accession neared. In September 1980 he went with the 
EDG bureau to Athens to discuss groupings with Ministers, yet the New Democracy 
members were already considering their options regarding groupings in the EP. Bethell 
believed there was some strong support from members of New Democracy to join the EDG, 
but there were also some concerns.763 They did not like the fact that the EDG was mainly 
composed of British Conservative members. Moreover, they feared that in the 1984 European 
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elections the number of EDG members would be greatly reduced. David Close also suggests 
there were divisions on ideology over how the two viewed Conservativism.764 Additionally, 
New Democracy had other options available to them besides the EDG.  
Both the EPP and the Liberal groupings had expressed their interest in the Greek party. The 
EDG was a small grouping and in a larger group such as the EPP New Democracy members 
could better influence policy. Furthermore, there were practical problems for the EDG. A 
Greek general election was likely to occur in May 1981 which New Democracy could lose. 
The credibility of the Greek right had been damaged as they were associated with the military 
that had been overthrown in 1974.765 Moreover, Greek members could have opted to sit 
independently or form their own grouping. Only one MEP from another country was required 
to form a two-nationality grouping and with Greece having twenty- seats allocated in the 
European Parliament this was possible. Furthermore, with Spanish and Portuguese accession 
imminent they could form a grouping in following years composed mainly of members from 
Southern European states. Since direct elections the EDG had been seeking to expand to be a 
more effective centre-right grouping as the EPP and Socialist numbers had grown which 
diminished the influence of the EDG.  
Thatcher was scheduled to have a state visit to Athens in late 1980, and Bethell proposed that 
she discuss European Parliament groupings with George Rallis (who would have the final say 
on where the party would sit) and the benefits of being part of the EDG. In a letter to 
Thatcher he outlined five key benefits New Democracy would gain if it joined the EDG.766 
First, he suggested that the British and Danish grouping was sympathetic to the accession of 
new members. Secondly, Bethell pointed out that Britain and Greece had similar 
geographical interests as they both sat on the periphery of the Community. For Greece, the 
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trade routes through Yugoslavia and the sea link with Italy were important, while for Britain 
the channel link was paramount. Thirdly, if New Democracy were to join it would be the 
second largest contingent of the EDG, granting it senior positions in the grouping. Fourthly, 
there was the matter of religion. If New Democracy sat with the EPP there might be tensions 
between Roman Catholic ideology and Greek Orthodoxy. The EDG was not concerned with 
religion. Lastly, New Democracy, like British Conservative MEPs, was not federalist.767 
Bethell believed this differed from both the EPP and Liberal groupings, which was reflected 
in 1980 when both groupings were in favour of majority voting in the Council. Although 
initially, a merger would undoubtedly highlight differences, the EDG members remained 
keen on gaining New Democracy members, as it would give the EDG more influence in the 
European Parliament.768 Bethell had stated to Thatcher that ‘it would rid us of the label of 
being a simply British lobby’.769 Moreover, it would make the EDG stronger financially 
which would be vital if the budget debate led to Britain withholding its contribution. 
Importantly, Scott-Hopkins was not involved in the majority of these discussions. Thus, when 
the EDG ultimately failed to obtain Greek MEPs, Scott-Hopkins was held responsible as he 
did not engage the Greek MEPs personally as he instead opted to defer the responsibility onto 
Bethell. 
Thatcher eventually discussed matters with George Rallis in Athens, who suggested it was a 
decision the party, rather than him personally, would have to take.770 In 1980, the party had 
decided it would sit as an independent grouping and postpone the decision on which grouping 
to join until it had more experience of Community affairs. Rallis also suggested to Thatcher 
that they would wait until after the 1981 general election, a conclusion with which the EDG 
 
767 Ibid. 
768 CCA, CATH 243, EDG influence and enlargement, 15 September 1980. 
769 TNA, PREM, 19/236, Lord Bethell to MT, 19 September 1980. 




agreed.771 The eventual failure to secure Greek MEPs also contributed in Scott-Hopkins’s 
downfall despite him having limited input in the matter as Bethell led the discussions with 
New Democracy. Bethell had even been able to discuss the matter with Thatcher, who in turn 
raised the subject with Rallis which again demonstrates that Thatcher did work with MEPs. 
Yet the eventual inability to secure Greek members was a significant failure for the EDG, as 
they would continue to be a non-diverse grouping. The struggle to recruit and retain MEPs 
from other nations was the main reason why the EDG failed to be a successful alternate 
centre-right grouping, which was confirmed when they made the decision join the EPP in 
1992.  
Greece joined the Community in January 1981, marking the second enlargement and 
increasing the membership to ten. Enlarging the Community again meant that the overall 
decision-making process would become even more cumbersome. The domestic situation in 
Greece was also altered by the general election, which in turn impacted the European 
Parliament and the centre-right groupings. Under George Rallis, New Democracy had lost the 
election by a landslide to the Panhellenic Socialist movement (PASOK) led by Andreas 
Papandreou, PASOK winning 172 seats against New Democracy’s 115. In total, 185 of the 
300 seats were won by PASOK or the Communist Party.772 Both these parties were openly 
hostile towards the Community and Greek membership of a supranational organisation. 
Additionally, Greece held its first European election on 18th October 1981. The election 
results mirrored the general election with PASOK winning ten seats, New Democracy eight, 
and the Communist Party three. The remaining three seats were won by smaller parties, each 
with one seat.773 The result again demonstrated the opportunity European elections provided 
for smaller parties. Winning European Parliament seats gave these parties legitimacy and 
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financial support, providing them with a base to build upon which subsequently gave them a 
voice in national parliaments.  
Many expected that the PASOK members would eventually join the Socialist grouping while 
the New Democracy members would join the EPP. One of the reasons that the Christian 
Democrats had re-branded itself as the EPP was to appeal more broadly to other right-wing 
parties that would eventually join the Community, a policy they adopted in response to the 
increase in Socialist numbers.774 The EDG remained relatively small. Moreover, it was 
increasingly seen as a predominantly British grouping that did not appeal to other European 
nations, despite its Danish members. There were also wider Conservative fears that Greece, 
with its relatively unstable economy and political system, would prove to be a burden on the 
Community. Certain German EPP and British EDG members were united on this front, albeit 
in a minority, and both floated the idea of a two-tier European Community with developing 
Southern European states in one tier and developed states in another.775  
The August 1982 European Council meeting explored the British government’s view on 
enlargement. Thatcher stated that the government adopted the European Parliament’s 
resolution in support of Spanish and Portuguese accession and hoped that negotiations would 
be concluded swiftly. But Britain would have concerns over how future negotiations for 
enlargement should be conducted. The Conservatives wanted more emphasis on a transitional 
arrangement.776 They felt it would assist in preventing sharp changes occurring in the 
Community that would affect all member states. Accession negotiations had centred on these 
matters on two previous occasions. The Conservatives feared that future enlargement would 
potentially increase Britain’s budget contribution to the Community.777 Negotiations for the 
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accession of Spain and Portugal had raised some concerns in respect of the cost of agriculture 
and the effect future enlargement would have on Britain’s budget contribution. These were 
concerns also raised in the European Parliament by MEPs. However, they also reiterated the 
political and institutional problems the Community would face with enlargement. EDG 
members, along with other MEPs, stated that it was essential for the Community to 
strengthen its internal cohesion. The British Conservative government and its MEPs were 
wary of the speed in which enlargement could occur; however, the Community in a Cold War 
world wanted to enlarge and safeguard Europe from Communist expansion.  
Some MEPs felt that the internal effects of enlargement on the Community could be managed 
through stricter adherence to common policies and the clarification of institutional decision-
making.778 The accession of two more nations would increase the European Parliament’s size. 
It was paramount that the EDG gain members from this round of enlargement, for reasons 
similar to those given on Greek accession: it would show it as a more diverse grouping and 
provide them with more influence in the European Parliament. Moreover, a larger and more 
diverse grouping would entitle the grouping to more financial incentives through Community 
funds. However, Conservatives in Westminster were concerned about the economic cost of 
enlargement. Conservative MEPs at the time felt, however, that Greek accession was 
inevitable and thus wanted to capitalise on the opportunity to expand the EDG.779 They raised 
matters such as the effect Spanish industry would have on British textile industries.780 
Moreover, Britain like Denmark had reservations over the impact Spanish accession would 
have on the common fisheries policy. Both nations suggested that this would be a matter 
raised during negotiations.   
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Mediterranean enlargement was almost complete as the Treaty of Accession for Spain and 
Portugal was set to occur on 1 January 1985. It concluded a lengthy round of negotiations and 
would also change the dynamics of the Community, as observed by Manuel and Royo.781 
Furthermore, David Clark stated that ‘it marked the start of a shift of emphasis in the 
Community towards the South which was consolidated by the Iberian enlargement’.782 EDG 
members placed great stress on the Conservative Party at Westminster to persuade some 
MEPs from both countries to join the EDG rather than the EPP or the Liberal grouping.783 
Efforts were made to build relations with right-wing parties in both nations. The 
Conservatives were particularly successful with the People’s Alliance, the major right-wing 
party in Spain. Fortunately for the EDG, it seemed that its MEPs would join the EDG. The 
People’s Alliance was led by Manuel Farga who had been a Minister under Francisco Franco. 
The Spaniards would eventually have to join the EDG, as Farga with his Franco past ‘was not 
accepted by the EPP’.784 Though some MEPs did not want Spanish members as they felt this 
might represent a move too far right for the grouping.785 There were potentially fifteen 
members that could join the EDG.786 The EDG would also benefit financially from the 
inclusion of the Spanish MEPs as it would gain a further £10,000 per member from the 
Community and greatly increase the reputation of the EDG as a larger and more diverse 
grouping.787 The aim of the EDG was to be an alternative centre-right grouping to the EPP 
and with Spanish MEPs this could be achieved. Some EDG members feared this was a move 
too far to the right, however, even with the addition of fifteen Spanish MEPs, the majority of 
the grouping were either British or Danish (64 MEPs). 
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The Spaniards were also supported to join by Plumb personally, as he had longstanding 
relationships with Spanish MEPs, which proved vital. The People’s Alliance was very close 
to joining the EPP in 3 June 1984, negotiating with them on the same day as with the EDG.788 
It narrowly decided on the EDG largely because Plumb held pre-existing relations with the 
Spanish MEPs. Additionally, many of the EPP members were unwilling to readily accept the 
People’s Alliance due to its reputation as a far-right party. For the EDG, a strong Spanish 
contingent meant the argument that the EDG was a British lobby. Plumb stated that the 
People’s Alliance joining was a ‘historic day for Conservatism in Europe’.789 But making the 
EDG more diverse meant that the Conservative Party at Westminster had less control over 
EDG matters. Moreover, with fifteen Spanish MEPs the internal workings of the grouping 
would also change. The British Conservative MEPs would now have to liaise with their 
Spanish counterparts regarding the future of the grouping.  
The EDG’s actions show how important a diverse grouping was in the European Parliament, 
a point highlighted by Simon Hix, who emphasises how important expansion was to both the 
EPP and the Socialist grouping with Iberian enlargement.790 Tapio Raunio, agrees with Hix 
but states that it was the Liberals and the Socialists groupings who specifically benefited from 
Iberian enlargement.791 Yet neither Hix nor Raunio discuss in detail how the EDG was also 
able to expand, which this chapter has been able to examine in greater detail due to new 
archival material and interviews with former MEPs. Additionally, despite the enlargement of 
the EDG, they were still at a disadvantage as the Socialists expanded, taking MEPs from the 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (the grouping 135 seats in 1985). Moreover, Portuguese 
MEPs could also join the EPP, once more limiting the EDG’s influence. But the inclusion of 
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Spanish MEPs in the EDG was the first ever enlargement of the grouping and was a major 
achievement under Plumb’s chairmanship. Yet the failure to retain the Spanish MEPs led to 
the ultimate demise of the EDG. 
Powers of the European Parliament 
The following section will explore the powers of the European Parliament. Many MEPs had 
grown frustrated as, since direct elections, the European Parliament’s powers had not 
increased. This section will show that the inability for the European Parliament to decide on a 
permanent seat damaged the institution’s credibility in the eyes of both Westminster MPs and 
the wider British public. It will also demonstrate how the European Parliament tried to 
develop its role through scrutinising the European Council and through the publication of the 
Spinelli report. Additionally, it will examine the work of EDG MEPs Christopher Prout, Ben 
Patterson and Pete Price and the important work they did in defining the powers of the 
European Parliament. Their contributions in defining these powers led to the European 
Parliament gaining its first real power since direct elections which was the power to delay 
transactions, amendments and proposals. 
As seen earlier in this chapter, the European Parliament was more efficient and better 
prepared for enlargement than other Community institutions. The MEPs of various nations 
felt that the EP should be given more responsibilities. Increasing the European Parliament’s 
powers had been an overarching objective for MEPs throughout the 1970s, as seen in chapter 
one. In 1980 MEPs wanted to be consulted on the appointment of the President of the 
Commission, an effort predominantly led by the Dutch.792 The matter surfaced at the end of 
Roy Jenkins’s presidency. Moreover, with direct elections being successfully carried out in 
the previous year, MEPs felt that the European Parliament was a legitimised Community 
 




institution. These issues were again discussed at a European Council meeting held in April 
1980. Lord Carrington and Thatcher both agreed that a strong independent president was 
needed, although a definite choice was not urgently required.793 Names for potential 
candidates had been suggested, including those from Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg.  
The Conservative government was firmly committed to the notion that a president should be 
appointed six months prior to taking office. The FCO proposed that the default position 
should be the guidance given in the treaties, which gave the European Parliament no say in 
the presidency selection procedure.794 It asserted that the European Parliament would still be 
able to hold the European Commission accountable through its power to dismiss the 
European Commission. The EDG remained in line with government policy on the matter, and 
this was also supported by France and Germany.795 However, no further progress was made 
in 1980, despite strong support from the Netherlands and the other Benelux states. Again, this 
shows that despite European Parliament matters at times falling out of the remit of the overall 
European policy for the British government, it was still an institution they had to address.  
The Benelux states had created further tensions because of the site of the European 
Parliament. Since direct elections, MEPs had also grown frustrated by to the amount of travel 
involved.796 British MEPs had taken the lead and wanted a decision urgently. They frequently 
raised the matter and reiterated how it added ten per cent to the European Parliament’s budget 
annually.797 In November 1980 the situation intensified as MEPs passed a resolution which 
gave member states until June 1981 to conclude the matter. France, Luxembourg and 
Belgium were the states most concerned with the site of the European Parliament. France 
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wanted to ease tensions amongst MEPs by declaring Strasbourg, Luxembourg and Brussels 
as the parliamentary, financial and judicial, and executive capitals of the Community, 
respectively.798 Luxembourg wanted to keep its share of the European Parliament as it 
benefited economically from hosting the Secretariat. Belgium had remained more reserved, 
hoping that maintaining the status quo would ensure a decision that would favour Brussels. It 
was supported by the fact that both Denmark and the Netherlands had expressed vague 
interest in the site being in Brussels.799 However, both nations also raised questions with 
France about the cost of a permanent building and the need to consult the European 
Parliament prior to any final decision.800 Greece and Italy clearly supported the site being in 
Brussels as it had better communications. Britain also favoured Brussels but did not want to 
be seen as confrontational and so avoided taking any initiative on the matter.801 It was 
because of France, Belgium and Luxemburg that the decision on the site of an European 
Parliament was consistently delayed, this turned into a sensitive topic as hosting the European 
Parliament brought financial incentives. However, the inability of the European Parliament to 
decide on a seat damaged its credibility. 
Britain agreed with the Netherlands that the European Parliament should be consulted prior to 
a final decision as it would appease British MEPs and would prevent relations between the 
Council and European Parliament worsening. Ensuring the European Parliament was 
consulted would also delay a decision and increase pressure on France to opt for Brussels. 
The site of the European Parliament demonstrates that the Conservatives wanted to avoid 
tensions within the Community on this issue, which differs from other matters, such as the 
CAP and budget contribution, despite British Conservative MEPs wanting a decision to be 
taken. Again, it shows that the European Parliament was only a small aspect of the overall 
 







British European policy, which led to some MEPs becoming disillusioned with the 
Conservative government. Moreover, the divisions on the site of the European Parliament 
were sensitive for member states such as France, Belgium and Luxembourg as there were 
financial benefits for housing the European Parliament.   
Another concern for the European Council and the European Parliament in 1981 was the 
debate on whether or not the president of the European Council should report to the European 
Parliament on matters discussed at European Council meetings. French President Giscard 
d’Estaing opposed this, believing that, as he was not required to report back on European 
Council meetings to the French Parliament, neither was there need for him to appear before 
the European Parliament.802 He initially prevented an agreement being made in 1981. 
Belgium had remained neutral stating that if the Community agreed to go before the 
European Parliament it would have no objections.803 Ben Soetendorp has argued that the 
Netherlands traditionally wanted to make the European Parliament a more powerful 
institution, as it felt the Council of Ministers benefited larger countries disproportionately and 
that the European Parliament could offer a counterbalance.804 So, unsurprisingly, the 
Netherlands opposed France. Moreover, it exacerbated the situation, particularly for Britain, 
by suggesting that as Britain assumed presidency of the European Council in 1981 one of its 
initial acts should be to ensure the proposal was passed. It was a concern for the 
Conservatives as they were to remain neutral. Eventually, Thatcher and Scott-Hopkins agreed 
to the Netherlands’ demands because they did not want Britain to be viewed as a 
confrontational nation, again demonstrating Thatcher’s pragmatism regarding European 
Parliament matters. The Conservatives wanted to focus on the most important issues for 
Britain, which were CAP reform and Britain’s budget contribution.  
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However, due to the statement made by the Dutch Prime Minister, Thatcher was forced to 
decide, which was made somewhat easier as Giscard d’Estaing became less vocal and French 
opposition eventually disappeared. It meant that if Britain were to oppose the proposal in 
1981 it would have no support from other nations. David Hannay had stated that the 
relationship between the Council and Parliament was poor, and he did not want the UK 
presidency ‘to be marred by a row with the Parliament’.805 Eventually, it was agreed by the 
Conservative government. The decision would also allow Conservative MPs to work more 
closely with Conservative MEPs, as well as providing leadership and direction to the MEPs 
thus improving their morale and communication which had been a problem since Thatcher 
became Prime Minister in 1979. Thatcher stated that she would not be able to address the 
Council until the next European Council meeting in 1981 due to various domestic 
commitments.806 Moreover, this meeting would allow Thatcher to develop and push her 
thoughts on CAP reform and Britain’s budget contribution, which were both vital issues to 
her, unlike other aspects of the Community.  
Furthermore, since 1979 the Conservative MEPs had greatly contributed to the powers of the 
European Parliament, such as the contribution made on the Rules Committee. The 
Conservative MEPs on this committee since 1979 were Peter Price, Ben Patterson and 
Christopher Prout.807 They were extremely active in publishing reports on the powers the 
European Parliament should have in amending proposed bills. There was much work to do on 
the Committee as they had inherited the rules of the previous unelected European Parliament. 
The number of MEPs had increased from 198 to 418 and, with enlargement, it was clear that 
this committee would have to continue its work in defining a role for the European 
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Parliament.808 Moreover, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office took great interest and 
liaised with Prout on the powers of the European Parliament throughout the period between 
1979 and 1985.809 Prout used this interest to build relations with Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office civil servants and Lord Carrington. He also used his influence to ensure the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office examined other European Parliament committees.810 Hence, 
Christopher Prout contributed greatly to the development of the European Parliament and was 
‘one of the architects that increased its powers’.811 As a result he also had strong relationships 
with senior Conservative MPs at Westminster. Prout was the first person to suggest that the 
European Parliament committees should delay making their decisions in committee.812 By 
doing so it forced the Commission to attend meetings or engage with the European 
Parliament.813 Through this, the committee could identify why its position was being 
overruled and the source/origin of opposition. Thus, it could adopt the resolution or address 
the opposition in committee. The Conservatives, and Prout in particular, were very important 
in the period from 1979 to 1984 in developing the European Parliament. Prout's work on the 
Rules Committee marked a success for the EDG as one of the grouping’s objectives since 
1973 was to make the European Parliament a legitimate institution. In defining the powers of 
the European Parliament, Prout gave it the ability to delay the Community budget, 
transactions, amendments and proposals. Delaying Community business could have serious 
repercussions as will be seen with the British rebate. Matters regarding the rebate 
overshadowed Prout’s achievement which is reflected in the limited literature that discusses 
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the EDG in this period.814 Furthermore, Prout's ability to build relations with the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office made him one of the few MEPs who was able to effectively 
communicate with Westminster. Prout's work did not go unnoticed as he would eventually 
become the grouping’s leader in 1987.815 
At a time when Britain’s budget contribution was being scrutinised, the CAP potentially 
being reformed, and the productivity of the Community increasing, some MEPs were 
frustrated with their limited influence in Community affairs. Many felt that as the only 
democratically elected body in the Community they should be given a bigger role. The Italian 
MEP Altiero Spinelli greatly contributed to this debate. Spinelli was a Communist, who had 
been detained by the fascist regime in 1927. During his incarceration he converted to 
federalism and would in 1941 write (under the influence of British literature produced by the 
Federal Union) with fellow prisoner Ernesto Rossi the Ventotene Manifesto.816 The manifesto 
called for a democratic European federation, in order to prevent further wars in Europe.  
In February 1984 Spinelli urged the European Parliament to approve a draft treaty that he and 
fifteen other rapporteurs had written. This draft was written in an attempt to constitutionalise 
the Community, and provide clarity during a time of Eurosclerosis.817 Robert Salais has 
argued that many of the issues addressed in the report would later come into effect in the 
various treaty ratifications in future years.818 Glencross and Treschel have provided a detailed 
study of the importance of Spinelli’s earlier work which his 1984 report builds upon.819 The 
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Spinelli report was the first to clearly mention freedom of movement in Europe. It also 
suggested that a form of the Luxembourg Compromise remain for a transitional ten-year 
period and be eventually replaced by majority voting.820 The report can be seen as an attempt 
to resolve chronic economic difficulties through political means, namely deeper integration. 
However, the report did not signal a change in policy but was instead a difference in its 
presentation and tone that reflected the frustrations of MEPs such as Spinelli. The 
Conservative Party at Westminster was sceptical of the report as it was a clear commitment to 
deeper integration and a step towards federalism, which was strongly opposed. Harvey 
Proctor (Conservative MP for Billericay) stated that the ‘British Government do not support 
any further loss of sovereignty, as would be initiated by acceptance of the Spinelli report’.821 
Yet the EDG, and Plumb in particular, was supportive of aspects of the report, Plumb stating 
that ‘the EDG welcomed an open discussion on how to improve the Community’.822 He did, 
however, emphasis that only certain aspects of the report were supported by the EDG. 
Regardless, the report demonstrates some disparity between Continental MEPs and British 
MEPs over the future direction of the Community.   
Overall, enlargement and direct elections meant that the Community's dynamics would 
inevitably change, yet despite this the Community stagnated between 1979 and 1984. Juliet 
Lodge shows that the European Parliament wanted more influence because it had 
successfully carried out direct elections in 1979 and wanted more responsibilities.823 Yet, 
accounts such as Desmond Dinan’s argue that it was not until after 1986 that the European 
Parliament gained influence due to treaty reform via the Single European Act and eventually 
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the Maastricht treaty.824 Helen Wallace points specifically towards the SEA as being the 
catalyst for the European Parliament becoming more established.825 Yet this chapter has 
shown that British Conservative MEPs consistently worked to make the European Parliament 
more effective even in the period from 1979 to 1984, as seen with the work of the Rules 
Committee and Prout. Additionally, the Spinelli report demonstrated the frustrations of MEPs 
who wanted to see the Community develop, and which would lead to a stronger European 
Parliament. The Spinelli and Vedel reports did not have an immediate impact on the 
Community, but their legacy would be seen in future treaty ratifications which illustrates their 
long-term importance.  
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Chapter Seven: The MEPs role in Britain's Budget Contribution 
 
The following chapter will explore Britain’s rebate which was settled in 1984. It was a central 
part of the Conservative government’s European policy in which the European Parliament 
played a significant role. The chapter will demonstrate the contributions the EDG made to the 
Conservative government’s policy and how the European Parliament’s growing influence 
allowed it to delay the rebate. In particular, the chapter will focus on the communication 
between the EDG and Westminster since the budget was an example where there were clearer 
communications between the two parliaments. Communication on the budget was stronger 
for two reasons: firstly, because the rebate was a central part of Thatcher’s overall European 
Policy; and secondly, because Christopher Jackson, the MEP who worked on the Budget 
Committee, and Scott-Hopkins were both able to effectively build relations with Thatcher, 
Conservative MPs, and civil servants. It shows that MEPs who worked on committees that 
were central to British interests were able to build stronger relations in Westminster. The 
chapter will also show the important role the MEPs played in the rebate. 
The 1980s began with the Conservative Party led by Thatcher wanting to resolve Britain’s 
budget contribution to the Community, a fundamental objective for the Conservative 
government. Kevin Hickson has argued that Thatcher felt Britain paid too much and that the 
matter dominated her earlier tenure.826 For British EDG members the budget contribution was 
linked to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). But in 1980 little progress was made 
because of the approaching elections in France and Germany (set for 1981). It meant that 
Thatcher did not press the matter strongly in 1980 despite MEPs being keen to work on re-
structuring the budget. As seen previously, Scott-Hopkins had considered withholding British 
payments in order to support Thatcher. If the Conservative MEPs rejected the Community 
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budget in 1980 nearly 40 per cent of its funds would be affected.827 Fortunately, the EDG had 
eight million Belgian Francs in reserve which would allow them to function without support 
from the Community for an interim period. Scott-Hopkins sought clarity from Westminster 
through a series of correspondences with Thatcher.828 He suggested that the European 
Parliament would reject the budget the Commission proposed, arguing that too much of it 
was devoted to the CAP.829 MEPs were willing to support the EDG in lobbying for CAP 
reform, however, opposition came from France as it was the largest benefactor of the CAP.830 
France led matters and were supported by Ireland and Denmark. Communication between 
MEPs and Westminster was becoming a reoccurring reason why MEPs struggled to build 
effective relationships with Westminster. Yet it can be seen MEPs collaborated with 
Whitehall officials, and had a better relationship with Thatcher than has been appreciated. 
Consequently, Conservative MEPs represented both effective diplomatic and political levers 
in the British pursuit of the final resolution for the rebate. 
Thatcher insisted that she sought a satisfactory agreement on Britain’s budget contribution.831 
However, she opposed withholding Britain’s payments despite Scott-Hopkins warning it was 
the only real power Britain held.832 Thus, in May 1980, Thatcher made an enquiry to the 
Treasury about the procedure of withholding payments. Treasury officials consulted 
Christopher Jackson and they both worked to explain that if Britain intended to withhold 
payments, necessary legislation would have to be put in place to ensure no ensuing legal 
matters would arise,833 again showing that some MEPs could work effectively with the 
Conservative government and Whitehall departments. Regardless, there were fears that 
withholding funds would be met by opposition from Conservative MEPs, such as Henry 
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Plumb or Alexander Sherlock.834 Plumb had served as the president of the National Farmers 
Union (NFU) prior to direct elections and was the chairman of the Agricultural Committee of 
the European Parliament on 1980.835 Continental Europeans who supported the CAP felt that, 
due to his background, Plumb was more sympathetic towards the CAP then his British 
counterparts.836 Pierre Méhaignerie, the French Minister of Agriculture, had even wanted to 
negotiate the CAP specifically with Plumb. Moreover, in 1980 the French Prime Minister 
Raymond Barre invited Plumb to meet with him.837 Plumb’s background and views had 
caused some anxiety amongst Conservatives as they felt France was attempting to align 
Plumb with them on CAP matters and, ultimately, on Britain’s budget contribution.838 
However, little came of the discussions between French officials and Plumb. Moreover, most 
MEPs were willing to support Thatcher in securing a rebate despite some who opposed 
withholding payments, which highlights that MEPs and Thatcher were able to collaboratively 
work together. 
The CAP and budget contribution were linked and were both sensitive issues that Thatcher 
was keen to resolve. Yet John Turner explains that Thatcher was not willing to strike a deal 
on Britain’s budget contribution through accepting the CAP.839 Scott-Hopkins again worked 
with Thatcher and ensured that the European Parliament would block a budget increase of 
over 3.5 per cent.840 Thatcher clearly stated that Britain could not accept too large a price 
increase as it would cancel out gains made in the budget. Overall, the budget could not be 
fixed until matters around the CAP were decided. Scott-Hopkins and Christopher Jackson 
worked with Thatcher to achieve this goal. Scott-Hopkins raised these concerns because they 
 
834 See chapter six. 
835 TNA, PREM, 19/216, Note on meeting with Sir Henry Plumb, 20 March 1980. 
836 Ibid. His background as the head of the NFU had allowed him to build strong relations with Continental 
European MEPs.  
837 Ibid. 
838 Ibid, Record of conversation (Walker-European Parliament Chairman of the Agriculture and Food 
Committee, Henry Plumb), 21 March 1980. 
839 J. Turner, The Tories and Europe, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), p.94. 




affected the EDG budget, as the EDG could only function until mid-summer of the following 
year if Britain withheld payments. Scott-Hopkins’s and Christopher Jackson’s contributions 
in 1980 show that there was better communication between MEPs and Westminster on this 
specific matter as the budget rebate was a central policy to Thatcher. Moreover, both MEPs 
had better relationships with senior Ministers and Thatcher. The work of Jackson and Scott-
Hopkins shows that MEPs also had a role in the rebate being both effective political and 
diplomatic levers in ensuring that the rebate would be delivered. 
At the 1981 Luxembourg European Council meeting both the CAP and Britain’s budget 
contribution would be discussed. In the meeting it was agreed that further steps would be 
taken to ensure that reforms for the CAP would be considered as would Britain’s budget 
contribution.841 Upon reflection, Thatcher would later state the she was defending British 
interests and that the member states were ‘un-English’ in negotiation.842 The view that 
Thatcher took a patriotic stance against the Community is shared by other writers such as 
Shirley Letwin and Patrick Cosgrave.843 A decision was taken because Europe’s economies 
were struggling, with member states impacted by high unemployment and inflation. 
Moreover, with the US and Japan advancing economically it became clearer that France and 
Germany wanted further integration which Britain would not support unless the CAP and 
budget issues were resolved. If these were not addressed, the Community could weaken, as 
had happened during the OPEC crisis when member states sought bilateral agreements.844 
Larry Neal has observed that the Community saw political reform as a way to combat 
economic difficulties.845 Hence France and Germany went into the European Council meeting 
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willing to reach a compromise with Britain.846 The means to achieve CAP reform were not 
defined in the meeting and were left deliberately vague. It was merely concluded that reforms 
would be made in economic, regional, and social policies.847 The vague goal set at Council 
meetings was a characteristic of the European Council in the 1980s, in contrast to the 1970s. 
It was partially because of problems member states faced with direct elections in the previous 
decade. European Council meetings at that time decided to set strict goals and deadlines 
which inevitably had to be pushed back, as seen previously regarding direct elections. Thus, 
CAP reform dates and aims were left broad to maintain credibility of the Community. 
The Conservative Party, including the MEPs, were in agreement. Scott-Hopkins, amongst 
others, was keen to resolve the CAP, stating in the European Parliament that it was vital that 
‘an agreement over the CAP be reached’.848 However, the budget was more complex since 
the European Parliament held budgetary powers. Moreover, if a reduction was to occur in the 
budget it would impact MEPs directly, but they nevertheless continued to support the 
government on a rebate. Furthermore, Britain feared that the future accessions of 
Mediterranean members would lead to an increase in regional and social funds to help 
Southern member states, particularly if the CAP was to be reformed which was not beneficial 
to countries like Britain and Germany.849 It was also emphasised by the Commission at this 
meeting that ‘the Commission believes that Europe cannot make a new start until it puts its 
house in order – in other words until it solves the budget problems.’850 It can be seen, 
therefore, that Conservative European concerns were being addressed at this meeting. The 
Community was willing to listen to Britain but wanted a commitment to deeper integration in 
return. The budget reform would aid the British economic recovery, but also shows 
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Conservative MEPs being valuable to the government as Conservative MPs and MEPs 
worked together on a central topic.  
In 1982 the Council of Ministers came to another confrontation with the European Parliament 
over the Community budget. The Parliament adopted a budget that was substantially larger 
than the one the Council had approved. The European Parliament did so because it required a 
larger sum in order to function. Following Greek accession, the European Parliament had 
more MEPs and its expenditure had increased. The European Parliament thus adopted a new 
budget without seeking the approval of the Council.851 The Conservative government was 
asked by fellow member states to urgently outline Britain’s position as the Commission had 
already decided to implement the budget, which in turn meant that if member states did not 
make their payments on time the Commission could take them to the European Court of 
Justice. The Lord Privy Seal Humphrey Atkins outlined the potential action Britain could 
take.852 The Conservatives, like other member states (which included Germany and Italy), felt 
the European Parliament’s actions were illegal.  
Belgium held the presidency of the Council of the European Union during this time. It 
proposed that a compromise could be reached that would unify the Council. The proposal 
required member states to pay in full and on time. In return, the Council would then take the 
matter to the European Court to decide the legal validity of the European Parliament’s 
actions.853 Simultaneously, the Council would open discussions that could lead to an 
agreement being made with the European Parliament.854 Christopher Jackson was again 
consulted on the matter by the Conservative government. He observed that ‘the advantage of 
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paying in full was that Britain could be seen as a tolerant member state’.855 Moreover, it 
would persuade other member states to do likewise. Another option Christopher Jackson 
presented was that Britain could pay only the part it deemed legal.856 However, this would 
mean the Commission would take Britain to court which could lead to a fine as well as 
forcing Britain to pay the full amount. Atkins argued that Britain should pay the full amount 
as this would make a stronger case when it came to resolving the overall budget issue for 
Britain.857 By 1982 these discussions were making progressing. EDG members were also 
supportive of Atkins’s view.858 Scott-Hopkins reiterated that if payments were withheld, the 
EDG could function for a short period of time without the budget being settled.859 The EDG 
felt that the European Parliament’s actions were illegal, and supported Thatcher on 
withholding the full amount.860 However, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe 
disagreed with Atkins, stating that the European Parliament’s actions were illegal. He felt that 
Britain alone had a strong enough case to go before the European Court, and a satisfactory 
decision could be reached.861 Hence the two potential solutions were either to pay in full or to 
pay the part deemed legal. The British government was prepared to pay the full amount on 
the condition that other member states agreed to cooperate in a joint Council action against 
both the European Parliament and the Commission.862 Again, this episode shows how the 
Conservative Cabinet worked cohesively with Conservative MEPs on certain matters. The 
fact that a decision had to be reached quickly diffused the matter. It also illustrated the 
European Parliament’s growing influence in the Community as, in the interim, it was able to 
secure a desired budget without the Council’s approval. 
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Throughout 1982 the Conservatives lobbied to secure an arrangement that would allow the 
Community to pay rebates to Britain. Thatcher had stated that she wanted Britain’s ‘money 
back’.863 Britain was one of the largest contributors to the Community’s budget but did not 
benefit greatly from the Community. As seen in Stephen George’s account, the Community’s 
budget was geared towards spending on agriculture rather than industry, benefiting France, 
principally.864 Hence, France opposed the rebate or reassessment of how Community 
spending should occur. Yet EDG members had worked to ensure an agreement was made 
within the European Parliament to approve the rebate. The method by which payment was 
meant to occur was through a supplementary budget that would be added to the European 
Parliament budget. The supplementary budget would then be used to make payments to 
Britain. However, throughout 1982 MEPs of other countries had opposed this method of 
payment.865 As these payments would have to be made on an ad hoc basis there was no 
mechanism in place to make them. The newly elected president of the European Parliament 
Pieter Dankert was vocal on the matter. He stated that ‘any potential rebate would require the 
full support and approval of the Parliament’.866 Eventually, it meant that by the end of 1982 
the European Parliament turned down the supplementary budget proposed by the 
Commission and therefore rebates would not be paid. The rebate would be an issue 
throughout the early 1980s until it was settled in 1984. Accounts such as that of Peterson and 
Shackleton conclude that the European Parliament had gained more influence after 1986 with 
the signing of the Single European Act.867 However, as can be seen even prior to that and 
only five years after direct elections, the European Parliament had significant influence over 
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the budget and the rebate showed how effectively the European Parliament could use its 
influence as early as 1982. 
The Conservative government had wanted a rebate of £500 million from the Community. 
Stephen Wall shows that the rebate was an overriding factor which determined the 
government’s attitudes towards the Community.868 In January 1983 the European 
Commission attempted to draft the budget proposal that included a British rebate. However, 
MEPs led by the European Parliament’s President Pieter Dankert opposed the method for a 
rebate. They demanded that no special arrangements should be made to accommodate 
Britain’s rebate, arguing that ‘Community policies had to be altered repeatedly’ damaging the 
overall workings of the Community.869 Francis Pym as the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs attempted to negotiate with Pieter Dankert and the MEPs by 
resolving the rebate issue through pre-existing Community policies. Members of the Council 
of Ministers disagreed, believing that alterations to policies would have to occur before 1984 
for Britain to get a rebate.870 The Commission then proposed to add an additional £353 
million to the budget for the next year, classified as money the European Parliament could 
spend. These funds would be diverted to repay Britain. In doing so, the Community would 
not have to alter existing policies. However, Dankert and other MEPs still opposed the 
suggestion, arguing that these extra funds might be used instead to bolster non-agricultural 
spending.871 The EDG attempted to defend the Conservative government’s stance by 
suggesting that Britain was one of the largest contributors to the Community.872 These 
comments created tensions between the EDG and other groupings, including the Liberals and 
the EPP.  
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Additionally, the Conservatives at Westminster were deeply engaged with the matter on 
rebates. The Chairman of the 1922 Committee Edward Du Cann (MP for Taunton) concluded 
that Britain should withhold its payments to the Community until the matter was resolved.873 
Thatcher underlined that, like the European Parliament, they wanted a solution on the rebate, 
although Britain would keep all its options open, including withholding future payments.874 
From both a British and Community perspective the matter had to be resolved quickly 
otherwise it could create a substantial backlog of rebates that would have to be paid to the 
UK. The situation was exacerbated as Britain proposed that unless repayments were made on 
31 March 1983 they would withhold budget contributions.875 A preliminary agreement was 
eventually reached between the European Parliament and the European Commission whereby 
the European Parliament would be willing to accept alterations to the EEC development and 
financial policies.876 The episode demonstrates again the powers of the European Parliament 
as it pertained to Community finance. Moreover, the EDG and the Conservative government 
as a whole worked together cohesively on the rebate as the government saw the effective 
political and diplomatic role the EDG could play. 
Both the Council of Ministers and the Commission were willing to accommodate the needs 
for a British rebate whereas the European Parliament was a major obstacle. Both Pym and 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister, who held the presidency of the 
European Council, suggested to the European Parliament that the money being added to the 
supplementary budget was not going to stop special one-off payments to Britain.877 Dankert 
remained disappointed and argued he would be 'looking to other member states to add more 
funds to the overall budget'. He believed this was required as the workings of the Community 
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were growing, partly because of enlargement.878 France remained the biggest opponent of 
Community rebates as it wished to safeguard the CAP. It was one of the greatest benefactors 
of the CAP, which was integral to its overall European policy. Between the European 
Parliament and France, it was becoming increasingly unlikely that a settlement on a rebate 
would be reached before the March deadline. The EDG was also concerned: Christopher 
Jackson, the MEP attached to the European budget, being extremely pessimistic on the 
matter.879 He raised his concerns with Treasury officials that if Britain withheld its payments 
this would be deemed an illegal act by the ECJ, which would eventually force Britain into 
making its payment as well as facing a fine.880 Jackson was also convinced that due to 
pressure from MEPs in the large groupings of the EPP and Socialists, a budget rebate was 
unlikely to occur. Withholding would also have ramifications for the EDG, as other 
groupings saw them as an extension of the British Conservative government. Yet the rebate 
showed that Christopher Jackson was able to work with Number Ten and the Treasury on a 
sensitive matter, hence to an extent some MEPs were consulted and involved in Conservative 
government’s European policies. 
In late January the Conservatives agreed with Jackson’s view that a rebate would not be 
made. In the event of withholding a payment, the Cabinet noted the importance of Britain not 
appearing triumphant, but rather adopting a tone of ‘sorrow and disappointment’.881 But the 
Commission and the Council eventually persuaded the European Parliament to adopt the 
supplementary budget. The EDG also played a role in this matter as they negotiated with 
some members of the EPP, Gaullists and Liberal Grouping who were working to block the 
supplementary budget.882 The EDG as a whole negotiated with these groupings to ensure they 
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voted to approve the supplementary budget, which was significant.883 In the final vote in 
February 1983 it was approved by 183 votes to 35, with five abstentions.884 The EDG had 
played an important role in this vote. It meant that by the end of February Britain would 
receive the rebate for contributions made in 1983. Even Labour MEPs defended the 
Conservative government. Barbara Castle had even commented that it was Thatcher’s right to 
decide how it should be spent.885 However, in July the Council of Ministers moved to block 
the £60 million that was being offered to Britain, a substantial portion of the rebate initially 
agreed. The EDG released a statement suggesting that ‘the Council had plunged a dagger in 
the back of Britain.’886 The Minister of State for Europe, Malcolm Rifkind, argued that the 
rebate was beginning to cause a division between Britain and other member states and an 
agreement for this sum was not reached in 1983. Overall, Thatcher had delivered on a 
preliminary agreement for a budget rebate by 1983, which was vital as had Thatcher not 
achieved a rebate, it would have meant a central aspect of her European policy had failed 
heading into a general election. Moreover, British MEPs had remained united and 
Conservative MEPs had followed the party line, despite some hesitation over withholding 
payments. Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated how Scott-Hopkins and Christopher 
Jackson worked with Number Ten and Treasury officials to ensure clear communication 
between MEPs and MPs on the rebate. Jackson also contributed to the thinking of 
Westminster as he explained the problems of withholding payments. As a result, both Scott-
Hopkins and Christopher Jackson worked with Number Ten and the Treasury in the instance 
of the rebate demonstrating that the MEPs represented both effective political and diplomatic 
levers. The rebate also demonstrates the difficulties the European Parliament, on a very 
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technical level, caused Britain which is not fully examined in the historiography.887 The 
frustration the European Parliament caused during the rebate reinforced the views of some 
MPs who opposed the development of the European Parliament.888 
Despite 1984 being a European election year, the Conservatives at Westminster continued to 
press the Community regarding Britain’s rebate. Thatcher and other Conservative MPs felt 
strongly since 80 per cent of the Community budget was spent on the CAP in 1984.889 The 
situation was exacerbated in this year as the Community was looking to increase its net 
resources, which led to the Conservatives pushing for a conclusion on Britain’s rebate.  
European MEPs from other member states, however, worked to oppose Britain’s rebate 
claim. The European Parliament had until 31 March 1984 at the latest to release £457 million 
from its budget to the UK which would cover Britain’s rebate for the previous year.890 New 
regulations to allow rebates to be paid were put in place. However, the MEPs decided against 
giving a formal opinion on these regulations.891 The delay by the European Parliament meant 
that the Council of Ministers could not approve any regulations, which in turn meant the 
rebate to Britain could not be paid before the March deadline. Conservative EDG members 
raised this in European Parliament Question Time.892 The European Parliament eventually 
concluded that the decision to pay Britain would be contingent on the outcome of the 
European Council meeting in Brussels which was set to occur in March 1984.893 Mitterrand 
recognised the importance of a solution because it had a direct impact on France, which, like 
West Germany and Britain, was going to become a net contributor to the Community. Howe 
later commented that Mitterrand understood ‘the need to grasp the nettle.’894 Thus France 
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began to become more supportive of British interests. In the run up to the Fontainebleau 
Council meeting a series of discussions between British and French officials occurred. The 
importance of this is discussed by William Nicoll who argues that from this meeting a loose 
arrangement in principle had been reached.895 Eventually, it was agreed that Britain would 
receive 66 per cent of its annual contribution. With the matter settled, Leo Tindemans, 
chairman of the EPP, was quick to express relief.896 It can be seen from this chapter that the 
rebate was only possible with the support of the European Parliament which demonstrates its 
influence in this period of 1979 to 1984. The chapter shows that the European Parliament 
prior to any treaty reform still had significant influence over Community finances which is 
not described in other accounts such as those of Desmond Dinan or Helen Wallace who both 
argue that the European Parliament’s powers increased after Treaty reform (the SEA 1986 
and Maastricht 1992).897  
There is much literature on the rebate. Patrick Cosgrave praised Thatcher’s patriotism in 
securing it.898 Shirley Letwin considers Fontainebleau an 'impressive victory'.899 Stephen 
George sees it as significant that Thatcher also secured limits on the CAP budget.900 Yet 
others have highlighted the failures of the rebate, economist Ali El-Agraa pointing to its 
small sum.901 David Reynolds states that Thatcher’s 'insistence on national sovereignty was 
unreal'.902 However, Hugo Young raises the most important point as he argues Thatcher had 
missed the chance to put her own initiatives forward for the Community by allowing the 
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budget to dominate affairs.903 Yet these accounts do not examine the European Parliament. 
The above chapter contributes to these debates as it demonstrates the influence the European 
Parliament had in the rebate as it was able to stall repayments, a matter not discussed in the 
historiography. It also shows that the Conservative MEPs (particularly Scott-Hopkins and 
Christopher Jackson) had worked with the Conservative government on the rebate 
demonstrating the important diplomatic and political levers MEPs represented. Lastly, the 
most significant contribution made by the EDG was ensuring their colleagues in the 
European Parliament voted in favour of the supplementary budget in March 1983 as had this 
not passed, the rebate would have been further stalled which could have caused more delays 
as the Community would have to pay a backlog of rebates, meaning a core aspect of the 
Conservative government’s European policy would have been postponed beyond 1983.  
  
 





Chapter Eight: The relationship between the Conservative MEPs and 
MPs’  
 
The following chapter will explore the relationship between MEPs and MPs. It will cover the 
general election in 1983 and the European election of 1984. It will also demonstrate how 
matters regarding the cost of the MEPs continued to be a concern, as was the growing 
influence of the European Parliament. It again shows that MEPs that worked on committees 
covering aspects important to the Conservative Party built stronger relations with 
Westminster. This will be demonstrated through the work of Diana Elles on the Political 
Affairs Committee on matters regarding Northern Ireland and the Falklands.  
Due to anti-marketers from both the Conservatives and Labour being hostile towards the 
Community, the European Parliament came under more scrutiny. Once again, this scrutiny 
concerned the cost associated with MEPs: the salaries and allowances they received for 
attending the European Parliament in Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg. MEPs’ 
allowances were inevitably higher than those of MPs at Westminster which created tension. 
When an increase for MEPs’ wages was debated in the House of Commons, Thomas Torney 
(Labour MP for Bradford South) state that ‘any salary increase for MEPs should be 
blocked’.904 Many felt that large amounts of resources were going to the MEPs who were 
achieving little in the Community. Moreover, Kenneth Morgan has shown that the Labour 
party under Michael Foot had moved towards a more Eurosceptic view.905 MPs had a distinct 
feeling that MEPs undermined them, and relations between the two Parliaments collectively 
were strained. As seen in this thesis, the function of the European Parliament and its 
significant cost was regularly debated in the House of Commons.906 Yet some MEPs felt that 
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the salary and expenses of an MEP was a particularly sensitive matter to MPs.907 But in 1981 
MEPs felt that they were underpaid due to working in three locations across Europe as well 
as in their constituency. The attitude of MPs such as Thomas Torney contributed to the MEPs 
becoming disillusioned with Westminster. 
MEPs’ pay was eventually discussed in a Cabinet meeting in 1981. William Whitelaw, the 
Secretary of State for Home Affairs, stated that the European Assembly Pay and Pensions 
Act in 1979 had initially defined the salary of an MEP as equivalent to that of a MP.908 An 
MEP’s pay could only increase through a resolution in the House of Commons bearing the 
Queen’s recommendation.909 The debate on pay had intensified in 1981 due to the pay 
increase for MPs that came into effect from June 1980 which saw their salaries rise from 
£10,725 to £11,750. Even civil servants had seen a slight salary increase, hence MEPs 
thought they would receive one too.910 The Cabinet understood the potential division salaries 
would cause and opted to increase the MEPs’ pay. Yet to increase their pay the Controller 
and Auditor General required instructions from the government, as there was no legal 
authority without a resolution.911 The government acted swiftly to ensure parity between 
MEPs and MPs. It did, however, mean that Labour could attack the government on 
Community matters. But the Conservatives remained committed to the equality of pay 
between MEPs and MPs due to potential divisions and the subsequent damage these could 
cause in the party. The matter of pay shows that the Conservative government valued the 
MEPs and were trying to maintain a strong relationship with the delegation. Yet the cost of 
the Parliament had significantly increased from £66 million in 1978-79, to £112 million in 
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1979-1980, and £150 million in 1980-81.912 Thus the European Parliament and MEPs would 
face more hostility in forthcoming years. MEPs’ salaries were a very sensitive topic but in 
1981 the pay increase for MEPs clearly shows that Thatcher supported their work as she had 
done in the past.   
In 1982 the Falkland Islands was invaded by Argentina despite the islands being considered a 
British territory.913 Upon invasion of the Falklands Britain moved to secure a UN resolution 
that demanded Argentinian withdrawal from the Falklands and by 3 April 1982 the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 502 passed. The resolution demanded Britain 
immediately cease hostilities and called for a truce between Argentina and Britain.914 The 
United States at the time was also concerned that a protracted war could cause the Soviet 
Union to potentially support Argentina and wanted a diplomatic solution to be reached. The 
US Secretary of State Alexander Haig had met with both British and Argentinian officials to 
find a diplomatic solution.915 However, the Junta regime rejected the UN diplomatic solution 
and it was becoming difficult to foresee a peaceful solution. Thatcher wanted to press for 
military intervention and most significantly, had support from the general public from the 
outset, an IPSOS-MORI poll conducted at the time showed that 84% of respondents were in 
favour of using British military force and that 71% supported severing diplomatic ties with 
Argentina.916 Despite this, the United States worked with Peru who had been an ally of 
Argentina in the past to reach a peaceful solution, the President of Peru Fernando Belaúnde, 
worked with Haig and eventually created a peace plan although by 2 May 1982 the Argentine 
cruiser ARA General Belgrano was torpedoed and sunk by a British submarine marking a 
significant moment in the conflict. Despite this the Peruvian plan had some support from 
 
912  CCA, THCR 2.11.12.1, Gow letter to Jim Spicer MEP (dual-mandate MPs-MEPs), 14 April 1981. 
913 See L. Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, (London: Routledge, 2005). 
914 Ibid, p.21. 
915 Ibid.  




members of the Conservative government, moreover Jim Prior, Patrick Jenkin and Peter 
Walker favoured a return to diplomatic methods to conclude the matter and Dominica Bruni 
states this led to Thatcher ‘face rising pressure for a drastic change in strategy’.917 The EDG 
also opposed military intervention, believing that a diplomatic agreement should be 
reached.918 It also feared that actions of the Conservative government would damage its 
relationships with other groupings.919 The European Parliament moved to make a resolution 
report to outline its views on the Falklands. The matter was very sensitive, the MEPs Diane 
Elles (who was on the Political Affairs Committee) and Henry Plumb, (who had just become 
the grouping’s leader) worked closely with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
Number Ten regarding the report.920 Diane Elles and Henry Plumb clearly communicated that 
the European Parliament report resolution would oppose British military intervention and that 
the Falklands as a whole had begun to divide the European Parliament.921 In a meeting at 
Number Ten they had also explained that the EDG did not support the naval action that 
Britain had taken.922 By May 1982 the report had been completed and Dankert became very 
vocal suggesting member states should agree to adopt the report, including Britain. The 
resolution stated that the Community was shocked by the actions of Argentina and feared the 
effects it could have on other South American nations.923 The Council of Ministers had 
already taken steps that reflected the Community’s position by imposing an embargo on 
Argentinean imports and banning member states from exporting arms to Argentina.924 Lastly, 
the report recognised that if Argentina were to comply with the UN’s resolution on the 
Falklands this would stop Britain’s naval operation in the region.925 As a result the EDG 
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supported the resolution as did the Conservative government. The issue demonstrated that 
MEPs such as Diana Elles and Henry Plumb could clearly communicate with government 
departments and certain Conservative MPs. The fact that both MEPs were able to speak to 
Ministers at Number Ten also shows that the Conservative government valued MEPs who 
worked on certain European Parliament committees.  
However, the Falklands had caused tensions to rise across the Community and was a major 
concern from the outset for the Conservative government. Upon Argentinian invasion of the 
Falklands Lord Carrington had resigned on 5 April 1982 as Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs as he believed the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had failed to 
monitor and anticipate Argentina's intentions effectively before they invaded, Humphrey 
Atkins who was Lord Privy Seal at the time followed Carrington and also resigned.926 Some 
member states opposed Britain’s actions which had included a naval response. The matter 
intensified in the Community and internationally as Britain rejected the UN’s request for a 
ceasefire.927 In contrast to Denmark and Ireland, France and West Germany supported Britain 
and suspended military contracts they had with Argentina.928 Regardless, Britain’s navy did 
not cease operations until Argentina surrendered on 14 June 1982. Lawrence Freedman has 
argued that throughout the campaign Britain had limited support internationally,929 while 
Daniel Gibran has suggested that the Falklands offered Britain the chance of having a 
strategic position in South America.930 The Falklands, together with the Community, were 
matters that deeply divided the Conservative Party. Robert Blake suggests that the Cabinet 
had little confidence in Thatcher’s support for military intervention, which many in the party 
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also opposed.931 Junior Ministers such as Ken Clarke and Chris Patten opposed intervention, 
and even senior figures such as David Wolfson and Alan Walters opposed her actions, both 
of whom felt a diplomatic deal should be reached with Argentina.932 The opposition of the 
EDG adds to Blake’s work as it shows another group who opposed the government’s actions 
in the Falklands that was within the Conservative Party. Yet Thatcher pressed for military 
intervention as she had the support of the British public from the outset of the war.933 In his 
diary, Alan Walters remarked on the negativity within the Conservative Party as everyone 
‘was very upset’ over these resignations.934 The division over the Falklands was a very 
significant moment for the Conservatives as it allowed for divisions on other matters to come 
to the forefront, including the Community. Yet the report again showed that some MEPs were 
able to clearly communicate their views with the Conservative government, as seen at the 
meeting at Number Ten. The Falklands is an example where certain Ministers and MEPs 
opposed Thatcher’s decision.  
In 1983 there was also a British general election and Eric Evans suggests that high 
unemployment and a decrease in overall productivity since 1979 led the campaign debates.935 
However, due to the SDP–Labour split, the Community would also be a topic that would be 
debated in this general election. Labour was openly hostile towards the Community, and 
many of its MEPs criticised the Community during European Parliament debates.936 Barbara 
Castle, on reflection, emphasised the importance of ‘safeguard[ing] British interests from a 
federalist institution’.937 The Labour Party at Westminster also attacked the Community more 
widely in parliamentary debate. Peter Shore (Labour MP for Stepney and Poplar) stated that 
he 'deplores the continuing failure of Her Majesty's Government to end the scandal of 
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Britain's inequitable contributions to the EEC'.938 Because of these views the Conservatives 
believed that Labour would campaign on an anti-European platform. Scott-Hopkins and Peter 
Walker (Minister of State for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) recommended that the 
Conservatives run on a pro-European platform and highlight the benefits of the Community. 
Both suggested that employers who traded with other member states explain to their 
employees the dangers of an exit, namely the effect it could have on jobs and wages.939 The 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) was particularly keen on promoting the benefits of 
the EEC and had been a traditional proponent for the Community since the 1960s.940 
Moreover, many Conservative MEPs supported the European Parliament, hence were willing 
to run on a pro-European platform. As in 1979, MEPs believed that the European Parliament 
was the future as a large Heathite presence still dominated the Conservative delegation. 
Though MEPs were part of the British Conservative Party many still saw themselves as a 
body independent of the party at Westminster as they also worked in the EDG which was a 
multi-national grouping of the European Parliament and not Westminster.941 
Scott-Hopkins believed that in the election campaign, Labour would attack the cost of the 
EEC through budget contributions and the inefficiency of its work along with matters such as 
sovereignty.942 All three of these core matters could be linked to the European Parliament. 
Because of this the Utley Group (chaired by Peter Utley) worked on a mock manifesto 
defining the Conservatives’ attitudes towards the Community.943 It highlighted the financial 
benefits of the EEC, the jobs it brought to the UK, and how membership attracted overseas 
investors. The group also argued for the importance of membership regarding Britain’s wider 
defence policy. If a member state withdrew from the Community the Soviet Union would see 
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this as a sign of Western disunity, damaging Britain’s position in the world. The report 
concluded that the party should take ‘a middle of the road’ view on Europe and reject 
Labour’s stance of a complete withdrawal.944 The European Parliament was not mentioned in 
the review reflecting the ambivalent views the Conservative Party. Yet the problem for the 
Conservatives was that the European Parliament was an elected chamber whose powers were 
steadily increasing. Traditionally, Conservatives had wanted to retain the majority of these 
powers within the Council of Ministers. One Conservative MEP felt that the Conservative 
MPs as a whole ‘collectively despised the MEPs [thinking] that Europe was undermining 
them, not individually but as a group and that was very damaging’.945 Other member states 
shared a similar view, believing that the European Parliament undermined national 
parliaments. However, the Conservatives still had to manage their MEPs and thus opted to 
avoid discussing the matter in great detail in their manifesto. The decision to avoid the 
European Parliament damaged the Conservatives’ relationship with MEPs as it contributed to 
some MEPs feeling undervalued and acted more autonomously from the party.  
The general election was held on 9 June 1983, after the Conservative government had 
achieved an agreement with the Community to give Britain a rebate in that year. Brendan 
Evans suggests that this put the Conservatives in a strong position heading into the 
election.946 John Young argues that the Falklands had boosted Thatcher’s popularity.947 
Labour had campaigned on an anti-European platform. Its manifesto stated that it wanted a 
complete British withdrawal from the EEC. Labour had also warned previously that any of its 
MEPs who disagreed with the party line on Europe would be removed from their posts.948 A 
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poll suggested that out of the seventeen Labour MEPs only six would remain.949 Labour had 
been weakened by defections to the SDP following the split in 1981. The Conservatives 
attempted to portray themselves as the European party for the country. In their manifesto they 
even pointed out the importance of their MEPs in ensuring the reform of the Community. 
They wanted to use MEPs to divert funds away from agriculture and towards industry.950 
These ideas also set the foundations for the Conservative 1984 European elections campaign. 
It provided clarity between MEPs and the party, in stark contrast to Labour, whose manifesto 
suggested complete withdrawal from the Community in order to push through the party’s 
own economic policies.  
The Conservatives suggested that they rejected both extremes regarding the Community and 
had the nation’s best interest at heart. Furthermore, the manifesto highlighted the potential 
shortcomings of Britain leaving the EEC. It suggested that economically it would be 
catastrophic as the EEC was one of the world’s largest trading blocs, and that it would lessen 
Britain’s chances of overseas investment while losing an estimated two million jobs.951 It also 
highlighted the effects leaving would have on an international stage. In a Cold War world, the 
Soviet Union would rejoice in seeing Britain becoming isolated. Moreover, British 
withdrawal could potentially undermine the European project as a whole.952 The 
Conservatives eventually won the election with 397 seats against Labour’s 261, increasing 
their overall majority by 38 seats since the 1979 election; Labour lost 52 seats, due to the 
SDP and Liberal alliance splitting the vote between the left and centre-left parties.953 Richard 
Hill describes the disastrous impact of Labour’s poor performance and suggests that ‘the 
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campaign itself was a political and organisational shambles’.954 With a larger overall majority 
than 1979, the Conservatives had the ability to be more assertive on matters such as Britain’s 
future relationship with the Community. The election also demonstrated that in 1983 the 
Conservatives were more pro-European than they would be in the near future under Thatcher. 
Yet the fact that the SDP, Liberals and Labour had all mentioned their MEPs in their 
manifestos and the Conservatives did not explicitly, and MEPs felt disappointed and that an 
opportunity had been missed feeling that Conservative MEPs had achieved more in the EP 
than their Liberal and Labour counterparts.955  
After the election Margaret Thatcher moved to assist the Conservative MEPs. She understood 
the powers of the European Parliament, as demonstrated by Britain obtaining the budget 
rebate. She also understood how frustrating the European Parliament could be as seen with 
the Northern Ireland report and the stalling of rebate payments. Moreover, with the EDG 
being a small non-diverse grouping, Thatcher understood its limited effectiveness. However, 
Richard Corbett has shown that, increasingly, the majority of European Parliament work (in 
the 1980s) was being carried out in committees and not in the hemicycle.956 But even in 
committees grouping size and relations with other MEPs were important. Due to this, 
Thatcher discussed with Kohl at an Anglo-German summit the importance of like-minded 
groupings working together.957 She even stated that Conservatism did not serve the sole 
purpose to preserve past practices but also to adapt them to the needs of the future.958 She 
emphasised the need for the Conservatives to put forward a credible candidate for the 
presidency of the European Parliament. Kohl agreed, but also highlighted the need to avoid a 
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repetition of the last presidency election which Dankert had won.959 Kohl also believed that 
both the EPP and EDG could not achieve anything significant in the European Parliament 
unless they established a unified grouping. The Conservative Party was supportive of a 
merger as long as appropriate steps were taken to safeguard EDG members.960 Thatcher had 
suggested that representatives of the German Conservative MEPs (many of whom were 
members of the EPP) meet with British Conservative MEPs directly after the European 
elections due to occur in June 1984.961 The fact that Thatcher was advised to attend by 
officials suggests that the Conservative government understood the value of MEPs.962 
Moreover, the Conservatives understood that the European Parliament dealt with matters 
central to the government, particularly regarding the CAP and Britain’s budget contribution. 
Since its powers over the budget had increased in 1975, the European Parliament had been 
more effective, as demonstrated by the role it played in winning a budget rebate and delaying 
the process of rebate payments. Hence the European Parliament was a developing institution 
and one where the Conservative government sought further influence. Thatcher’s meeting 
with Kohl shows again that she had to think strategically about the Conservative MEPs and 
shows her willingness to work with Continental Conservatives.  
As seen previously, Thatcher wanted closer relations with other European Conservatives, 
even entertaining the idea of a merger between the EDG and EPP.963 Many Conservative 
MEPs did not wish to discuss the future of the EDG during a European election campaign. 
They believed that ‘attempting to campaign while suggesting Conservative MEPs were 
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EDG members had thought about the future of the grouping.964 There were three different 
approaches being considered within the EDG about its future. Some MEPs were in favour of 
joining the EPP, as they could better influence the European Parliament being in a larger 
grouping.965 They believed it would facilitate gaining support from fellow MEPs, a major 
obstacle since 1973. Moreover, being in a multinational grouping such as the EPP could ease 
tensions and reduce the animosity the EDG faced. Other members of the EDG supported the 
idea of joining the Liberal grouping, on the basis that its views were similar to British 
Conservatives.966 The Liberals had sat to the right of the EDG in the European Parliament. In 
1984 there were also rumours that the grouping would be led by the former European 
Parliament president Simone Veil who had been an ally of the EDG.967 The Liberal grouping 
at the time was also willing to change its name to make it more appealing to other MEPs. 
Lastly, a third group within the EDG thought it should remain as an independent entity and 
used as a platform to further British interests.968 These MEPs believed that the role of the 
EDG would be limited if it were to join a large grouping like the EPP. They also believed that 
the EDG could attract MEPs from Spain and Portugal when they joined the Community.969 
The grouping was evenly split between the three options.970 Conservative MPs, however, felt 
that the EDG should merge with the EPP and since direct elections in 1979 the Conservative 
delegation was ‘an embarrassing and unwieldy power base’.971 Yet as seen with the rebate, 
Conservative MEPs had been effective, and some of them built strong relationships at 
Westminster.972 Thatcher supporting a merger showed her interest in the MEPs; however, it 
was a view that was not shared by two-thirds of the delegation. As a result, her view to 
 
964 Author interview with Michael Welsh, 11 November 2016. 
965 Author interview with Peter Price, 13 July 2016. 
966 Author interview with Amédée Turner QC, 18 October 2016. 
967 Bodleian Library, CRD 4/22/41, EDG Grouping relationships, 6 March 1984. 
968 Ibid. 
969 Ibid. 
970 Author interview with Amédée Turner QC, 18 October 2016. 
971 British Library, Newspaper Archive I. Murray, The Times, ‘Tory Euro-MPs divided over plan to merge with 
right wing’, 20 February 1984. 




potentially merge with the EPP showed a difference between MEPs Thatcher.  The differing 
opinions on the future of the EDG had created internal divisions within the grouping. These 
divisions had developed because direct elections had increased the number of MEPs in the 
EDG, but also because of the circumstances in which Scott-Hopkins had departed as leader.  
In 1984 the second European elections would be held. Conservative MEPs were aware of the 
low turnout in 1979 and did not want a repeat.973 Dankert even emphasised the importance of 
the European Parliament and the work of its MEPs, stressing that European elections should 
not be seen through a domestic lens but rather from a Community perspective.974 The UK 
agreed to make a documentary entitled ‘Decision Makers' to generate more interest in the 
European Parliament. Conservative MEP Richard Cottrell was interviewed for this and he 
argued that the European Parliament was an integral part of the Community and had been for 
the past 25 years. However, given that the media took more interest in Westminster politics 
than in the European Parliament, the British public were left uninformed about developments 
in the European Parliament and the wider Community. Cottrell concluded by stating that 
there was no way of educating half a million people on the complexities of the European 
Parliament without the support of the media.975 Other MEPs also spoke on the documentary 
including Barbara Castle, John Hume, and Pieter Dankert and was aired on 3 June 1984, two 
weeks prior to the election date. The documentary was an attempt made by the European 
Parliament to increase awareness of the European Parliament in Britain. The MEPs wanted a 
higher turnout for the 1984 election because if turnout remained low, the credibility of the 
European Parliament would be further damaged.  
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During this period, Neil Kinnock, the leader of the Labour Party, had undertaken the task of 
reforming the party through his policy review. Richard Hill suggests this was an attempt 
made to disassociate it from the Eurosceptic, ‘loony left’ image.976 Kinnock also spoke on the 
upcoming elections. He stated that the elections were of great importance as they provided 
the public with the opportunity to exercise their democratic right.977 He also stated the 
importance of the Greater London Council (GLC) and how the European Parliament elections 
could be used to support this.978 However, this again portrayed European elections from a 
purely domestic standpoint rather than from the European perspective Dankert had urged. 
Furthermore, despite Conservative Party efforts, not all senior figures were concerned with 
the European elections or the European Parliament, being more focused on larger issues 
regarding the Community. They felt that other fora such as the Council of Ministers were 
more effective in addressing Community matters. The issue regarding direct elections and the 
manner in which they were viewed (through a domestic lens) shows that the European 
Parliament as an institution would struggle to find a role in UK politics, and this is proven 
through consistent low turnout in European elections. 
Both parties published their manifestos on 22 May 1984. Labour highlighted the failures of 
the Conservative government to gain reforms in the Community in vital areas, including the 
CAP and Britain’s budget contribution. Labour’s manifesto stated that it was the only party 
that had the ‘determination to fight for reform’.979 However, it also suggested that Britain 
should remain in the EEC until 1989 but should retain the right to withdraw after this date. 
Some Labour members such as Eric Heffer (MP for Liverpool Walton) believed that a strong 
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European Parliament ‘would take us a giant step along the road to a federal Europe’.980 The 
Conservative manifesto was similar to the general election manifesto of the previous year. It 
suggested that Labour was Europhobic, while the SDP was perceived as Eurofanatic and 
wanted Britain to be engulfed by the Community.981 It also reiterated the Conservatives’ 
successes in securing rebates for Britain. Furthermore, Anthony Forster has stated that the 
manifesto attempted to link Community membership to mutual European defence.982 
Through the manifesto it can be seen, however, that the Conservatives viewed the 
Community’s fundamental function as a common market in goods and services. They 
believed this would make member states competitive and provide budgetary discipline. 
Thatcher, however, suggested that she wished the matter of Britain’s budget contribution had 
been concluded before polling day, stating that she could not wait to ‘put the haggling behind 
her’.983 The Conservatives were confident going into the election and foresaw a result similar 
to the general election, meaning that they would win 58 seats out of a possible 78.  
The results, however, were different to those predicted. The Conservatives won 45 seats, 
Labour 32, and the SDP one. Compared with the 1979 European elections, the Conservative 
Party had lost fifteen seats while Labour had gained fifteen.984 John Gummer, the 
Conservative Party chairman, suggested that the Conservatives should be satisfied at the 
outcome, and that it was the ‘best result for any comparable sitting government’ in the 
EEC.985 He went on to state that it would be unrealistic for a government one year into a new 
parliament not to lose any seats. However, the turnout in Britain was again low at 33 per cent 
compared with an average of 60 per cent for other member states. The turnout showed a gap 
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between the British public and the European Parliament,986 and demonstrated that the 
European Parliament would not effectively fit into British politics. The low turnout also 
damaged MEPs’ morale.   
From the 1980s the influence of the European Parliament was seen through the British rebate 
which hardened the views of MPs on the European Parliament. The situation was exacerbated 
in 1985 as the European Parliament wanted to reform the Treaty of Rome in order to gain 
further powers for itself, allowing it to play a larger role in the decision-making process. 
Helen Wallace argues that many MEPs attempted to address the imbalance between the 
Council of Ministers and European Parliament.987 MEPs also felt that due to poor 
communication between the Council of Ministers and MEPs, as it stood in 1985 the European 
Parliament could not play a part in decision-making.988 The President of the European 
Parliament Pierre Pflimlin, (French EPP member) argued that the Community was becoming 
too short sighted. He felt that the focal point of the Community should be the re-launch of 
Europe and that a more prominent role for the European Parliament would facilitate the re-
launch.989 The President of the Council Jacques Poos, (Luxembourg's Foreign Minister) said 
that the Council would have to proceed with some caution if the Treaty of Rome were going 
to be reformed. Poos also highlighted that there needed to be better cooperation between 
MEPs and Ministers. But, more importantly, a balance of power between the two institutions 
had to remain.990 Britain and Denmark were both hesitant about an increase in the European 
Parliament’s role. Georges Foulkes (Labour's shadow spokesman on foreign affairs) launched 
a scathing attack on MEPs stating that ‘Many Euro-MPs seem to have too much time on their 
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hands and little function to perform’.991 Conservative Party members also spoke out against 
the European Parliament as they saw it as a supranational organisation that would undermine 
Westminster. William Whitelaw, the Deputy Prime Minister, had even likened the 
nomination of a MEP to that of a Lord, and suggested they had a minimal role to play.992 
Generally, therefore, there was hostility in Britain towards the European Parliament. The 
views in Westminster had a direct impact on Conservative MEPs’ morale, as they had 
worked on important issues for the Conservative government such as Britain’s rebate. 
Regarding the European Parliament demanding more powers in the decision-making process, 
it can be seen that MEPs viewed this as a natural progression. The fact that the EP had 
control over the budget and had been using its powers in relation to Community finance more 
readily led to MEPs feeling that the European Parliament should play a role beyond 
consultation.  
Following the replacement of Scott-Hopkins by Henry Plumb, Conservative MEPs began to 
act more independently. Plumb, as seen previously, was vocal on matters such as farm prices 
and the EMS. Additionally, MEPs did not have access to the House of Commons which made 
it difficult to manage relations with fellow Conservative MPs. EDG members had monthly 
visits to the European Parliament’s London Office. This was close to the House of Commons 
allowing MPs to attend also, as well as members of the CBI and NFU.993 Despite this, very 
few MPs took advantage of the chance to meet MEPs. Andrew Pearce (MEP for Merseyside 
and Cheshire) stated that ‘if the relationship between MEPs and MPs had been better […] the 
Conservative Party could have had a better overall policy towards the EU’.994  By 1985 MEPs 
struggled to keep in contact with MPs due to the lack of opportunities for the two to meet, 
which damaged the relationship between the two. Due to this some MEPs eventually gave up 
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trying to maintain relations with MPs. In contrast, many members of the House of Lords had 
consultations with MEPs regarding Community matters, and MEPs found it easier to work 
with the Lords.995 MEPs felt that MPs were sometimes dismissive towards them, believing 
them to be members of a separate supranational institution which widened the gap between 
MEPs and MPs.  
Geoffrey Howe, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, wanted to 
change the relationship between Westminster Conservatives and those in Strasbourg. He 
maintained regular contact with MEPs and eventually made Malcolm Rifkind head of 
relations between MEPs and MPs.996 In addition, Howe made a list of senior Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office officials to contact if a specific Minister could not be reached.997 
Howe hoped these measures would improve relations between the Conservatives in 
Strasbourg and Westminster. In 1985, however, Howe addressed the European Parliament, 
setting out Britain’s position on the future of the European Parliament. He stated that the 
European Parliament was integral to the Community, being its only democratically elected 
body. Despite this, he suggested that parity between Community institutions was essential, 
and that the European Parliament should not have an increased role in the Community.998 
Howe, therefore, played an active role regarding the European Parliament and Conservative 
MEPs. Howe’s actions again show that the Conservative government attempted to maintain 
clear lines of communication with MEPs, particularly as Henry Plumb was a more vocal 
leader than Scott-Hopkins and was willing to act more assertively. Moreover, by 1985 and 
unlike the 1970s, there were only two Conservative MEPs who held a dual mandate, Tom 
Normanton (MEP for Rochdale, MP for Cheadle) and James Spicer (MEP for Sussex, MP for 
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West Dorset); another reason why the gap between Strasbourg and Westminster began to 
widen. 
The chapter demonstrates that the Conservative MPs had made efforts to ensure relations 
with MEPs existed. The increase in MEPs’ pay shows that the Conservative government 
valued them. Regarding the Falklands Nicholas Crowson has argued that the Community’s 
support ‘mollified some Conservatives’.999 Others, such as Richard Vinen, have suggested 
that Thatcher’s dominance over the Falklands divided the Conservative Party.1000 The 
Falklands report showed that MEPs were able to build relations with Ministers and were also 
a group within the Conservative Party that opposed Thatcher’s actions, adding to debate 
around the Falklands. Additionally, Howe’s efforts to ensure communication with MEPs 
highlighted that some Ministers understood that MEPs had a role to play. However, MEPs 
still felt undermined by the various comments made by MPs in debates or statements in 
newspapers. Furthermore, as the EP was not explicitly mentioned in the Conservative 
manifesto for the general election in 1983, some MEPs felt alienated. The matter was 
worsened by Conservative MPs wanting the EDG to merge with the EPP as almost two-thirds 
of the EDG disagreed with this course of action. Many opposed a merger feeling that since 
the 1982 European Parliament presidency election they would struggle to work with the EPP. 
Thus, it can be seen from this chapter that in spite of efforts being made by Westminster, 
MEPs felt that they were being undermined which greatly damaged the relationship between 
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Section Four: The Conservative Party and Delorism 1986-
92 
 
The following period was the single most turbulent period since British accession to the 
Community. Delors completed the single market through the Single European Act (SEA) and 
then the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. With Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) the Community 
was moving at a much faster pace than ever before. Both the SEA and Maastricht also gave 
the European Parliament more powers. However, despite developments in the Community, 
the CAP remained untouched by either treaty reform which frustrated the Conservative Party 
and Thatcher. QMV was pivotal for the future of Europe, as it gave smaller European nations 
a platform to influence its development.   
Thatcher and the Conservatives began to grow more sceptical regarding European integration 
in this period, which culminated in Thatcher’s Bruges speech in 1988. She would eventually 
be forced to resign and was replaced by John Major in 1990. Maastricht was an important 
moment for the Conservative government as Britain was able to gain opt-outs from the 
negotiations over joining the single currency. Yet two years later the ERM crisis was a 
historic event and would lead to deeper British Euroscepticism.  
Alongside all of these major events there were many developments for Conservative MEPs. 
Henry Plumb became President of the European Parliament in January 1987, and he also 
expanded the EDG as Spanish members joined. However, the 1989 European Elections 
devastated the Conservative MEPs as they lost fifteen seats. This was worsened as Spanish 
members left the EDG to join the EPP. Under the chairmanship of Christopher Prout, the 
remaining Conservatives would also join the EPP in 1992 – a historic moment for the MEPs, 
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Chapter Nine: Completion of the Single Market and the European 
Parliament 
 
The following chapter will examine two major treaty reforms which include the Single 
European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992). It will give a detailed account of how 
both treaty reforms impacted the European Parliament, the British government’s reaction, and 
the EDG’s position during this period. The chapter will show that Diana Elles standing down 
as an MEP and Henry Plumb having to balance different commitments damaged 
communication with Number Ten and other Conservative MPs which in turn led to relations 
between Thatcher and the MEPs worsening, however they both continued to work together as 
will be seen with the passing of the SEA1001  
Continuing Delors’ plan to develop the economic aspect of the Community by completing the 
internal market, the SEA was agreed by twelve member states in February 1986. The SEA 
was one of the most significant (and first) revisions of the Treaty of Rome, and Britain signed 
with little opposition. Helen Wallace argues that the SEA embedded a wider policy agenda of 
the Delors’ Commission.1002 Stephen Wall observes that the SEA was agreed by the Prime 
Minister as it would provide an opportunity for Britain to press its national interests. The 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office agreed as they felt it could build a strategic relationship 
between France and Germany.1003 John Young has argued that the SEA ‘codified policies 
which had been developing since 1957’.1004 The SEA had two objectives. First, it was to 
create a single market by 1992, achieved through the removal of several barriers: physical 
barriers such as the movement of goods and people; technical barriers including transport, 
technology, capital, and financial services; and fiscal barriers including excise duty and 
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VAT.1005 The aim of the SEA was to finalise a commitment to the completion of a single 
market by 1992. The second objective of the treaty was to streamline and define the 
Community’s procedures, as well as to deepen integration, made via political provisions. It 
proposed that member states commit to the future Economic and Monetary Union.1006 Neil 
Nugent has argued that some political integration was required for economic integration.1007 
The EDG, like much of the European Parliament, was supportive of the SEA as it could 
potentially increase the influence of MEPs.1008  
Another major reform was the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) for all 
matters that concerned the single market (barring matters concerning movement of people 
and taxation). QMV was significant for the Community, and Mark Gilbert has commented 
that Britain felt it was a ‘crucial dilution of sovereignty.’1009 QMV was important to smaller 
countries as it gave them a platform to influence European affairs, QMV would go on to 
change the way the Community operated, as matters that required QMV would need the 
approval of the EP under the co-decision procedure.1010 Regardless, it meant that decisions on 
policy matters could happen quicker. It also gave the European Parliament an increased role 
in Community affairs.1011 As seen in the previous sections, since 1973 the European 
Parliament was lobbying to extend its decision-making powers. Mark Gilbert observes that 
the signing of the SEA ‘was the largest single step towards fuller economic and political 
integration in Europe since the signature of the EEC treaty in 1957’.1012 The SEA was 
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catalysed by high unemployment across Europe which was steadily increasing throughout the 
1980s. The SEA however, did provide an opportunity for the European Parliament to expand 
its influence which was supported by the EDG. 
Delors’ vision of Europe was also crucial in the development of the SEA, Patrick Crowley 
stating that ‘Delors had a vision for the EU but also had the diplomatic skills’ to achieve his 
goals.1013 Through QMV, the SEA also limited the degree to which a single member state 
could influence the Community. Moreover, the cooperation procedure was the first real step 
in the European Parliament gaining decision-making powers. The significance of the SEA 
meant that many member states had internal concerns surrounding its implementation and 
many voiced them, including the British Conservative government. Conservative MEPs saw 
the SEA as an important step in increasing the influence of the European Parliament, 
although the final decision remained with the Council of Ministers. The SEA was 
traditionally supported by MEPs for many years. Amédée Turner, for example, promoted the 
benefits Suffolk would have through the SEA.1014 MEPs including Christopher Prout, 
Christopher Jackson, Henry Plumb, Diane Elles, and Amédée Turner had all worked with 
government departments to promote the SEA since 1983.1015 The civil service and the 
government also saw the benefits of the MEPs promoting the SEA as they generated public 
support in their individual constituencies.1016 Hence the SEA is a good example of the 
influence on Whitehall by MEPs, who were often more advanced in their European policy 
than the government. But both Conservative MPs and MEPs were left frustrated that the SEA 
had not addressed the CAP.  
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The select committee that examined the SEA concluded that the treaty would weaken the 
British Parliament, as Ministers would not be able to influence the Community without 
institutional support, the committee also concluded that the SEA went further than the 
European Council had suggested in December 1985.1017 They would also be subjected to 
closer scrutiny by the European Parliament which was perceived as another obstacle 
undermining Westminster. The cross-party Commons Affairs Committee also concluded that 
the SEA went further than what was suggested at the European Council in December 
1985.1018 Conservative MP and former chairman of the 1922 Committee Edward Du Cann 
stated that the SEA signified a more integrated Community and a lesser role for the UK.1019 
Edward Taylor (Conservative MP for Rochford and Southend East) argued that ‘the number 
of regulations that the SEA forces upon Britain affected Britain on a number of levels’.1020 He 
felt that great changes to the British constitution would come about when the single market 
was completed in 1992. Taylor also reiterated that Britain should block reforms that were 
necessary to preserve British sovereignty, which included increasing the European 
Parliament’s scope.1021 The EDG supported the Conservative government as it too wanted the 
SEA to be enforced.1022 Yet some EDG members took offence at the comments made by 
Edward Taylor regarding the European Parliament. MEP Ben Patterson stated that Taylor’s 
comments only showed ‘the gap in perception which has opened up between Britain’s elected 
representatives in respectively Westminster and Brussels’.1023 Patterson’s comments also 
highlighted the growing frustration some MEPs felt towards their Westminster counterparts.  
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As has been shown, MEPs had worked to reform the Community since entering in 1973 and 
had followed the party line. They had been crucial in attempting to reform both the CAP and 
Britain’s budget contribution. By 1987 there were many who supported the SEA. The CBI, 
for example, felt that the SEA was vital for British business and the economy.1024 The 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office had also been supportive, despite the Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Geoffrey Howe arguing that the party was replaying 
the accession battles of 1972.1025 Thatcher herself had signed the SEA with little 
apprehension in spite of her less federal vision of the Community. Stephen Wall has argued 
that Thatcher saw the benefits of the single market but did not support further integration that 
was meant to proceed the SEA.1026 The treaty was signed after Britain’s budget contribution 
was resolved, and during the ‘new cold war’ era. Due to these reasons, Thatcher wanted to 
develop a positive image for Britain in the Community and thus the SEA was accepted by the 
government. Moreover, the SEA was one of Delors’ greatest achievements as it introduced 
QMV which streamlined decision-making in the Community.1027 He had achieved this 
through gaining the support of all heads of governments including Thatcher, as Britain had 
wanted the completion of the Single Market which could only be achieved through the 
deregulation of various directives. To achieve this, QMV was required; thus ‘Delors had 
created a set of circumstances where QMV seemed to make sense’ to all heads of 
government.1028 MEPs had supported Thatcher and were keen on the SEA but for different 
reasons. Many still saw the European Parliament playing a large role in Community affairs in 
the future, and wanted it to have more powers, which the SEA granted; many MEPs had even 
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promoted the benefits of the SEA in their individual constituencies. This again shows that 
despite relations worsening, Thatcher and the MEPs continued to work together.  
In 1988 the European Parliament attempted to implement the SEA which had an impact on 
the annual budget. The budget in 1988 was also an example that showed Plumb's complicated 
relationship with the European Parliament due to his various roles. This budget was 
particularly difficult due to the reforms that occurred to Community finances under the SEA. 
Thus, the budget was delayed by almost five months because of the reforms which were 
known as the Delors One Package, which was meant to streamline the annual budget 
process.1029 An institutional agreement which included the European Parliament, Council, 
and the Commission would eventually be signed on 29 June 1988. Under this agreement 
strict rules were laid out that would reinforce the budgetary discipline and fix financial 
perspectives from 1988 to 1992.1030 The agreement set the limit on how far expenditure could 
increase over one year. Furthermore, the growth rate for agricultural goods was capped at 75 
per cent of the growth rate of the Community. The Delors One package aimed at making the 
Community self-sufficient. Thus, member states would have to make a payment to the 
Community based on their GNP. The European Parliament and EDG supported the £28.44 
billion budget, but this was delayed as the European Parliament had to implement the 
reforms.1031 Having a general consensus in the European Parliament on the budget was 
extremely rare but suggests that Delors’ reforms had an instant positive effect within it.  
MEPs formally agreed to the budget in a vote on 19 May 1988, but instructed Plumb not to 
sign it off until he was satisfied that there was a balance between Community expenditure 
and revenue.1032 The recommendation was made by European Parliament officials as they 
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wanted more powers from the Delors One package.1033 The decision had repercussions for the 
relationship between the EDG and the Conservative Party. Thatcher had initially opposed the 
intergovernmental conference, as well as the growing influence of the European Parliament, a 
view held since 1975. But with Delors pushing for reforms she became increasingly hostile 
towards the Community, which culminated in the Bruges Speech in 1988.1034 Plumb was in a 
unique position, as he had become the president of the European Parliament in 1987, was a 
Lord and also the leader of the EDG.1035 Hence he had to balance the interests of the 
European Parliament and as a Conservative Peer in the House of Lords.1036 Plumb struggled 
to balance these responsibilities and, as a result, MEPs’ relations began to become more 
strained with Thatcher, particularly after the 1988 Bruges speech.  
In 1988 the European Parliament began to use more of its powers as it attempted to 
implement the SEA and increase its influence in the Community. Under the SEA’s second 
reading, agreements made with third countries required a majority vote (260 seats) in the 
European Parliament.1037 Because of this, the EDG emphasised the need for closer 
cooperation between the groupings.1038 This happened primarily through the EPP and the 
Socialists working closer together. However, a by-product of this was that the EDG became 
less influential on account of its small size. With the expansion of the European Parliament, 
the EDG had to rely on close relations with the EPP to achieve its goals. Despite this lack of 
influence in the hemicycle voting process, the EDG did have some influence through the 
work it did in committees. For example, Christopher Jackson, who had been a MEP since 
1979, chaired the Spokesmen Committee which resolved issues around voting in the 
European Parliament. He stated that it was clear that since 1979 there had been an attempt by 
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the European Parliament ‘to increase its powers and influence’,1039 a policy pursued by the 
European Parliament since British accession. After the SEA, MEPs generally had more 
authority in the Community, which was particularly the case for those who belonged to large 
groupings. The Conservative government was resistant to these developments as it was still 
not in favour of seeing a strong European Parliament.  
However, in 1988 the general public’s views differed from those of the government. Market 
Opinion Research International (MORI) conducted research regarding the Community at the 
request of the EDG, as European elections drew closer. The results showed that 48 per cent of 
those who polled wanted to remain in the Community, while 39 per cent wished to leave.1040  
In 1984, 55 per cent had wanted to leave, showing the increase in domestic support for the 
Community since then. Regarding the European Parliament specifically, 87 per cent did not 
know their constituency MEP with a mere eight per cent being able to name them 
correctly.1041 The opinion poll demonstrated to the EDG that MEPs would have to do more 
for their constituencies. This was compounded by the fact that the poll also showed that 62 
per cent of the public wished to learn more about the European Parliament. 1988 was an 
important year for the European Parliament. Its decision-making powers had increased, in 
spite of members of the French, German, and British governments opposing a stronger 
European Parliament. As outlined by Christopher Jackson, the European Parliament was 
acting quickly to implement the SEA and pushed to gain more influence. The EDG-
commissioned poll showed that British Conservative MEPs would have to raise awareness of 
the European Parliament and themselves before the European elections. The poll again 
demonstrates a disconnection between British politics and the European Parliament despite 
the SEA increasing the European Parliament’s influence. 
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Yet by 1989 the European Parliament was becoming a stronger Community institution, and 
this was reflected in higher MEP attendance. Pre-1987, the average attendance was below 
220; after 1988 the average was well over 300 MEPs.1042 The increase in attendance was a 
direct impact of the SEA as the European Parliament had more responsibilities. However, it 
meant there was a need for MEPs and their staff to travel to Brussels more often to work with 
other institutions, which many EDG members believed wasted time.1043 Additionally, all of 
the European Parliament’s committee work occurred in Brussels and under the SEA these 
committees had an increased workload. The amount of travelling was extremely costly with 
estimates being £18-23 million a year.1044 Due to this British Conservative MEPs wanted to 
move some of the European Parliament’s personnel to Brussels permanently. They did this 
through a motion led by Derek Prag, who was the EDG deputy chairman and also worked in 
the European Parliament’s Institutional Affairs Committee as the grouping’s spokesperson. 
The vote was opposed strongly by Luxembourg and France who both felt that this was the 
first step for the site of the European Parliament to be eventually moved to a single 
location.1045 The Conservatives however, managed to gain support from the EPP and Liberal 
groupings.1046 The resolution was passed by 222 votes to 172 and meant that France and 
Luxembourg would have to relocate almost two thousand staff to Brussels.1047 The vote 
demonstrated how the European Parliament had developed, and how the Conservative MEPs 
understood voting in the European Parliament, given the small size of the EDG.  
The EDG understood that it would receive support from the EPP to move staff to Brussels. 
The EPP had wanted the European Parliament to be housed in Brussels as it felt it could 
allow it to work more closely with other Community institutions who also had a large 
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presence in Brussels.1048 However, support from other groupings would be subject to the 
EDG voting in favour of them on other matters. Hence it would be more beneficial for the 
EDG to rely on one large grouping like the EPP rather than a combination of smaller ones. 
William Riker refers to this as ‘minimum-winning’, which became more apparent to the EDG 
in the mid- to late-1980s.1049 Another tactic the EDG began to implement was to ensure that 
roll-call voting occurred.1050 Roll-calling held MEPs accountable and there was no anonymity 
involved. The EDG controlled a mere 3.3 per cent of the votes in the European Parliament, 
and thus had to employ strategic measures to ensure certain votes went in its favour as the 
European Parliament became a more important institution.1051 However, reliance on other 
groupings including the EPP became more difficult. The EPP had been somewhat supportive 
of the EDG, and some EDG members even hoped that a future merger of the groups was a 
real prospect. The activities of the EDG are consonant with Riker’s account as they 
demonstrate how a small grouping like the EDG attempts to gain influence in the European 
Parliament through the ‘minimum-winning’ tactic.  
In the 1990s, the Community remained a key area of concern for the Conservative Party. The 
1989 European elections had reduced the number of Conservative MEPs to 32.1052 However, 
‘virtually all down to the last man were very pro-European.’1053 Furthermore, many of the 
remaining Conservative MEPs were in their third terms, including Amédée Turner, Peter 
Price, Michael Welsh, and Christopher Prout these MEPs were well established within the 
European Parliament having such vast experience. Yet Diane Elles, as will be seen, was a 
large loss to the delegation. Moreover, the result of the 1989 European elections united the 
Conservative MEPs in their opposition to the views on the Community of Thatcher and the 
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Conservative Party. The senior Conservatives felt, however, that it was important that the 
relationship between MEPs and MPs improved or they faced the potential of losing another 
election.1054 A reshuffle occurred in the Conservative Party in order to make it more electable 
in the next election.  
Kenneth Baker, who had been loyal to Thatcher, was appointed party chairman in July 1989, 
and at the beginning of 1990 he attempted to bridge the gap between MEPs and MPs. Baker 
stated in a BBC interview that he would organise a meeting between MEPs and MPs to 
improve relations and provide a more coherent policy towards the Community.1055 However, 
at the December 1989 European Council meeting Thatcher was unsupportive of Community 
developments.1056 Despite her support for the SEA, she had grown to oppose the flanking 
policies that accompanied it; as noted by Nicholas Crowson, the SEA ‘expanded rather than 
consolidate its remit’ of the Community.1057 Thatcher had also spoken against the free 
movement of people, stating that it was a nation’s right to manage its borders, fearing the 
prospect of illegal immigration, drugs, and terrorism.1058 She had also opposed the 
development of the social dimension of the Community. Her decision led to some MEPs 
growing more hostile towards Thatcher: Peter Price, who had been a MEP since 1979, openly 
criticising her. He stated that she had displayed a ‘negative’ approach to the Community 
which damaged the reputation of the British Conservatives.1059 Baker also made little effort to 
communicate with MEPs, as seen by the fact that there are limited archival records showing 
him interacting with MEPs, barring one study day which occurred in late October 1990 to 
facilitate interaction between MEPs and MPs.1060 The growing gap between the two were 
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shown when MEPs at this study day spoke strongly in favour of monetary union and a single 
European currency which many Conservative MPs opposed.1061 Baker earlier in the year had 
outlined his an view. He reiterated this at the study day, suggesting that the government 
supported monetary union and that Britain would enter when the right conditions were met. 
He went on to state that the British government did not support a federal Europe.1062 
Inevitably, this study day, as with similar attempts to bridge the gap between Strasbourg and 
London, was ineffective. Moreover, Baker’s comments earlier in the year had publicly 
displayed the disagreements and disunity the Community was causing the party. Thus, it can 
be seen the relationship between the MEPs and MPs quickly deteriorated in this period 
between 1988 and 1990. 
Furthermore, during this period German reunification became a pressing concern. Helmet 
Kohl, the West German Chancellor, had initially constructed a five-year plan to unify East 
and West Germany, a plan that was similar to nineteenth-century German unification, as 
observed by Tony Judt.1063 It meant that the two countries would be joined by a single 
currency, and political union would follow. However, due to East Germany’s public outcry 
for unification, it was required more urgently. Hence Kohl had to strengthen his case for 
unifying Germany and expedite its timetable. Internationally, however, unification was 
opposed by all major powers apart from the US. Judt observes that many nations had grown 
accustomed to the arrangements regarding Germany and did not want this to change.1064 
Berger and Laporte note that Thatcher was ‘worried about the implications of 
reunification’.1065 Again this was not a view that was shared by Conservative MEPs. The 
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European stability fund should be created for East Berlin to provide time and money to 
facilitate it.1066 But the EDG warned of the problems of a ‘hasty’ unification, despite 
supporting it.1067 Thatcher increasingly became hostile towards the idea of a unified Germany 
and the impact this would have on the Community, which again worsened relations with 
Conservative MEPs and distanced them from the wider party. At this stage little was 
discussed with Thatcher who had become more dismissive of the Community. What had 
further damaged the link between MEPs and Thatcher was that Diane Elles was no longer a 
MEP. Elles had decided not to stand in the 1989 European Elections which was a blow to the 
MEP delegation.1068 Elles, as seen on previous issues, was able to discuss matters regarding 
foreign policy with Number Ten officials, Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials and 
Thatcher.1069 With Elles no longer an MEP a gap had clearly been created.  
Unlike Britain however, France changed its policy regarding unification. Tony Judt observes 
that Mitterrand saw that unification after 1989 was inevitable regardless of any opposition, be 
it from Britain or the Soviet Union.1070 Because of this, Mitterrand suggested that France 
would support unification but at a price: namely, concessions in the Community. Kohl was 
willing to concede on a number of minor matters to ensure cordial relations with France.1071 
Fundamentally, Mitterrand wanted the Community’s foundation to be on a Franco-German 
alliance, a matter Britain would have to deal with consistently in its relationship with the 
Community. As observed by Nicholas Crowson this frustrated Thatcher as she was 
‘unwilling to play a secondary role to the Franco-German axis.1072 On a more immediate 
level, the relationship between Conservative MEPs and Thatcher worsened again over 
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reunification as there was little communication, unlike in the past. Poor communication on 
central foreign policy issues occurred because of the loss of Diane Elles as a MEP. Because 
of this, a gap would continue to grow causing tensions within the Conservative Party until 
Thatcher was replaced by John Major. 
Delors’ policy on German reunification was consistent with Mitterrand’s, and he also saw it 
as an opportunity for the Community to expand and deepen integration. In 1990 he pressed 
for the European Commission to have more powers, particularly over decision-making.1073 
He also wanted the European Parliament to have more legislative powers to counterbalance 
the increased powers of the Commission. Delors was firmly committed to making a new 
‘institutional framework’ as German reunification would strain the Community.1074 He 
wanted to have an economic and political dialogue with Eastern European countries after 
reunification was completed, which would eventually lead to the Community expanding into 
Eastern Europe. Eastern European enlargement, however, would pose many economic and 
political problems for the Community and potentially slow down the decision-making 
process. Anneli Albi has argued that eastward expansion was contested by France, Germany, 
and Britain as they felt a sharp increase in their contributions to the Community would be 
required to counterbalance the unstable economies of Eastern European nations.1075 The 
British government was quick to dismiss Delors’ views stating that it was premature to make 
assumptions regarding German reunification or the need to develop the Commission’s role. 
The British Conservative government still wanted the Council of Ministers to have the final 
say on Community matters.1076 Despite British views, most member states wanted to see a 
deeper commitment to political union as they saw it as a natural step that should follow the 
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completion of the single market. In contrast to the Conservative government, Conservative 
MEPs were more supportive of political union and German reunification, again creating 
tensions between the party and the MEPs. Again, these tensions were worsened due to the 
loss of Diane Elles as a MEP. In terms of Eastern European expansion, Britain, France, and 
Germany wanted stricter conditions for accession.  
The location of the EP was a continuous problem dating back to the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome.1077 Peter Price, the British Conservative MEP, had chaired the seating group of the 
European Parliament from 1989 to 1994. The matter began to surface again in 1990. By then, 
the EP’s plenary sessions were held in Strasbourg on a monthly basis, committee work took 
place in Brussels, and the secretariat general headquarters was in Luxembourg. Enrico Vinci, 
the European Parliament’s Secretary General, had argued for Brussels speeding up its 
construction of a building for the European Parliament. Moreover, by 1990, 600 out of 3,300 
secretariat staff worked in Brussels.1078 The site of the European Parliament worried both 
France and Luxembourg who, for financial reasons, wanted the European Parliament to 
conduct its work in their countries. Both attempted to appease MEPs because of this, 
providing colour TVs and new fax machines.1079 Following the staff move, France changed 
tack and wanted the hosting of plenary sessions in Strasbourg to be written into the 
Community treaties.1080 Regarding the future of the site of the European Parliament, French 
Foreign Minister Roland Dumas argued that unanimity was required. MEPs also suggested 
that France blocked other matters, including the creation of the European Environmental 
agency, in the European Parliament until Strasbourg was confirmed as the location for 
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plenary sessions.1081 Conservative MEPs maintained that Brussels should be the site as it 
already housed the Commission. The EDG thus moved to table a motion that wanted the 
European Parliament to move entirely to Brussels.1082 The resolution is significant as it was 
made with little consultation with Westminster.1083 However, it was narrowly voted down, to 
the relief of French officials.1084  
The location of the European Parliament continued to be a problem throughout the early 90s 
until it was resolved in 1992. The matter was sensitive mainly because of the financial 
incentives it offered France, Luxembourg, and Belgium. It also demonstrates the problems of 
unanimous decision-making. The EDG resolution is of importance as it shows a departure 
from the policy in the late 1970s. The policy since Thatcher became Prime Minister was led 
by Westminster, which wanted no firm commitment on a site as the matter could be used as a 
bargaining chip for other negotiations.1085 The resolution in 1990 was made by the EDG, who 
continued to act more independently from Westminster in the later stages of Thatcher’s 
premiership. The decision by MEPs to act more autonomously had also occurred because 
after the 1989 European Election. Many EDG members were now third-term MEPs and felt 
that they did not need strong support from Westminster.1086 The resolution demonstrates how 
strained MEP and MP relations had become with Thatcher during the latter part of her tenure. 
Major, who had replaced Thatcher as leader, demonstrated that he was more willing to work 
with the Community than his predecessor. John Young states that by approaching the 
Community in a ‘genuinely communitaire manner’ he could safeguard British interests in 
Maastricht negotiations.1087 An example of this was when he proposed Britain switch to PR 
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voting in time for the 1994 European elections.1088 Major and the Conservative MEPs 
believed this was the right course of action to take as it aligned Britain with other member 
states without having to concede on vital issues regarding monetary or political union.1089 
However, the Conservative Party wholly rejected the idea of moving to PR for Westminster 
elections. As observed by Philip Norris, electoral reform was a difficult subject often brought 
up by the party in opposition.1090 The government and opposition had to balance the 
representation of smaller parties against winning seats themselves. Yet Major had selected 
PR as an issue because it gained the support of the Conservative MEPs and the Community. 
Moreover, the lack of interest in the subject by the British public meant it would not damage 
him in a general election.1091 Thus the EP with its Conservative MEPs was a forum in which 
Major could show his diplomatic style and disassociate himself from Thatcher.  
1991 was dominated by the Maastricht negotiations. The objective of this treaty was to 
extend the Community’s remit into areas of criminal justice and foreign policy. It also aimed 
to broadly extend powers over social issues, including law enforcement, immigration, and 
asylum. Neil Nugent has summarised the factors that had led to the Maastricht Treaty, 
suggesting that Delors understood a social dimension was required if economic and monetary 
union was to be successful. Nugent also argues that mechanisms needed to be put in place to 
cope with concerns arising from dismantled borders.1092 Anthony Forster sets out the British 
strategy from the outset. He suggests that from the beginning, Major had told Kohl he could 
not accept a social chapter, nor a single European currency.1093 The idea of rejecting 
Maastricht was considered by the Conservative government. The case was strengthened as 
the Danish government was also very pessimistic on Maastricht: like Britain, it did not want 
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to accept the single currency, and defence was covered by NATO. Denmark would thus hold 
a referendum on the treaty in 1992.1094 The matter was also controversial in France. There 
was hostility towards Maastricht from the left of the political spectrum with the French 
Communist party, Revolutionary Communist Legal, and Worker’s Struggle all opposing the 
treaty.1095 They saw it as a drive towards neoliberalism. All these factors put immense 
pressure on French President Mitterrand as Delors was pushing for Maastricht to succeed. 
Due to these divisions, France too was to hold a referendum on the treaty in 1992. It 
appeared, therefore, that the Maastricht Treaty would not be ratified by all member states. 
Moreover, the European Commission understood that concessions would have to be granted 
to individual member states if any form of treaty ratification was to occur.  
Yet there were others who were supportive of Maastricht. Conservative MEPs were 
especially keen and wanted to be part of the single currency.1096 As Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Major had worked closely with the Treasury's Second Permanent Secretary Nigel 
Wicks. By 1991 Wicks had engaged with the Conservative Party and the general public 
regarding their views on the Community. Chris Pilkington observes that it was Wicks who 
proposed to Major the idea of opting out of aspects of Maastricht.1097 It was a strategy 
previously used by Callaghan as Prime Minister in 1979. Callaghan had committed to the 
EMS but opted out of the ERM. It was an ideal solution as Major was willing to accept what 
Kohl wanted regarding the introduction of the EMU, but to remain outside of the single 
currency and social chapter. It was on this basis that Major began negotiations with the 
Community in 1991.   
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Conservative MEPs were also consulted on the matter, Major working closely with 
Christopher Prout who remained the chair of the EDG as it transitioned into the EPP. Prout 
was a constitutional lawyer, which made him an excellent resource for Major. Moreover, as 
the two worked together, MEPs in turn had more access to Major through Prout.1098 Michael 
Welsh (MEP for Lancashire Central) worked closely with Prout on a number of matters prior 
to the 1989 European elections. Due to this, Welsh also worked on the Maastricht 
negotiations.1099 On the whole, Conservative MEPs felt they had a stronger relationship with 
Major than with Thatcher. Due to the impending election, Conservatives at Westminster were 
mute on the Maastricht issue despite Major’s biggest concern being party unity. They feared 
losing their seats if inter-party tensions rose, which freed Major and MEPs to work closely as 
negotiations developed.  
The final Maastricht negotiations began on 11 December 1991 and lasted a total of 31 hours. 
Neil Nugent has observed that the final form of the treaty was not the tree structure as 
envisaged by Delors, but rather a three-pillared system. The first pillar included the European 
Community, under which the European Commission held the powers of initiation, and the 
Council of Ministers remaining the main decision-making body that could make decisions via 
QMV.1100 It also gave an increased scope to the European Parliament.1101 The second pillar of 
Maastricht covered the common foreign and security policy, and the third covered home 
affairs and internal security policies. The second and third pillars were both 
intergovernmental.1102 These pillars were purposely left to cover fewer areas as this would 
allow the majority of the Community’s decision-making to remain with the Council of 
Ministers. There were loose discussions of a fourth pillar regarding defence, but this did not 
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materialise. Dinan, Nugent and Patterson argued for the importance of the Maastricht Treaty, 
referring to it as ‘the high point of European integration’.1103 Helen Wallace describes the 
way in which the treaty fundamentally changed the political system of the Community.1104 
Both accounts highlight the treaty’s importance to the development of the Community. 
However, Major working with Conservative MEPs, wanted to ensure British interests were 
safeguarded.  
During the negotiations, John Major ensured that Britain gained opt-outs from both the single 
European currency and the entire social chapter. After the 31-hour negotiations concluded, 
Kohl made a statement suggesting that the treaty had succeeded in concluding monetary, 
economic, and political union.1105 Kohl downplayed Britain’s concession and even suggested 
that Britain would eventually fully accept Maastricht by 1996.1106 From a British perspective, 
John Major had delivered on Maastricht. As he stated in the House of Commons, Maastricht 
was ‘game, set and match’.1107 There has been much literature on Major’s success on 
Maastricht, Hugo Young commenting that upon his return Major was ‘a conquering hero’,1108 
whilst Booker and North describe the praise the British media gave Major.1109 However, 
Nicholas Crowson has argued that the opt-outs would later cause economic divisions amongst 
former Thatcherites.1110 Yet this literature does not cover the relationship between 
Conservative MEPs and Major during Maastricht, which had developed positively. Prout had 
worked with Major on the Maastricht negotiations, thus MEPs’ contribution is also 
overlooked.  
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Having won a fourth consecutive general election, discontent over the Community began to 
grow in the form of the ‘Maastricht rebels’. These members of the Conservatives prevented 
the passing of the Maastricht bill in the House of Commons. Dalibor Rohac has observed that 
the rebel MPs had a disproportionate amount of influence due to the small majority the 
government held.1111 There were 22 rebels, while the Conservative government held a small 
majority of eighteen seats.1112 These Eurosceptics had the support of prominent Conservative 
figures, including Norman Tebbit and Margaret Thatcher, both were in the House of Lords by 
this point which enhanced their political platform. Thatcher would go on to state that she 
‘would never have signed that treaty’.1113 Conservative MEPs wholly opposed this, which 
again strengthened relations with Major, as many MEPs felt that Major was more receptive to 
their ideas regarding the Community.1114  
As seen previously, Maastricht was problematic for other member states including Denmark 
and France. It was decided by Delors that these matters would be resolved at the European 
Council meeting in December 1992 scheduled to be held in Edinburgh. Persuading Denmark 
to agree was vital as without the consent of all member states Maastricht could not be 
enforced. At the European Council meeting it was decided that Denmark would get opt-outs 
in four areas which encompassed matters over national citizenship, EMU, defence and home 
affairs. The first was over citizenship: national citizenship was not replaced by European 
citizenship.1115 British Conservative MEPs had been supportive of Denmark over Maastricht 
as it was in a similar position to Britain.1116 Maastricht was a landmark treaty which had three 
broad effects as set out by Tony Judt. The first was the unexpected boost that NATO 
received. The stricter monetary policies from Maastricht meant that the newly liberated states 
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of Eastern Europe could not join the Community in the foreseeable future, thus membership 
of NATO was offered in the interim. It also deferred the problem of Eastern European 
enlargement. The second effect of Maastricht was that the treaty had brought Community 
politics to the forefront. This raised public awareness of the European Union in Britain and at 
Westminster. Lastly, it showed unity amongst Community members and illustrated a 
commitment to the EU.1117 Maastricht was a significant moment for the Community and 
British Conservative MEPs were able to work alongside Major to secure the Conservative 
government’s goals. 
The Edinburgh Council of Ministers meeting was dominated by Denmark and Maastricht. 
However, the matter regarding the location of the European Parliament was also decided. As 
seen previously, this had been an unresolved issue since the Treaty of Rome. Conservative 
MEPs were in favour of a move to Brussels where the majority of the European Parliament’s 
staff was already based; more importantly, so was the majority of the European 
Commission’s staff and MEPs were supported by Major on the matter.1118 However, as 
mentioned previously, due to the financial incentives attached to housing the European 
Parliament, Strasbourg, Brussels, and Luxembourg all wanted to be its official seat.1119 Major 
wanted to appease both Belgium and France, as well as support his MEPs.1120 It was 
eventually agreed at the Edinburgh Council meeting that the work of the Parliament would be 
split between three locations: the monthly plenary sessions would be held in Strasbourg, 
committee meetings in Brussels, and Luxembourg would host other European Parliament 
affairs, as well as holding the European Parliament Archive.1121 The agreement reached 
settled the dispute, but many MEPs remained hostile towards the solution. Conservative Lord 
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Bethell wanted the site to be moved to Brussels due to the link it would have to other 
Community institutions.1122 The Conservative MEP Andrew Pearce (MEP for Cheshire West 
and Wirral) also suggested that the site should have remained in Brussels, as the city was ‘the 
nerve-centre’ of the Community. He also believed that Major could have ensured that the seat 
remained in Brussels as Major held the EU chairmanship in 1992.1123 As a whole, the 
European Parliament was hostile towards the agreement as it felt its fate should have been 
decided by MEPs and not in a European Council summit. The decision was important as it 
again demonstrated that the European Council was the final decision-making body despite the 
European Parliament increasing its powers through the SEA and Maastricht. British 
Conservative MEPs were disappointed by Major in not securing a move to Brussels, which 
marked the first disagreement between them.  
Overall, the chapter has shown the various contributions made by the MEPs in an extremely 
turbulent period. Regarding the SEA it is seen that the MEPs who held relationships with 
Whitehall departments and MPs, attempted to discuss the SEA at Westminster. Many, also 
with the support of Westminster, promoted the SEA in their local constituencies. However, as 
Thatcher became more Eurosceptic in her Bruges Speech, the MEPs felt disconnected from 
the Conservative government. Communication worsened as the loss of Diane Elles was vital, 
a situation exacerbated by Henry Plumb attempting to balance his various commitments, 
which contributed to damaging the relationship with Westminster. Yet with the departure of 
Thatcher, Major was thrown into Maastricht negotiations. Much has been written on this 
topic, Anthony Forster suggests that Major had to appease both wings of the Conservative 
Party.1124 Dalibor Rohac suggests that Major struggled to appease the Eurosceptics and 
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focuses specifically on the Maastricht rebels.1125 Nicholas Crowson concurs with Rohac's 
account and suggests the opt-outs gained at Maastricht would cause long-term division in the 
Conservative Party.1126 Yet Hugo Young highlights the importance of Major's skilful 
negotiating tactics in securing opt-outs.1127 Tony Judt shows that most member states had 
domestic pressures preventing them from agreeing Maastricht.1128 However, none of these 
accounts explore the Conservative MEPs’ role in Maastricht. This chapter has shown that 
Major was able to quickly build strong relations with Conservative MEPs, including 
Christopher Prout, Michael Welsh, and later Amédée Turner, all of whom assisted Major in 
the negotiations. As seen in the chapter Prout was particularly important and was regularly 
consulted by Major.   
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Chapter Ten: Thatcher's resignation, and John Major's relationship 
with MEPs 
 
The following chapter will examine the downfall of Thatcher. It will discuss the Westland 
Affair, how divisions over EMU eventually led to her resignation, and how Conservative 
MEPs reacted in this period. The chapter will show the positive impact that Major’s eventual 
leadership had on MEPs. Ensuring stability through maintaining relations with Conservative 
Party members was a fundamental objective of Major when he became Prime Minister. The 
chapter will show how he successfully achieved this through his relationships with MEPs. 
The Westland Affair had caused much controversy and division in the Conservative Party.  
The matter led to the resignation of Michael Heseltine as Secretary of State for Defence and 
damaged the reputation of the Conservative government.1129 It also affected the dynamics 
between MEPs and the Conservative Party. Westland was a British-based helicopter company 
which had been in steady decline since the 1980s, being heavily reliant on government 
contracts. In November 1985 an American company, Sikorsky, made a bid to rescue 
Westland which Heseltine opposed. Thatcher’s view was that Westland’s future should be 
decided by the company and not the government. Heseltine leaked a statement to The Times. 
In it he argued that Westland would risk its future if it were owned by Sikorsky.1130 A series 
of Cabinet meetings followed, which Westland Chairman Sir John Cuckney could attend. 
From these meetings it became clear that Thatcher and Cuckney, who attended a Cabinet 
meeting on 9 December 1985, were in favour of a US solution, whilst Howe (Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs), Lawson (Chancellor of the Exchequer), and 
Heseltine (Secretary of State for Defence) were in favour of a European solution.1131  
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The matter was also discussed in the European Parliament and 180 MEPs voted in favour of a 
European solution. More importantly, 31 out of 32 British Conservatives voted in favour.1132 
Margaret Daly, MEP for Somerset and West Dorset (where Westland was based), was vocal 
on the matter and was supported by Frederick Catherwood.1133 They argued that the 
government should support a European project as the 1984 European elections were fought 
on the grounds of stronger and more coordinated European defences. Yet neither MEP had 
effectively built relations with MPs or Whitehall departments and thus struggled to influence 
the government. Moreover, Thatcher did not consider the MEPs’ views on the subject as she 
was swaying towards an Anglo-American project.1134 Heseltine was unable to convince the 
Cabinet of a European solution and resigned. Peter Jenkins would later state that Heseltine 
‘had lost his cool’.1135 However, the Westland Affair did not conclude there as Leon Brittan 
who also resigned. Beetham and Weir have argued that more members of Cabinet were 
beginning to feel that Thatcher was making decisions within ‘small and informal groups’, 
which created tensions in Cabinet.1136 However, many Conservative MEPs opposed the 
official government/party line which supported a US solution; they also struggled to 
communicate with the leadership on Westland, thus damaging the relationship between some 
MEPs (Frederick Catherwood and Margaret Daly) and Thatcher.  
During this period Lord Cockfield’s term as European Commissioner was due to expire. He 
had been vital for the SEA and the steps taken towards completing the single market.1137 Yet 
his efforts to harmonise VAT were met with scepticism by some members of the 
Conservatives in London. These members felt that Cockfield, like other Commissioners 
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under Delors, was acting to harmonise too quickly.1138 They felt that VAT harmonisation 
should occur naturally and when financially beneficial.1139 Cockfield, however, was pressing 
for the completion of the single market because of the deadline of 1992; but Thatcher and 
other Conservatives were consistently against the idea of deadlines for Community 
objectives.1140 Because of Cockfield’s inability to accept this advice, both the Treasury and 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office opposed a second term for him despite his support 
amongst Conservatives MEPs.1141 Thatcher made an effort to engage the MEPs through a 
letter to Plumb asking for an opinion on Cockfield’s tenure.1142 Yet as a grouping the EDG 
became more vocal on the matter when rumours began to circulate that Cockfield would be 
replaced by another Commissioner.1143 The EDG was supported by the Leader of the House 
John Wakeham who also wanted Cockfield to remain a Commissioner: another example of 
divisions within the Conservative Party on European matters.1144 The issue was not decided 
until late September 1988 when it was determined by Thatcher that Cockfield would not 
serve a second term and would be replaced by Leon Brittan.1145 In 1988 Brittan reluctantly 
resigned as an MP to take up his post as the European Commissioner for Competition. The 
EDG was not supportive of the decision nor of the direction in which the Conservative 
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government was heading.1146 The episode also meant there was more dissent between the 
EDG and the Conservative Party at Westminster. It is also clear from this that 1988 was a 
turning point for the Conservatives as they became increasingly divided on the Community. 
Labour had many internal problems which meant that the Conservatives were in a stronger 
position heading into the 1987 general election. The Conservative manifesto set out the 
successes the party had in securing Britain rebates from the Community.1147 It also stated that 
the Conservatives would continue to play a leading role in the Community as they would 
continue to work on reforming the CAP. Unlike the 1983 manifesto it also emphasised the 
importance of their MEPs in ensuring the common market developed in the manner that 
suited Britain.1148 Moreover, Plumb was consulted on the manifesto, particularly regarding 
the element that related to the CAP and the budget contribution.1149 His role in the manifesto 
shows his influence in the Conservative Party. 
In their manifesto, Labour were less hostile to the Community in comparison to previous 
years. Labour stated that they would be willing to cooperate with the Community and were 
willing to work with member states to combat unemployment and expand economically. 
However, it also suggested that it would fight on matters that affected Britain, namely CAP 
reform.1150 The election held on 11 June 1987 saw another Conservative victory with 375 
seats, compared to 229 for Labour, and 23 for the SDP-Liberal Alliance.1151 Labour had 
improved significantly from the 1983 election, gaining an additional twenty seats. Butler and 
Kavanagh have argued that one of the underlying reasons Labour lost was because there had 
been a sharp rise in living standards under the Conservatives.1152 They also suggest that 
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Labour’s performance solidified its position as the second largest party in the UK. Despite 
winning, the Conservatives lost 22 seats since the 1983 election. Comparing the 1987 
election to the previous European elections (1984), it can be seen that the European elections 
were accurate as a forecasting tool, in terms of both the result and the swing away from the 
Conservatives. 
For the Conservatives in London tensions further arose within Cabinet. Both Howe and 
Lawson wanted to enter the EMU as the British economy worsened with fears of inflation. 
The matter of economic and monetary union was to be discussed at the European Council 
meeting in Madrid (26-27 June 1989). The MEP Christopher Jackson had worked with the 
Treasury and had attempted to discuss the benefits of the EMU with Thatcher.1153 However, 
unlike previous years, Thatcher was less receptive to Jackson’s views.1154 Before the meeting 
in Madrid both Howe and Lawson threatened to resign if Thatcher did not agree a date before 
1992 for Britain to enter the EMS.1155 At the meeting, Thatcher merely outlined the 
framework that had to be met before Britain considered joining. Despite this, neither Howe 
nor Lawson resigned. Thatcher became critical of both after the Council meeting and opted to 
work more closely with Senior Economic Advisor Alan Walters. Walters had worked with 
Thatcher since 1983 and strongly opposed British entry to the EMS. A rift immediately arose 
between Lawson and Walters. Seldon and Collings have argued that the combination of the 
ERM and Walters had made the post difficult for Lawson, who resigned on 31 October 
leaving the party more divided.1156 Lawson’s resignation came during a period in which the 
party began to lose public support. By 1989, it had become more fractured and continued to 
be so, even after Britain joined the ERM on 8 October 1990. Moreover, Thatcher’s 
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relationship with the MEPs deteriorated as her views on the Community hardened, as 
demonstrated by her ineffective communication with Jackson. 
The final disagreement between Conservative MEPs and Thatcher was over the ERM. 
Thatcher had invited the Conservative MEP delegation to Downing Street to ease tensions. 
The meeting did indeed resolve issues regarding the 1989 European elections and the party 
was able to move forward.1157 However, a 90-minute debate ensued regarding monetary 
union. MEPs argued that the government should have a more positive outlook towards 
monetary union and the creation of a single European bank. Prout had also suggested that 
Britain should enter the ERM by the end of 1989.1158 Thatcher responded by outlining her 
stance taken at the Madrid European Council meeting, which was that Britain would join 
under the right conditions.1159 It meant there was not a timetable to join which frustrated 
supporters of the ERM. Labour benefited from the internal fighting of the Conservatives, Neil 
Kinnock stating that the Labour party was now the ‘party of Europe’.1160 In response to the 
continuous internal disputes, John Major as the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs attempted to appease MEPs. He reinforced what Howe had achieved 
as the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and attempted to give MEPs 
more access to Ministers.1161 Much has been written on EMU during this period. Collings and 
Seldon suggest Howe and Lawson calculated that if Britain was part of the EMU it could 
better influence the Community.1162 Others, such as Shirley Letwin, suggest that Lawson’s 
ineffective management of the British economy made EMU entry seem more favourable to 
Conservative MPs.1163 Yet the Conservative MEPs also supported EMU and this was another 
strand of opposition Thatcher had to contend with, which is overlooked in the literature. 
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Moreover, it can be seen that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under Howe and Major 
had made efforts to work with the MEPs. 
The handling of ERM and EMU policy led to the eventual resignation of Geoffrey Howe as 
Deputy Prime Minister. Howe was the last Cabinet member remaining from the 1979 
Cabinet. His resignation placed even more pressure on Thatcher’s leadership, and this came 
to a head when Heseltine stood against her for the party’s leadership. The first-round ballot 
was won by Thatcher with 50.8% of the vote, with Heseltine winning 40.9%.1164 However, 
due to Conservative leadership election rules, a second ballot was required. Upon consulting 
members of her Cabinet, some, including Malcolm Rifkind and Kenneth Clarke, observed 
that she could not win, and she resigned on 22 November 1990. Chris Gifford, amongst 
others, has argued that Howe’s resignation had compounded Thatcher’s fate as the leader of 
the party.1165 The second ballot was fought between John Major, Douglas Hurd, and Michael 
Heseltine. Conservative MEPs were split evenly between the three candidates.1166 However, 
collectively they stated that the leadership race highlighted the need for a change in the 
party’s European policy. John Major won the second ballot with 49.7% of the vote.1167 The 
ending of Thatcher’s tenure was an historic moment in British history and much has been 
written about her overall European policy. In his memoirs, Nicholas Ridley indicates that 
Thatcher successfully defended British interests and had a positive influence in the 
Community.1168 Stephen George comments that she established Britain as a ‘skilful actor in 
the Community game’.1169 David Reynolds argues that Thatcher never faced the public 
honestly and instead wore a ‘mask of patriotic jingoism’ to hide the loss of British 
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sovereignty.1170 Unlike the accounts mentioned above, this thesis showed her interactions 
with the MEPs throughout her tenure. It shows Thatcher's pragmatism towards MEPs, as she 
was willing to work with them on certain matters such as the rebate. She had even supported 
them on sensitive topics such as increasing the salary of MEPs. However, by 1988 Thatcher 
had grown more Eurosceptic and this was exacerbated by changes occurring to the MEPs that 
held strong relationships with her. Diane Elles was a big loss, and Henry Plumb became less 
accessible due to his various roles, which also contributed to the overall relationship between 
Thatcher and the MEPs worsening in this period.  
The MEPs grew more distant from their Westminster counterparts. The change of leadership 
drastically altered the dynamics as Major was different to Thatcher. John Young states that 
‘Major had to prevent the EC issues from upsetting domestic politics.’1171 He had to balance 
the difference wings of the Conservative Party, which included the MEPs. Tim Bale suggests 
that with Thatcher sharing her views with the media regularly, ‘Major became more sensitive 
to what the papers were saying about him but also tried to limit the damage he and others felt 
Thatcher was doing’.1172 Whilst Nicholas Crowson stated that Major from the beginning took 
‘a less antagonistic approach’ to the Community’.1173 He moved quickly to prevent a rift 
occurring between him and the MEPs and met the delegation on 30 November 1990.1174 He 
did this to seek their advice on the forthcoming intergovernmental European meeting which 
had an immediate positive effect on his relationship with them. Both had left the meeting 
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with a mutual understanding, and both believed they could work with one another moving 
forward into Maastricht negotiations.1175  
In 1991 Major’s biggest problem was that of party unity over the Community. This was at a 
time when the negotiations to complete the single market neared, as set out in the Maastricht 
Treaty. Major made efforts to meet with MEPs regularly and, as seen previously, he 
developed a strong working relationship with the leader of the EDG, Christopher Prout. Prout 
was more involved with the Prime Minister than any previous leader of the EDG. Upon 
reflection, Lord Inglewood stated that: ‘Major was much easier to work with. He was more 
sympathetic when a policy issue went against his position in Westminster, he understood that, 
but she never did.’1176 It made management of the MEPs easier for Major as there was little 
confrontation. However, Major struggled to consolidate the support of the small far-right 
wing of the party regarding further European integration. Nicholas Ridley, the former Trade 
Secretary, had challenged Major and wanted to prevent deeper integration at Maastricht. 
Major attempted to quell this by reiterating his view outlined at the Conservative Party 
Conference in October 1991: ‘Closer union between states. Not a federal merger of states. 
That is still our policy.’1177 The comment assisted in easing tensions, but due to the recession 
and Community problems, the Conservatives were less vocal on the Community ahead of the 
British general election which took place on 9 April 1992, in order to try and ensure an 
electoral victory.  
In the lead up to the general election matters such as the 1989 European election results, 
coupled with the ongoing recession meant that many opinion polls predicted a Labour 
victory.1178 After the British general election on 12 May 1992 the Queen also spoke at the 
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European Parliament, giving a positive outlook towards the Community. Major was quick to 
respond to this and ease any internal problems by suggesting British sovereignty was not for 
sale.1179 The Conservative manifesto had stated that as the Soviet Union had collapsed, 
Britain would have to play a leading global role. It suggested that the Conservatives had in 
the past gained concessions from the Community to protect British interests, as reflected in 
the Maastricht opt-outs.1180 On the back of its success in the 1989 European elections, Labour 
suggested that it was the party of Europe. However, its election campaign focused more on 
traditional issues such as taxation, jobs in Britain, and healthcare than on Community matters. 
The results were surprising as the opinion polls were incorrect. The Conservatives won 336 
seats, Labour 271, and Liberal Democrats 20. It meant that the Conservatives had won with a 
small majority.1181 This was a significant victory for Major. Timothy Heppell argues that it 
gave Major both ‘authority and legitimacy’.1182 However, with a small majority, party 
management become an issue. Moreover, as the Conservatives had won again, it gave 
Eurosceptics an opportunity to raise concerns over Maastricht more readily. 
One of the key events in this period was the withdrawal of Britain from the ERM in 
September 1992. The ERM was originally created because European businesses wanted 
exchange rate stability within a narrow band, and it had begun as a political project to deepen 
integration.1183 German reunification had, however, come at a heavy price for Germany in the 
short-term as the country had to quickly re-evaluate wages, as well as consider transformation 
projects for social services, and communities.1184 The speed in which reunification had 
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occurred also came as a shock to the EDG.1185 Many were supportive of having a unified 
Germany however, some MEPs saw reunification as a Mitterrand led political project to bind 
Germany within European structures which would satisfy French national interests, these 
MEPs emphasised reunification should have occurred  more slowly.1186 The end of the Cold 
War also had an impact on the future of the Community as a number of new Eastern 
European countries considered membership, however, because of the stricter monetary 
policies enforced by the Maastricht Treaty it was unlikely these countries could join the 
Community, however as a result, a number of Eastern European countries would eventually 
join NATO. Regarding German reunification Leonhard and Funk have observed that it was 
extremely costly and forced the Bundesbank to raise interest rates in order to counteract 
inflation.1187 It strained all members of the ERM. Britain had been experiencing economic 
difficulties as well as suffering from the weakening of the dollar. Initially, Major attempted to 
support the pound in order to remain part of the ERM by increasing interest rates and 
authorising the sale of foreign currency reserves. However, despite these efforts, Sterling 
slipped below its lower band within the ERM. An emergency Cabinet meeting was held, 
which included pro-Europeans such as Douglas Hurd, Ken Clarke, and Michael Heseltine and 
it was decided that Britain could no longer participate in the ERM and it withdrew.1188 The 
aftermath was economically devastating as high German interest rates forced Britain into a 
recession. The ERM crisis would damage the Conservative Party and cause internal disputes 
for years to come.  
British businesses began to struggle, and the housing market crashed. What became known as 
‘Black Wednesday’ was referred to as ‘White Wednesday’ by ardent Eurosceptics. They felt 
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they had regained economic control from the Community. Harold Clarke suggests that this 
event had a major impact on public opinion and the Conservatives, damaging the long-term 
legacy of the party.1189 Nicholas Crowson argues that ‘it undermined the party’s 
reputation’.1190 Tim Bale also observes that Major ‘barely had enough time to setup a Cabinet 
before he was hit broadside with Black Wednesday’.1191 The ERM crisis proved there was no 
halfway house between free-floating and fixed exchange rates. Britain and the Conservatives 
became more pessimistic about Europe as a result of the ERM crisis. However, other nations 
such as Italy came out of the crisis hoping to deepen integration, with which Conservative 
MEPs agreed. Major met with the MEPs to discuss the matter and many felt he was 
‘receptive to the ideas of the delegation’.1192 Many MEPs, including Christopher Jackson, felt 
that EMU still offered price transparency as well as improving trade with other member 
states.1193 Upon reflection some MEPs feel that the ERM crisis had made the advent of the 
Euro possible.1194 Regardless, the meeting again shows that Major had prioritised meeting 
with MEPs, demonstrating that he saw value in collaboration with the delegation. 
Overall this chapter shows that Thatcher’s relationship with the MEP delegation worsened, as 
demonstrated by the Westland affair and the meeting regarding EMU. On both subjects the 
MEPs opposed Thatcher’s views. However, the 1987 manifesto shows the influence certain 
MEPs held as Plumb was consulted regularly on matters regarding the CAP. The change of 
leadership to Major was a significant moment. Many historians have suggested that Major 
had to balance the varying views of his party to ensure unity. John Young states that Major 
had to 'prevent EC issues upsetting domestic politics’,1195 while Nicholas Crowson argued 
that despite the opt-outs secured at Maastricht, Major still struggled to appease the different 
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wings of the Conservative Party.1196 This chapter adds to these accounts as the MEPs were 
also a group within the Conservative Party that Major successfully worked with as their pro-
European outlook were similar to Major’s. Major, as seen from this and the previous chapter, 
regularly worked with the MEPs on matters ranging from Maastricht negotiations to the ERM 
crisis. His actions led to strong relations developing with the MEP delegation which was a 
success of John Major's premiership that is often overlooked. 
 




Chapter Eleven: EDG and EPP merger 
 
The following chapter will explore the relationship between the EDG and EPP, which 
culminated in the merger of the two groupings. It will also discuss the successes of the EDG, 
including Henry Plumb becoming President of the European Parliament, and Spanish 
members joining the grouping. However, it will also discuss the impact the Conservatives at 
Westminster had on the EDG through the 1989 European elections, and the replacement of 
Plumb as leader by Christopher Prout. The chapter will demonstrate that there was a window 
of opportunity to join the EPP (from Thatcher’s resignation on 23 November 1990 until the 
ERM crisis on 16 September 1992) which Prout was able to exploit for the merger, showing 
that the EPP was not the natural home for the EDG and that it was under fortuitous 
circumstances that a merger occurred.   
In 1986 Spain and Portugal formally became members of the Community, marking the third 
round of enlargement. Manuel and Royo have argued that Iberian enlargement was put on 
hold throughout the 1980s due to fears of immigration.1197  Yet the accession of both nations 
also had an impact on the Community’s relationship with the US, which feared it would mark 
a decline in trading with the Community. They even demanded that bilateral trade agreements 
should be made between themselves and the Community prior to formal accession, a view 
totally opposed by the Community. Additionally, MEPs were very vocal; even Plumb stated 
in an interview that ‘the USA must be challenged’.1198 The matter was also discussed in 
Cabinet as the Anglo-US relationship was of great importance. Howe argued that the US 
position was ill informed. Like other member states, he believed that the US would benefit 
from enlargement, and that despite the US potentially losing out in agriculture, this would be 
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compensated by a gain in industrial trade.1199 By March 1986 the US position began to 
change following a meeting in Washington between the British Minister of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, Michael Jopling, and Washington officials.1200 The US then began to 
support enlargement on a political level and admitted they had miscalculated the its effects. 
Moreover, with enlargement formally complete the EDG had increased in size with the 
addition of Spanish members. This was a major success under Plumb as the EDG gained 
credibility by becoming a more diverse grouping.  
An election for the European Parliament presidency was held in 1987 and was contested 
between Plumb and the Spanish MEP Enrique Baron Crespo. Crespo had been the Minister 
of Transport for Spain and was the Socialist grouping’s candidate.1201 The 1987 election was 
also the first in which small groupings ran for the presidency. Marco Pannella, the Italian MP 
and leader of the Radical Party, was in the running, as was the Greens’ candidate, Paul States, 
a member of the Belgium Ecology Party. Plumb was the favourite as he had the support of all 
the centre-right groupings in the European Parliament which would amount to 273 votes out 
of 518.1202 But as the election drew closer, the EDG feared that Plumb would not win all 
these votes as many across Europe saw him as ‘Thatcher’s man in Europe’.1203 Many 
Continental MEPs were frustrated by Thatcher because they felt she had been an obstacle in 
the development of the European Parliament as a Community institution.1204 During her 
tenure she had wanted decision-making powers to reside within the Council of Ministers. Her 
views led to an evident anti-British feeling in the European Parliament. Some centre-right 
groupings had confirmed the EDG’s fears as the Liberals stated that they would vote against 
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Plumb, accounting for 41 votes.1205 The EDG felt that Marco Pannella was a potential threat 
because of the anti-British sentiment amongst MEPs. In his presidency bid, Plumb also had 
regular communication and support from Number Ten and the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office.1206 It again demonstrates that some MEPs (Henry Plumb, Christopher Jackson, Diane 
Elles, and Christopher Prout) were able to collaborate and work alongside MPs. They were 
able to build these relations as the European Parliament committees they worked on covered 
matters central to the Conservative government or because they were the leader of the 
Conservative MEP delegation.  
On 5 January 1987 Plumb succeeded in becoming the first British elected president of the 
European Parliament.1207 This was a great achievement for both Plumb and the EDG. In his 
opening remarks, Plumb stated that he was ‘born an Englishman but would die a 
European’.1208 His presidency marked the second major success in his leadership of the EDG 
within two years, the first being the inclusion of Spanish members in the EDG. In his 
memoirs, Plumb stated that winning the presidency was ‘the crowning moment’ in his 
political career.1209 These were both areas where Scott-Hopkins had been ineffective, as he 
failed to convince Greek MEPs to join the EDG and failed in his attempt to become president 
of the European Parliament.1210 Under the leadership of Plumb, therefore, the EDG gained 
more credibility. With both a multinational composition and a president of the European 
Parliament, the EDG had made inroads in bridging the gap between themselves and other 
large groupings. Due to his farming background, Plumb had very close relations with EPP 
members which dated back to 1970 when he was president of the NFU. As a result, many 
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EPP members felt that Plumb was more approachable on matters that were sensitive to 
Britain such as the CAP.1211 His relationship with the EPP had been vital for his presidency 
election in 1987.  
In March 1987 Plumb was awarded a life peerage. This, however, was a complex matter as 
British Conservative MEPs and continental MEPs viewed the award differently. The former 
felt it was not only recognition for Plumb but also for the EDG.1212 Other British 
Conservative MEPs felt it was the belated acceptance of the EP as a formal institution.1213 
However, other European MEPs saw it as an attempt by Britain to anchor Plumb to British 
politics and believed that on a practical level Plumb was now part of another legislative 
body.1214 These MEPs believed Plumb would be distracted and unable to carry out his duties 
as EP president effectively and considered this ‘undemocratic’.1215 Plumb eased these fears 
by reiterating his commitment to the European Parliament.1216 He emphasised that with the 
SEA and the nearing of the single market this was a historic moment for the European 
Parliament. Yet the award of the life peerage was another example of Thatcher supporting 
and recognising the work of MEPs such as Plumb. Plumb’s position as a Lord, leader of the 
EDG, and president of the European Parliament inevitably had an impact on the wider 
relationship between Conservatives in the European Parliament and Westminster as he 
struggled to balance his various commitments. The relationship/communication between 
MEPs and specifically with Number Ten worsened after Plumb. Moreover, Plumb also began 
to challenge the COM and wanted the European Parliament to play a larger role in decision-
making.1217 This view was not in line with Thatcher and Conservatives in London, a point of 
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similarity with Kirk in the 1970s, and all of which contributed to the worsening of relations 
between MEPs and Westminster.  
Internally, the EDG had begun to have more disagreements following the inclusion of 
Spanish members.1218 These were brought to the forefront in 1987 over a disagreement 
regarding Gibraltar and showed how Plumb struggled to balance his various commitments. 
Joshua Hassan, the Chief Minister of Gibraltar, was invited to a meeting in the European 
Parliament. However, he claimed he was humiliated when at the last moment Plumb changed 
the location after succumbing to threats made by Spanish EDG members.1219 The initial 
debate started due to the division within the EDG over whether Hassan’s visit should be 
considered official. The British Conservative contingent had wanted it to be so, but the 
Spanish contingent of the EDG disagreed and even threatened to leave the grouping 
entirely.1220 The Socialists were having a similar internal dispute over the visit. British 
Socialist MEPs (from the Labour Party) wanted the visit to be classified as official; the 
Spanish disagreed.1221 Thus, on this matter the split in the European Parliament was along a 
national rather than grouping basis. Joshua Hassan was left waiting for 35 minutes in the 
President’s ante-chamber while the matter was discussed. It was eventually moved from the 
President’s office and considered an unofficial meeting. After being offered a drink by 
Plumb, Hassan angrily stormed out, stating that he had been humiliated.1222 Thus little had 
been achieved from this engagement with the Chief Minister of Gibraltar.  
Historically, Gibraltar was a sensitive matter for both Britain and Spain as both had vested 
interests in the region dating as far back as 1704. Moreover, in 1985, two years previously, 
Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Moran had clandestinely offered Britain a treaty that 
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would re-integrate Gibraltar and Spain which was still under consideration by Britain.1223 
Spain and Britain would inevitably have disagreements over Gibraltar and this had extended 
into the European Parliament. The matter was particularly difficult for Plumb as he had to 
consider three areas of interest that directly affected him. Firstly, he had to consider the 
matter as President of the European Parliament and act in the European Parliament’s best 
interests. Secondly, he was leader of the EDG and maintaining unity within the grouping was 
paramount, a role that was becoming increasingly difficult following the grouping’s 
enlargement and consequent divergence of views amongst its members. Lastly, Plumb was a 
representative of the British Conservative Party, as well as being a Lord, and thus had to 
handle the Gibraltar matter with Britain’s interest in mind. Although he had succeeded in 
maintaining group unity, the credibility of the European Parliament and the relationship 
between Plumb and Hassan were damaged, both of which were detrimental for the European 
Parliament and Britain. The meeting with Hassan is an example of how difficult Plumb’s 
position had become.  
The episode led to Plumb stepping down as chairman of the EDG in 1988. The potential 
candidates to replace him were Christopher Prout, Frederick Catherwood, Baroness Diana 
Elles, and the Danish member of the EDG Claus Toksvig.1224 Prout won the grouping’s 
election.1225 He had been both deputy whip and then chief whip of the grouping. Taking over 
from Plumb would be an immense task given Plumb’s prominence in the European 
Parliament and Westminster. Vitally, Diana Elles, who had been very important in the 
relationship between Thatcher and the MEP delegation, would step down as an MEP by 
1989, and she would go on to work for the Belgian law firm Van Bael and Bellis.1226 Her 
departure meant that relations between Number Ten and the delegation would worsen until 
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Major became Prime Minister in 1990. Yet Plumb, even after stepping down as the EDG 
leader, still struggled to maintain relations with Number Ten in 1988. The EDG support staff 
on reflection felt that MEPs became more detached from Number Ten because of Thatcher’s 
hardening views on Europe.1227  
Prout, like Plumb and Kirk, had pro-European inclinations but in 1988 many were unsure of 
his views on many key matters. Michael Welsh observed that Prout was ‘a very very 
exceptional individual’ and was extremely talented at building relations with Westminster.1228 
However, Prout was less vocal than Plumb although he was quick to voice his opinion on the 
single market. He sided with Thatcher in condemning the Delors Commission regarding 
social policy and even stated that the European Parliament should use its powers to dismiss 
the Commission.1229 Prout argued that if more Conservative MEPs were elected in the next 
European elections (scheduled to take place in 1989) this was achievable, a view that was not 
popular amongst Spanish MEPs in the EDG as they felt that the grouping could become more 
sceptical about the Community in comparison to other groupings under Prout’s leadership.1230 
As Thatcher became more critical of the Community, Prout began to mirror her views. She 
stated that Delors wanted a federalised European Union which was ‘over the top’, and Prout 
agreed.1231 Some MEPs felt that this was an attempt by him to build relations with Number 
Ten,1232 but his actions made it more difficult to manage the Spanish members of the EDG. 
Prout took charge of the EDG at a very turbulent time. The Commission was working 
towards a more integrated Community, which was changing the European Parliament, while 
domestically Thatcher was becoming more sceptical. Because of this, Prout had to balance 
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the needs of the European Parliament and the EDG against those of the British Conservative 
government which complicated his position.  
After Prout took over the leadership of the EDG, the internal workings within the grouping 
became more complex. There was a rebellious element that did not support Prout, including 
Margaret Daly and Michael Welsh, due to his initial comments on the SEA as seen above.1233 
Amédée Turner (MEP for Suffolk) had been an MEP since 1979 and was the grouping’s 
chief whip, and worked alongside Prout on many issues including Maastricht, and eventually 
the EPP merger. They worked closely together to ensure the grouping remained united. The 
task was made easier after the 1989 elections as the size of the grouping shrunk, although 
prior to this it had been difficult. The difficulties were exacerbated because most of the 
grouping ‘completely ignored the Spaniards’,1234 which was at the grouping’s disadvantage as 
'the Spanish MEPs were very meticulous and organised'.1235 On votes, the views of Spanish 
MEPs usually prevailed, as they had worked out exactly how each member of the grouping 
would vote and worked accordingly to achieve their desired result.1236 This remained the case 
until 1989 when they decided to join to the EPP. 
The EDG felt that it had to come across as a pro-European group in the upcoming European 
elections.1237 The majority of the grouping had pro-European instincts, and this made them an 
independent cohort within the wider party, in spite of Thatcher’s and Prout’s statements in 
1988. Moreover, as seen previously, Henry Plumb as leader had acted against the policies of 
the Conservative Party in London and other MEPs were willing to do the same.1238 Tensions 
began to grow in this year when Plumb gave a seminar at Chatham House comparing the 
views of Conservative MEPs with those of the Conservative Party in London. At this seminar 
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he was openly critical of Thatcher’s stance on the Community.1239 He stated that he did not 
share the view that the Community should be connected merely through individual sovereign 
states, and that the Community was not a centralised super-state. He spoke favourably of the 
completion of the single market and suggested that a European single currency was 
inevitable. He expressed the views of other EDG members by arguing that a stronger 
European Parliament would mean that MEPs could better hold other Community institutions 
accountable. Moreover, he criticised the Conservative government that opposed the social 
dimension of the Community.1240 The seminar demonstrated a clear divide in opinion over 
the Community prior to European elections. It also damaged relations between the MEPs and 
Thatcher as many MEPs shared the views of Plumb.  
Concerns within the party had been steadily increasing regarding the Community due to 
Thatcher’s Bruges speech. Stephen Wall argues that Thatcher delivered the speech due to her 
frustrations that, despite the SEA, the CAP remained untouched.1241 John Young argues that 
the speech defended her ‘new right’ approach which coupled national sovereignty and free 
market economics.1242 Andrew Geddes correctly states that the speech ‘legitimised 
Euroscepticism’ within the Conservative Party.1243 However, the Conservative MEPs 
completely disagreed with Thatcher, as demonstrated by Plumb’s seminar at Chatham House. 
The former Prime Minister Edward Heath supported the MEPs and commented that Thatcher 
was ‘misleading’ the public on the direction the Community was heading, and that it was not 
a socialist super-state 1244 Tensions continued to rise as Thatcher responded to the MEPs and 
Heath publicly. She stated that she had prevented the Community from falling into a 
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cumbersome supranational organisation and argued that there was too much emphasis on 
bureaucratic procedures within the Community.1245 The exchange between Heath, Plumb, and 
Thatcher happened five weeks prior to the European elections. It would therefore be difficult 
for the Conservative Party to be seen as united on Europe going into the elections. The party 
inevitably would lose heavily, which had a knock-on effect on how much influence 
Conservative MEPs had in the European Parliament. Yet the Chatham House speech and the 
MEPs’ general response to the Bruges speech adds to the literature mentioned above as the 
MEPs were another group within the party that opposed Thatcher, albeit a smaller one 
compared to the members within her own Cabinet.  
With European elections nearing, the Conservatives aimed to repair the damage done by 
Thatcher’s Bruges speech. In their manifesto they wanted to emphasis their support for the 
Community.1246 The manifesto stressed that the Conservative government had been 
instrumental in the development of the Community having secured reforms for the 
Community budget, and that the Conservative government wished to set the agenda for the 
Community.1247 The manifesto attempted to balance the need for a liberal Community with a 
defence of British sovereignty. The Conservative MEPs did not have a large input into this 
election campaign. However, unlike most MEPs, Lord Plumb and Prout were consulted on 
the manifesto, both working on it with the Conservative Research Department.1248 Other 
MEPs thus focused more on their constituencies.1249 The build-up to the European elections 
exposed the internal disputes within the Conservative Party over the European Monetary 
System (EMS).1250 Labour wanted to take advantage of the internal problems of the 
Conservatives through these European elections. In the build-up, it posted statements from 
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Heath who strongly opposed Thatcher’s approach to the Community.1251 Labour’s manifesto 
focused less on the Community and more on their policy review and social justice. The policy 
review was established in the aftermath of the 1987 election defeat. It aimed to modernise the 
Labour Party and address popular issues in forthcoming elections, and the European elections 
were the first in which they could test how far the party had come.1252 Thus, again for parties, 
European elections could be used to measure public opinion on specific policies. 
The results of the election shocked the Conservatives as they lost thirteen seats while Labour 
gained thirteen. Labour now had 45 seats against the Conservatives’ 32 marking the first time 
Labour had overtaken the Conservatives in any election since October 1974.1253 The Greens 
had their best performance with more than two million votes. However, due to the FPTP 
system no Green MEP was selected. Anthony Forster has examined the 1989 European 
Elections, and concludes that it differed from the previous two since ‘Thatcher had put her 
own personal stamp on the election’.1254 He also suggests that Eurosceptics within the party 
felt that the poor performance was due to the campaign not being Eurosceptic enough, as the 
Conservative MEPs had worked to make the manifesto more supportive of the 
Community.1255 Forster’s account again shows the divide between Conservative MEPs and 
MPs over the Community in 1989. The 1989 election overall was greatly damaging for the 
EDG as they lost thirteen members, shrinking the size of the grouping, while Conservative 
MPs feared how they would fare in a general election.  
The Spanish members of the EDG had become increasingly more disillusioned by the 
attitudes of the EDG leadership. The Popular Alliance MEPs also felt that they would benefit 
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from being part of a larger group.1256 The EDG had been ineffective and spent much of the 
time attempting to develop relations with the EPP. Moreover, the Spanish MEPs disagreed 
with the Eurosceptic views of Thatcher, a major reason for them wishing to leave.1257 In May 
1989 the Spanish MEPs made it clear that they would be leaving the EDG and joining the 
EPP.1258 The exodus was formally completed after the elections, further shrinking the size of 
the EDG. It meant that once more the EDG would be a non-diverse grouping and some MEPs 
felt that with the defection of Spanish MEPs the EDG's ‘critical mass’ had collapsed.1259 
Following the poor elections and the Spanish defection the EDG had dropped from 66 
members to 34.  
Christopher Prout attempted to reassure the grouping and made attempts to bridge the gap 
with the Gaullists. Conservative MEP Jimmy Provan had even suggested joining them.1260 
However, the Gaullists did not support such a move as former French President Giscard 
d’Estaing was heavily involved in the grouping and felt that the EDG was an incompatible 
partner.1261 Prout then turned his attention towards the EPP. Some British Conservative MEPs 
had wanted to join this centre-right grouping and they had many allies in the EPP. The 
Conservatives in London also supported this move as they had felt that British Conservative 
MEPs could be more influential as part of a larger grouping. Due to this Prout was appointed 
as lead negotiator and opened discussions with the EPP.1262 There was some support from 
within the EPP for the EDG to join, but Italian MEPs felt that the British Conservatives were 
too right-wing.1263 However, some British MEPs, on an individual basis, held good working 
relations with EPP members and this developed due to the size and influence of the Socialist 
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grouping. Following the addition of Spanish members, the EPP still only had 122 members 
so a merger was potentially possible as the EPP still wished to enlarge further. Despite this, 
the EPP rejected the EDG and the grouping would not join until 1992 under John Major.1264 
The rejection of the merger by the EPP was due to the leadership of Thatcher, as well as the 
influence of Klepsch within the grouping, who had been unsupportive of the EDG since the 
1982 EP Presidency Election.1265 However, many EPP members still encouraged the EDG to 
continue to pursue membership.1266 The episode demonstrates the impact that Thatcher’s 
attitude was having on the EDG in 1990. Conservative MEP candidates had lost heavily in 
the elections, the Spanish members of the grouping had left, and, finally, the EPP had 
rejected their bid to merge, making it one of the most difficult periods for Conservative 
MEPs.   
1991 began positively for the Conservative MEPs as many found it easier to work with 
Major, who immediately developed a collaborative working relationship with most of 
them.1267 Many initially felt Major was more sympathetic towards the Community, and 
believed that he understood their predicament better than Thatcher in having to balance the 
needs of the European Parliament and Westminster.1268 Moreover, Major wanted to support 
certain developments within the Community while preserving British sovereignty as seen in 
the Maastricht negotiations. Stephen George has observed that this would be vital as he 
attempted to ensure internal divisions did not split the party.1269 Party management and the 
Community became interlinked and this was crucial as the Maastricht negotiations began. At 
the same time, Major supported Conservative MEPs in their further attempt to join the EPP.  
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With Major rather than Thatcher as leader there was renewed hope that this could happen.1270 
Major personally supported the move because it could give him influence in future 
negotiations with the Community. From an EPP perspective, they were also keen for 
Conservative MEPs to join and increase the grouping’s size: the Socialists now had 183 
MEPs against the EPP’s 122. The EPP had also worked closely with British Conservatives on 
a number of issues and were allies.1271 The likelihood of the Conservatives joining the EPP 
was high because of the poor performance of the Conservatives in the 1989 elections. The 
Conservative MEPs who were elected were all very much pro-European which made 
negotiating with the EPP easier.1272 The majority of the EDG also supported a move to the 
EPP, whilst almost one-third wanted either to remain an independent grouping or join the 
Liberal grouping.1273 There were also fewer MEPs and hence moving towards the EPP 
became less difficult on an administrative level.  
Yet there was still an issue regarding Conservatism as an ideology. As shown by Nelsen and 
Guth, the EPP wanted Christian Democracy to be a cornerstone of the grouping, and this 
differed from both British and Danish Conservatives.1274 As a result, it became clear that 
association status would be more likely granted to the EDG.1275 The fact that EPP merger 
negotiations were ongoing allowed Major to go into the Maastricht negotiations being viewed 
as a Prime Minister more willing to engage with the Community.  
Inevitably, however, because of the sheer size of the EPP there was opposition to the British 
Conservatives joining. The EPP was divided: German and French members were supportive, 
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while both Italian and Dutch members felt that the Conservative MEPs could not co-exist in 
the EPP.1276 They argued that the Conservative MEPs were not willing to compromise. One 
official stated that the Conservative MEPs were like ‘school swots, always there always 
voting’.1277 In this regard the Conservative grouping had more in common with the Liberals, 
which consisted mainly of Dutch MEPs. Moreover, the EDG had originally wanted to be an 
alternative centre-right grouping to the EPP, which could be achieved if they joined the 
Liberals. However, the Liberal grouping was smaller and had less influence. Thus, 
Conservative MEPs pressed on, with the support of the Conservatives in Westminster, to join 
the EPP.  
Merger talks were led by Christopher Prout and Amédée Turner, the EDG’s chief whip and 
MEP for Suffolk: both had been MEPs since 1979. Initially, however, they faced problems as 
the EPP ‘lacked the courage to invite us [the EDG] to join’.1278 Opposition was partially 
because of the religious divide between Britain and the EPP.1279 However, Klepsch was a 
central concern as he still had strong influence in the EPP. Prout and Turner felt they held 
good relations with EPP chairman Klepsch, but believed discussions were at a stalemate. 
Klepsch was ambivalent due to the 1982 presidency episode. Thus, the British pair decided to 
seek support from the national parliaments of Continental Europe.1280 They negotiated 
directly with Portugal and Spain and, because Turner had allies in both nations, they offered 
their support.1281 Greece eventually offered support for a merger, particularly from members 
of the New Democracy Party who sat in the EPP.1282 Conservative MEP Patricia Rawlings 
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(Essex South West) also assisted by dealing with the Dutch and Italian EPP members.1283 
France also remained hostile, and Britain failed to win its support. Vitally, however, Kohl 
was a key supporter of the merger and Germany was the most organised of the members of 
the EPP.1284 Kohl’s backing was a key factor in the eventual success. 
Merger talks were still ongoing in 1992, and a meeting between Kohl, Major, and Belgian 
Prime Minister Wilfried Martens was held late that year. Tony Jensen has suggested that 
Martens was more in favour of a merger.1285 Moreover, Major had also stated that he wanted 
to ‘put the Conservatives at the heart of Europe’, which had a positive impact.1286 On 17 
February 1992 the British Conservatives officially gained associate membership status within 
the EPP. Kohl's support proved to be vital. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd quickly 
announced his support for the merger as Eurosceptics remained hostile towards the EPP as 
they felt that the EPP supported federalism. Bill Cash (Conservative MP for Stafford) stated 
that ‘unfortunately, irrespective of what they think privately [EDG members], they have 
joined up with the European People's Party, the constitution of which is exclusively 
federal’.1287 This thesis has shown that EPP and EDG historically had differences. However, 
due to the smaller size of EDG in 1992 the practicalities of the merger were not difficult. 
Some British Conservative MEPs were glad to be sitting with a traditional ally, while others 
remained sceptical. As seen, Prout did not involve many Conservative MEPs in the merger 
negotiations, relying instead on support from his inner circle (which consisted of Amédée 
Turner and Patricia Rawlings) and support from some of the party at Westminster. Some 
MEPs felt they could do more for the Community as part of a much larger group, as the 
issues raised would not be perceived as arising from a British-dominated quarter but rather on 
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behalf of the second largest grouping of the European Parliament. Moreover, some MEPs 
expressed the ease with which they could discuss matters with EPP Commissioners, which 
many felt was important.1288 Yet some EDG members were disappointed with the merger. 
MEPs were split on the matter as they felt there were better alternative options, including 
joining the Gaullists, the Liberals, or remaining independent. The matter was further 
complicated as this was during a time when the British Conservative government struggled to 
work with other member states, while the Conservative MEPs were able to work effectively 
with MEPs from other member states, making them an independent and separate cohort from 
the rest of the Conservative Party. The most significant reason why this merger attempt 
succeeded was because Christopher Prout intensified negotiations in November 1990 after 
Thatcher’s resignation when there was a ‘window of opportunity for the merger’.1289 After 
the ERM crisis in September 1992 many Conservative MPs wanted the MEPs to distance 
themselves from the EPP. Thus, Prout was fortunate that the merger occurred when it did, as 
it would have been unlikely to occur after the ERM crisis. Therefore, the merger could only 
have occurred between November 1990 (after Thatcher’s resignation) and 16 September 
1992 (prior to the ERM Crisis) illustrating again that the EPP was not the natural home of the 
British Conservative MEPs. 
Overall, this was arguably the most turbulent period for the EDG. It saw the election of 
Plumb as President of the European Parliament, Prout becoming chairman of the grouping, 
the gain and loss of Spanish MEPs, and poor European election results. However, there was 
some success for the Conservative MEPs as Plumb became the first and only British 
European Parliament president in history. There is limited literature on the EPP–EDG 
merger. The accounts that have examined it, such as Nelsen and Guth or Heuser and Buffet, 
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all refer to religion being an obstacle for the merger.1290 Tony Jensen’s account goes further, 
emphasising the importance of the ongoing Maastricht negotiations which encouraged Major 
to accept a merger. Jensen also describes the pro-European nature of the EDG stating that 
‘Conservative MEPs understood, before their party friends in Westminster or in Central 
Office, that Britain’s future is at the heart of Europe’.1291 However, these accounts have all 
looked at the merger from an EPP perspective. In contrast, this chapter examines it from the 
perspective of the EDG. It has highlighted the importance of Prout, Turner and Rawlings in 
securing the merger. The chapter has also shown that opposition to the merger and tensions 
traditionally between the two groupings were not only due to religion, but also because of a 
clash in personalities, as seen with Klepsch or opposition by Italian EPP members. Most 
significantly, it has shown the importance of Prout acting within a window of opportunity 
from Thatcher’s resignation on 23 November 1990 to the ERM crisis that occurred on 16 
September 1992. This key intervention represents an important matter overlooked in all 
accounts as it shows that the EPP was not the ‘natural home’ of the British Conservative 
MEPs, and the two were only able to join due to very fortuitous circumstances.   
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The Conservative Party as a whole played an active role in the European Community 
throughout the period between 1973 and 1992, often engaging in a constructive fashion. This 
thesis has broadly covered three aspects of Conservative–Community relations as they 
pertained to the European Parliament: the relationship between Conservative MEPs and MPs; 
what these MEPs did in the European Parliament; and how the European Parliament 
developed.  
As seen in section one, Heath selected the initial cohort of MEPs, many of whom shared a 
similar pro-European attitude to his own and wanted to work with the Community. This 
approach had a legacy. Many MEPs had pro-European views throughout the period 
considered here. The objective of these MEPs was to legitimise the European Parliament and 
to have positive influence in this forum. This augments the work of Crowson and his account 
of there being a consistent pro-European wing in the Conservative Party.1292 Crowson’s work 
tracks the evolution of British Conservative forums that discussed European matters at 
various points, such as the Bow Group, but he does not refer specifically to Conservative 
MEPs. The impact of Conservative MEPs on the overall direction of Conservative European 
thought is again not a contributing factor in Crowson’s work. Others, such as Seldon and 
Ball, have also commented on the strained relations between pro and anti-European 
Conservatives, terming it a ‘central integrating force within the party.’1293 However, Richard 
Rose correctly points out that the divisions over Europe date further back, before 
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accession.1294 Overlooked in these accounts are the role of the Conservative Party MEPs who 
were an active part of the pro-European wing of the British Conservative Party, as seen in 
section one, with the introduction of a new question time, or in section four when they 
lobbied for the SEA. In this sense the thesis examines more closely the pro-European 
dimension of the Conservatives, and at the same time calls for a more nuanced view of this 
group within the party, through considering the particular role performed by MEPs. 
The thesis also enriches the literature on Thatcher’s attitude towards the Community, by 
looking specifically at her interactions with the European Parliament and the Conservative 
MEPs. There has been much written on Thatcher’s overall stance regarding the Community. 
David Reynolds suggests that she was vocal on matters that were central to British interests, 
making her policy no different to France and Germany, as they were ‘all playing the same 
game’.1295 In contrast, Hugo Young described her views on Europe as like ‘an agnostic who 
still goes to Church’.1296 John Young concluded that she, like Wilson, took a pragmatic 
approach to the Community.1297 The thesis adds to these debates as none of these accounts 
examine the EP specifically. Through examining Thatcher's attitudes towards the European 
Parliament the thesis concurs with John Young’s conclusion in regards to Thatcher's 
pragmatic approach. Thatcher worked with the MEPs on numerous important matters as seen 
in section three with the Haagerup report, the rebate and the SEA. Many MEPs were able to 
cultivate productive relations with Thatcher and Whitehall departments. During her tenure the 
six most significant MEPs to do so were Diana Elles, Christopher Jackson, Christopher Prout, 
Jim Scott-Hopkins, Peter Kirk, and Henry Plumb.1298 All were able to work with Thatcher 
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and Whitehall departments and provided a link between European Parliament committees and 
Westminster. Prout’s and Diana Elles’s efforts are described in section three: the former 
working on the Northern Ireland report (Political Affairs Committee) and the latter on the 
Rules Committee. Moreover, as seen in section four, the loss of Elles was significant as she 
had a vital link between MEPs and Number Ten. These MEPs were able to build relations 
with Ministers and senior civil servants as their committees covered policy areas that were 
central to the Conservative Party.  
Similarly, Christopher Jackson and Scott-Hopkins were very effective and had worked on the 
budget committee of the European Parliament. Jackson was particularly important in the 
debate on the rebate as he provided a clear link between the European Parliament and 
Westminster. There is much literature on the rebate with some praising Thatcher, such as 
Patrick Cosgrave who admired Thatcher’s patriotism in securing a rebate.1299 Shirley Letwin 
considers Fontainebleau an 'impressive victory'.1300 Furthermore, Stephen George sees it as 
significant that Thatcher also secured limits on the CAP budget.1301 However, others are more 
sceptical regarding the extent to which the rebate represented a meaningful achievement. 
Economist Ali El-Agraa highlights the relatively small sum involved,1302 while David 
Reynolds states that her policy of 'insistence on national sovereignty was unreal'.1303 Hugo 
Young raises the most important point as he argues that Thatcher missed the chance to put 
her own initiatives forward for the Community by allowing the budget to dominate affairs.1304 
Yet Martin Dedman does suggest ‘the rebate cleared the way for the SEA’ which was partly 
 
1299 P. Cosgrave, Thatcher: the First Term, (London: Vintage Publishing 1985), pp.27-60. 
1300 S. Letwin, The Anatomy of Thatcherism, (New York, Transaction Publishers, 1993), p.154.  
1301 S. George, An Awkward Partner: Britain and the Community, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p.150. 
1302 A. M. El-Agraa, 'MrsThatcher's EC Policy', in D. S. Bell, ed.,The Conservative Government, 1979-84 
(London, Croom, 1985), pp.174-82. 
1303 D. Reynolds, p.268. 




Thatcher’s initiative.1305 But the literature mentioned above does not discuss the role of the 
European Parliament or MEPs as it pertained to the rebate. Section three demonstrates the 
influence the European Parliament had on the rebate issue through its stalling of repayments. 
This section also shows that the Conservative MEPs, namely Scott-Hopkins and Christopher 
Jackson, worked consistently with Thatcher on the rebate. Lastly, the most significant 
contribution made by the EDG regarding the rebate was ensuring their colleagues in the 
European Parliament voted in favour of the supplementary budget in March 1983, which 
effectively concluded the rebate transaction. If this vote had not been passed, the rebate might 
not have been resolved until later, which could have had an impact on the upcoming election 
in June 1983 and subsequently a re-evaluation of Conservative policy towards the 
Community. 
The relationship between the MEPs and MPs was also explored throughout this thesis. As 
seen above, the relationship between the MEPs and the leadership was broadly constructive 
under Heath, Thatcher and Major. However, from 1988 to 1990, some MEPs became began 
to act more autonomously from the Conservatives at Westminster. There has been limited 
literature on the communication between MEPs and national parliaments, with accounts such 
as Marinus Van Schendelen’s suggesting that such communication has become ‘scarce and 
exceptional’.1306 However, his account focuses specifically on the Benelux states and their 
MEPs. The only account that discusses British MEPs and communication is David Judge’s, 
which examines the communication between British MEPs and their constituents.1307 This 
thesis extends these accounts as it documents the levels and formats of communication 
between Conservative MEPs and MPs. Towards the end of her tenure, Thatcher, more so than 
Heath and Major, had a difficult relationship with MEPs as she had dealt with them for the 
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longest period of time and became increasingly sceptical of the Community after her Bruges 
speech in 1988. The relationship had worsened for three reasons. Firstly, as seen in section 
one, with direct elections fewer MEPs held dual mandates, and lines of communication 
between the European Parliament and Westminster were weakened. Secondly, the 
disparaging comments openly made by MPs about the European Parliament led to MEPs 
feeling more detached and work more autonomously from the Conservative Party MPs. One 
source felt that MPs ‘despised the MEPs [feeling] that Europe was undermining them’, 
demonstrating how detached some MEPs felt.1308 Lastly, the Number Ten meeting in 1983 
was damaging for some MEPs as they struggled to build relations with Thatcher afterwards. 
However, Thatcher did work with certain MEPs throughout this period, and Ministers such as 
Geoffrey Howe and John Major tried to work with MEPs to improve communications, as 
seen in section four. Moreover, as mentioned above, some MEPs held strong relations with 
Thatcher, MPs and Whitehall departments.  
The relationship between MEPs and Heath, and eventually Major, was different to that 
between MEPs and Thatcher. Heath and Major were sympathetic towards their MEPs and 
made themselves accessible to them. Heath had the unique advantage of selecting his MEPs 
in 1973 which allowed him to pick a delegation that had a similar outlook to his own. 
Caroline Jackson examines the British MEPs from 1973 to 1979, and also suggests that the 
MEPs worked regularly with Heath.1309 The Conservative MEPs and Heath maintained a 
collaborative  relationship and even worked effectively together on the 1975 referendum, as 
seen in section two, which provides new empirical evidence providing more depth to 
Jackson’s work, particularly regarding the creation of the European Conservatives grouping. 
Heath’s relationship with MEPs was assisted by the fact that all MEPs held dual mandates 
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prior to 1979. Much has been written on John Major and the Conservative Party. It is widely 
agreed that upon winning the leadership he had to balance the party’s different wings. John 
Young comments that ‘he had to prevent EC issues upsetting domestic politics’.1310 
Furthermore, Andrew Geddes explains that Major ‘searched for balance’ between anti-EU 
and pro-EU wings in the party.1311 Yet no account discusses in detail the relationship between 
Major and the MEPs. As seen in section four, from 1990 Major enjoyed strong relations with 
EDG members. Many MEPs felt it easier to work with Major than it had been with Thatcher, 
as he made efforts to meet with the delegation. Moreover, in the Maastricht negotiations, he 
worked closely with the then leader of the EDG and constitutional lawyer Christopher Prout, 
who consulted with Major regularly.1312 Section four also shows that Major was able to 
secure his goals in relation to the MEPs, which is an overlooked achievement of his. He was 
able to hold satisfactory relations with them, and effectively worked with the delegation to 
secure his aims at the Maastricht negotiations.  
The leadership of the Conservative MEPs was vital to their relationship with Conservatives at 
Westminster. It also had a significant impact on what MEPs were able to achieve in the 
European Parliament. In this period the leaders were Peter Kirk, James Scott-Hopkins, Henry 
Plumb, and Christopher Prout. Kirk and Plumb were the most active and vocal.  Kirk played 
a vital role in the decision to create a separate grouping in the European Parliament, believing 
that there were ideological differences with the EPP. The decision to sit separately reduced 
the impact of the Conservative delegation, as it remained a small entity, and had to rely on 
support from other groupings in votes. On a more positive note, Kirk was important in the 
introduction to the European Parliament of sessions modelled on Question Time in the UK 
Parliament. 
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Kirk’s unexpected death eventually led to Scott-Hopkins becoming the chair of the EDG and 
leader of the British Conservative delegation from 1979. Scott-Hopkins led the first directly 
elected delegation. This delegation was more divided than previously due to the appearance 
of the more Eurosceptical ‘H bloc’. His largest failure was in running unsuccessfully in the 
European Parliament Presidency Election in 1983. The EDG voted against the EPP candidate 
Egon Klepsch, underscoring the difficult relations between the two groupings, as seen in 
section three. The EDG’s actions in the 1982 election and the decision to sit alone contributed 
greatly to the lukewarm relations with the EPP. This shows that the division between the 
groupings was not only due to religion, as suggested by Nelsen and Guth, but instead arose 
from the personal relationships between the two sets of MEPs and divergence over voting.1313 
Hence this thesis contributes to the field by addressing internal European Parliament 
problems from a non-religious perspective as seen, for example, in section three. Scott-
Hopkins, like Kirk, also struggled in the European Parliament due to the small size of the 
EDG. He failed in his attempt to expand the grouping to include Greek members. By the 
early 1980s the European Parliament had also developed internally with respect to how 
voting occurred. Groups were more willing to barter a vote in one area to secure the support 
of another group in another area, as seen in William Riker’s account.1314 Scott-Hopkins was 
more reserved than Kirk, Plumb and Prout. Yet his inability to expand the grouping and 
failed election campaign for the European Parliament presidency in 1982 led to him being 
replaced by Henry Plumb. 
Plumb had the most significant achievements of all the MEP leaders and had better 
relationships with continental Europeans than Scott-Hopkins and Prout, owing in part to his 
farming background. Plumb took over from Scott-Hopkins in 1982. He would enlarge the 
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grouping of the EDG by including Spanish members and became Britain’s first and only 
President of the European Parliament from 1987 to 1989. His presidency was a major 
achievement for himself and the British Conservative MEPs. Plumb was vocal in his views 
and had played an active role in the 1975 referendum as seen in section two. He also, unlike 
Scott-Hopkins, garnered strong ties with the EPP as he had worked with many in the past 
during his presidency at the NFU. Plumb eventually resigned as chairman in order to focus on 
his role as President of the European Parliament. Hence in 1987 it was agreed that 
Christopher Prout would become leader of the EDG. 
Prout had been in the first cohort of directly elected MEPs, with pro-European instincts like 
all his predecessors. He was one of the most significant MEPs as he worked on developing 
the European Parliament, initially as a member of the Rules Committee. Prout also led a 
small delegation of British Conservatives after they lost heavily in the 1989 European 
elections, as seen in section four. The shrinkage of the EDG was also due to the departure of 
Spanish MEPs. Prout oversaw the EDG–EPP merger working alongside MEPs Amédée 
Turner and Patricia Rawlings, as well as John Major. This merger was made easier as the 
Conservative MEPs elected in 1989 were all pro-European ‘down to the last man’.1315 Of the 
literature on the merger, Heuser and Buffet correctly point to the importance of Kohl 
ensuring that the merger occurred.1316 However, Tony Jensen focuses on the impact of the 
replacement of Thatcher by Major. He also suggests Major supported the merger as he felt it 
could assist him in Maastricht negotiations.1317 Section four adds a new perspective to these 
accounts by discussing the window of opportunity in which Prout had to secure the merger, 
which was from 23 November 1990 (when Thatcher resigned) to 16 September (the date of 
the ERM crisis). Prior to this, the EPP would not accept the EDG due to Thatcher becoming 
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more Eurosceptic. However, after the ERM crisis many Conservatives even suggested that 
the EDG leave the EPP grouping, as the party moved towards a more Eurosceptic line. Thus, 
a merger after the ERM crisis would have been highly unlikely. It demonstrates again that the 
EPP was not the natural home of the EDG, and they only merged due to fortuitous 
circumstances.  
The European Parliament as an institution changed dramatically from one that just held 
budgetary powers in 1973 and much has been written on the European Parliament as an 
institution. Neil Nugent tracks its evolution from 1958 to 2009. He suggests that the 
European Parliament has areas of weakness in the period covered in this thesis and argues 
that the prominent constitutional weakness was the fact that the European Parliament does 
not need to be consulted on all areas of legislation.1318 John Peterson and Michael Shackleton 
also suggest that the European Parliament has consistently evolved and steadily gained 
powers despite constant opposition by member states.1319 This thesis has briefly touched on 
these accounts but has also shown how hostile some British MPs were towards the European 
Parliament, as seen by the comments made in the House of Commons regarding the European 
Parliament, mentioned throughout this thesis. It has also shown that even prior to the SEA, 
the European Parliament had influence in the period between 1979 and 1984, particularly 
over Community finances, as seen in section three when the European Parliament stalled 
Britain's rebate payment. 
Section one discussed direct elections, which was one of largest achievement of the European 
Parliament. Much has been written on the subject, Juliet Lodge suggesting that direct 
elections were meant to ‘erase the democratic deficit of the Community’.1320 Richard Corbett 
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Press,2002), pp.124-148, also see R. Corbett, F. Jacobs, M. Shackleton, The European Parliament, (London, 
Catermill, 1999). 




has also described the effect direct elections had on the internal workings of the European 
Parliament as groupings worked more closely with one another.1321 As seen in section one, 
direct elections involved a monumental effort that required the support of all member states. 
Although a major achievement, from a British perspective it was less successful. Turnout for 
European elections has consistently remained lower than at general elections in the UK, as 
well as relative to other member states. Moreover, all the European elections in this period 
were fought primarily on domestic issues and were not Eurocentric. They became more a tool 
for forecasting how parties would perform in general elections. Low turnout and the 
comments made by certain MPs demonstrate that the European Parliament struggled to ever 
find a strong role in British politics. 
However, direct elections did provide enhanced democratic legitimacy to the European 
Parliament. Furthermore, Conservative MPs were less concerned with European elections as 
they were not the key to holding office in the UK. The elections were instead seen as another 
obstacle the Conservatives as a party would have to overcome. Low turnout in European 
elections also gave smaller parties an opportunity to build a platform, as seen with the 
Greens, or later the British National Party and then UKIP. Yet a failure of the European 
Parliament more generally was to generate enthusiastic public engagement in European 
Parliament affairs, which is suggested in Corbett’s account.1322 The average turnout over the 
eight European elections in total has been 33.83%, showing a clear disconnect between the 
European Parliament and the British general public.1323 Some MEPs that were interviewed 
felt that the greatest failure of the European Parliament were not being able to debunk the 
myth that Europe was run by bureaucrats, and not fully explaining to the public and media 
the role of the MEP. However, Lodge’s work suggests this was not because of the MEPs, but 
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because the European media underreported the developments of the European Parliament, 
neglecting the opportunity of raising awareness.1324 The British media, including TV and 
radio, were exceptional in their lack of coverage, due to the cost of transmitting via the 
European Broadcasting Union which greatly impacted the public’s awareness of the 
European Parliament.  Moreover, a by-product of the lack of coverage was, and still is, ‘that 
politics in the European Parliament plays out in a much more brutal way than in national 
parliaments’.1325  
Yet it was during the period from 1986 to 1992 that the European Parliament began to grow 
more influential, as seen in section four. This was because of the treaty ratification under the 
SEA (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Both these treaties transformed the European 
Parliament, as many scholars have demonstrated across different national contexts. Helen 
Wallace argues that the SEA was vital as it embedded wider institutional changes to the 
Community, including an increased role for the European Parliament.1326 Moreover, treaty 
ratification led to deeper integration, which was a traditional response to political or 
economic problems encountered by the Community as observed by Martin Dedman.1327 
Andrew Moravcsik places greater emphasises on economic problems faced by member states 
spurring on treaty reform.1328 The SEA and Maastricht included aspects of the Vedel and 
Spinelli reports (discussed in sections one and three), demonstrating the importance of these 
reports and their long-lasting impact.1329 Deeper integration tended to be the Community 
response to a crisis, which dated back to the OPEC oil crisis as seen in section one.  
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1327 M. Dedman, The Origins and Developments of the European 1945-95, (London: Routledge, 1997), p.100-
138. 
1328 A. Moravcsik, European Union and World Politics, (London: Routledge, 2006). 
1329 For a more detailed account on the Spinelli report see:  A. Glencross, A. Trechsel, eds., EU Federalism and 





The Conservative MEPs had moments of success within the European Parliament. This was 
mainly under Henry Plumb’s tenure as EDG leader. But a core objective of being an 
alternative centre-right grouping ended with the EPP merger. Nevertheless, the Single 
European Act extended the powers of the European Parliament and, following the merger 
with the EPP, Conservative MEPs had a significantly enhanced Community role than in 
1973. Despite the tendency to want to read backwards from the 2016 Brexit vote, and to cast 
the relationship between Conservatives and the European Parliament as souring over time, it 
is important to resist this teleological account. A close reading of the historical archives 
suggests that despite waxing and waning elements of collaboration and ideological alignment, 
the Conservative Party always regarded the European Parliament as a potential source of 
power and patronage. Some of their MEPs were well integrated into their national party and 
political power structures, in comparison to other British parties. And the European 
Parliament offered a realm in which Conservative politics and policies evolved and had 
impact, in ways which the existing literature on British Conservatism has never taken into 
account. This thesis thus breaks new territory in placing Europe and the European Parliament 
into close dialogue with British (Conservative) party politics and personnel, even as the 














Sir Tufton Beamish 1973-74 Military  
Earl of Bessborough 1973-79 British Diplomat  
Lord Bethell 1975-79 BBC Radio Script Writer 
Lord Brecon 1973-74 Former Minister of State of Welsh Affairs (1957) 
John Brewis 1973-75 Barrister 
John Corrie 1975-79 Farmer 
Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker 1973-75 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
(during Suez Canal Crisis) 
Hugh Dykes 1974-75 MP  Harrow East (1970 -1997) 
Baroness Elles 1973-79  Barrister 
Peggy Fenner 1974-75 MP Rochester and Chatham (1970-1974) 
Alex Fletcher 1975-77 Businessman 
Charles Fletcher-Cooke 1977-79 Barrister 
James Hill 1973-75 MP Southampton Test (1970-1997) 
 




John Hill 1973-74 Farmer 
Ralph Howel 1974-79 Farmer 
Elaine Kellet-Bowman 1975-79 Barrister 
Peter Kirk 1973-77 Former Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War (1963-64) 
Marquess of Lothian 1973-75 Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary (1960-1962) 
Earl of Mansfield 1973-75 Barrister 
Tom Normanton 1973-79 Businessman 
John Osborn 1975-79 Businessman 
John Peel 1973-74 MP Leicester South East (1957 - 1974) 
Lord Reay 1973-79 Hereditary Lord 
Brandon Rhys-Williams 1973-79 MP Kensington (1968 - 1974) 
Geoffrey Rippon 1977-79 Former Secretary of State for the Environment (1972-1974) 
Lord St Oswald 1973-79 Military  
James Scott-Hopkins 1973-79 Military  
Michael Shaw 1975-79 MP Scarborough and Whitby (1966 - 1974) 
James Spicer 1975-76 Military and Farming 
















Neil Balfour Yorkshire North Banker 
Robert Battersby Humberside Military  
Peter Beazley Bedfordshire South Businessman 
Lord Bethell London North West Historian/Translator 
Beata Brookes Wales North Social Worker 
Frederick Catherwood Cambridgeshire Businessman 
Richard Cottrell Bristol Businessman 
David Curry Essex North East Journalist 
Ian Dalziel Lothians Businessman 
John de Courcy Ling Midlands Central Diplomat 
Basil de Ferranti Hampshire West Businessman 
Marquess of Douro Surrey Hereditary Peer 
Baroness Elles Thames Valley Barrister  
Adam Fergusson Strathclyde West Journalist 
Norvela Forster Birmingham South Businesswomen  
 









David Harris Cornwall & Plymouth Businessman 




 Royal Air Force  
Brian Hord London West Charted Surveyor 
Paul Howell Norfolk Conservative Research Department 
Alasdair Hutton South of Scotland Journalist 
Christopher Jackson Kent East Businessman 
Robert V. Jackson Upper Thames 
Political Advisor to Lord Soames (1970-
74) 
Stanley Johnson 





Lancashire East Businessman 
Elaine Kellett-
Bowman 
Cumbria Barrister  
John Marshall London North Academic 




Robert Moreland Staffordshire East Management Consultant 
Bill Newton Dunn Lincolnshire Businessman 
Sir David Nicolson London Central Businessman 
Tom Normanton Cheshire East Military  
Lord O'Hagan Devon 
A Page to Queen Elizabeth II (1959-
1961) 
Ian Paisley Northern Ireland Protestant Evangelical Minister 
Ben Patterson Kent West Barrister  
Andrew Pearce Cheshire West Royal Air Force  
Henry Plumb Cotswolds Farmer 
Derek Prag Hertfordshire Journalist 
Peter Price Lancashire West Barrister  
Christopher Prout Salop and Stafford Barrister  
James Provan North East Scotland Businessman 
John Purvis Mid Scotland and Fife Banking 
Brandon Rhys-
Williams 
London South East MP Kensington (1968 - 1974) 
Shelagh Roberts London South West Inland Revenue 
James Scott-Hopkins Hereford & Worcester Military  






Essex South West Medical Doctor 
Richard Simmonds Midlands West Businessman 
Anthony Simpson Northamptonshire Military  
Tom Spencer Derbyshire Businessman 
James Spicer Wessex Military and Farming 
Jack Stewart-Clark Sussex East Businessman 
John Taylor Midlands East Farmer 
Frederick Tuckman Leicester Barrister  
Amédée Turner Suffolk Barrister  
Alan Tyrrell London East Barrister  
Peter Vanneck Cleveland Royal Navy, Fighter Pilot, Stockbroker 
Frederick Warner Somerset Ambassador to Japan (1970-74) 
Michael Welsh Lancashire Central Businessman 
1984-89 Delegation1332 
 
Name Constituency  Background 
Robert Battersby Humberside Military 
Christopher Beazley Cornwall & Plymouth Businessman 
 




Peter Beazley Bedfordshire South Businessman 
Lord Bethell London North West Historian/Translator 
Beata Brookes Wales North Social Worker 
Bryan Cassidy Dorset East & Hampshire West Military 
Fred Catherwood Cambridgeshire & Bedfordshire North Businessman 
Richard Cottrell Bristol Businessman 
David Curry Essex North East Journalist 
Margaret Daly Somerset & Dorset West Barrister 
John de Courcy Ling Midlands Central Diplomat 
Basil de Ferranti Hampshire Central Businessman 
Arthur Wellesley Surrey West Hereditary Peer 
Baroness Elles Thames Valley Barrister 
James Elles Oxford & Buckinghamshire Civil  Service 
Sheila Faith Cumbria & Lancashire North Dental Surgeon 
Paul Howell Norfolk Conservative Research Department 
Alasdair Hutton Scotland South Military 
Caroline Jackson Wiltshire Conservative Research Department 
Christopher Jackson Kent East Businessman 




John Marshall London North Academic 
Edward McMillan-Scott York Public Affairs Consultant 
James Moorhouse London South & Surrey East Aeronautical Engineer 
Bill Newton Dunn Lincolnshire Businessman 
Tom Normanton Cheshire East Military  
Charles Towneley Strachey Devon A Page to Queen Elizabeth II (1959-1961) 
Ben Patterson Kent West Barrister 
Andrew Pearce Cheshire West Royal Air Force  
Henry Plumb Cotswolds Farmer 
Derek Prag Hertfordshire Journalist 
Peter Price London South East Barrister 
Christopher Prout Shropshire & Stafford Barrister 
James Provan Scotland North East Businessman 
Shelagh Roberts London South West Inland Revenue 
James Scott-Hopkins Hereford & Worcester Military 
Madron Seligman Sussex West Businessman 
Dr. Alexander Sherlock Essex South West Medical Doctor 
Richard Simmonds Wight & Hampshire East Businessman 




Jack Stewart-Clark Sussex East Businessman 
Frederick Tuckman Leicester Barrister 
Amédée Turner Suffolk Barrister 
Peter Vanneck Cleveland & Yorkshire North Barrister 
Michael Welsh Lancashire Central Businessman 
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Robert Battersby Humberside Military 
Christopher Beazley Cornwall & Plymouth Businessman 
Peter Beazley Bedfordshire South Businessman 
Lord Bethell London North West Historian/Translator 
Beata Brookes Wales North Social Worker 
Bryan Cassidy Dorset East & Hampshire West Military 
Fred Catherwood 
Cambridgeshire & Bedfordshire 
North 
Businessman 
Richard Cottrell Bristol Businessman 
David Curry Essex North East Journalist 
Margaret Daly Somerset & Dorset West Barrister 
 




John de Courcy Ling Midlands Central Diplomat 
Basil de Ferranti Hampshire Central Businessman 
Arthur Wellesley Surrey West Hereditary Peer 
Baroness Elles Thames Valley Barrister 
James Elles Oxford & Buckinghamshire Civil  Service 
Sheila Faith Cumbria & Lancashire North Dental Surgeon 
Paul Howell Norfolk Conservative Research Department 
Alasdair Hutton Scotland South Military 
Caroline Jackson Wiltshire Conservative Research Department 
Christopher Jackson Kent East Businessman 
Michael Kilby Nottingham Barrister 
John Marshall London North Academic 
Edward McMillan-Scott York Public Affairs Consultant 
James Moorhouse London South & Surrey East Aeronautical Engineer 
Bill Newton Dunn Lincolnshire Businessman 




A Page to Queen Elizabeth II (1959-
1961) 
Ben Patterson Kent West Barrister 




Henry Plumb Cotswolds Farmer 
Derek Prag Hertfordshire Journalist 
Peter Price London South Ea Barrister 
Christopher Prout Shropshire & Stafford Barrister 
James Provan Scotland North East Businessman 
Shelagh Roberts London South West Inland Revenue 
James Scott-Hopkins Hereford & Worcester Military 
Madron Seligman Sussex West Businessman 
Dr. Alexander Sherlock Essex South West Medical Doctor 
Richard Simmonds Wight & Hampshire East Businessman 
Anthony Simpson Northamptonshire Military  
Jack Stewart-Clark Sussex East Businessman 
Frederick Tuckman Leicester Barrister 
Amédée Turner Suffolk Barrister 
Peter Vanneck Cleveland & Yorkshire North Barrister 
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